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Western Michigan University 
In the academic year 2013–2014, the Department of Economics 
at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan, commemo-
rated the fiftieth anniversary of the Werner Sichel Lecture Series with a 
series organized by this author and titled “Award-Winning Economists 
Speak on Contemporary Economic Issues.” The annual Sichel series, 
sponsored jointly by the Economics Department and the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research, is named for Dr. Sichel, a longtime 
Western Michigan University economics professor and former depart-
ment chair who retired in 2004. The success and longevity of this series 
is a testament to his vision and guidance. 
All five authors represented here who participated in this anniver-
sary series, although they are at different points in their accomplished 
careers, have achieved substantial national and international notoriety 
for their research accomplishments. While each speaker discussed a 
specific subject, they all adhered to the series theme of highlighting the 
various ways that economics can assist policymakers in the develop-
ment and evaluation of public policy. The topics were wide-ranging: 
microfinance, human capital, worker motivation, societal institutions, 
and workplace regulation. In all, five of the six presenters from that year 
prepared chapters from their presentations for inclusion in this edited 
volume. 
Chapter 2, “Microfinance: Points of Promise,” stems from the lec-
ture by Erica Field of Duke University, who was the recipient of the 
Elaine Bennett Research Prize in 2010. This prize is awarded by the 
American Economic Association’s Committee on the Status of Women 
in the Economics Profession to the top young female economist who 
completed her doctoral dissertation within the past seven years. 
Field’s lecture and the corresponding book chapter, jointly authored 
with Abraham Holland and Rohini Pande, both of Harvard University, 
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contain a nicely written description of microfinance, a popular anti-
poverty tool used most often by developing nations. In place of the 
requirement of collateral to ensure repayment, it relies on small-group 
social pressure. The chapter includes a comprehensive discussion of its 
early implementation and the ways it has evolved over time. Much of 
this evolution, at least in recent years, has been in response to rigorous 
economic analysis. Most interestingly, the chapter includes a thought-
ful discussion of what is meant, generally, by policy success or policy 
failure, and how economists ought to evaluate policy, followed by an 
application of this evaluation strategy to microfinance. 
Oftentimes, when researchers talk about microfinance, they speak 
of it in glowing terms, implying that it offers the promise of great suc-
cess with little downside. Field, Holland, and Pande relate the microfi-
nance “narrative” to that of penicillin, which preceded it by many years. 
Penicillin is often spoken of as a miracle drug that arose seemingly 
from nowhere. In reality, it was developed and brought to market over 
many years with much trial and error, and less than 30 years after its 
introduction physicians began observing occurrences of drug-resistant 
bacteria. Penicillin’s glory days were short-lived. 
This first section of the chapter makes clear that while microfinance 
has enjoyed explosive growth, there is limited evidence of “success” 
when focusing on outcomes closely tied to the likelihood that house-
holds will be extremely poor. The next section of the chapter looks at 
the nitty-gritty of the policy details, with the goal of identifying spe-
cific policy components that show the greatest promise. The authors 
present evidence that, if microcredit’s impacts are to be enhanced, 
microfinance contracts need more flexibility, particularly in the grace 
period between loan initiation and the start of repayment, as well as in 
the frequency of loan repayments. The authors themselves have been 
involved in the design and implementation of policy experiments that 
manipulate various loan details incrementally to determine the impact 
of specific changes. In one study described in this chapter, Field, with 
her coresearchers, shows that extending the grace period not only has a 
substantial positive impact on small business formation but also results 
in an impressive accompanying increase in household income. Another 
experiment focused on varying the frequency of repayment; the results 
were impressive, with substantial increases in household income and 
business profits along with no increase in default rates. 





In their description of the origins of microfinance, Field, Holland, 
and Pande lay the framework for the interdisciplinary discussions that 
occupy the remaining chapters in this edited volume. It is clear from 
their description that the origins of microfinance were based on a real-
ization of the ways that sociology and psychology can offer insight into 
the dilemma of how to provide credit to populations that simply cannot 
access traditional bank loans. Reliance on group pressure to repay the 
microloans reflects an appreciation for the way that culture is mani-
fested in social behavior: in developing nations, extended families and 
their local communities tend to be very tight-knit, making it possible 
to rely on these social connections in developing alternative loaning 
mechanisms. 
In Chapter 3, Nancy Folbre, emerita professor of economics at the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst, writes about “The Once (But No 
Longer) Golden Age of Human Capital.” Dr. Folbre, a MacArthur Fel-
low in 1998, devoted her career largely to the study of the interface 
between political economy and feminist theory, with an emphasis on 
the value of unpaid care work. Her chapter describes the evolution in 
how economists talk about human capital (specifically, college educa-
tion) as an investment, and the empirical evidence regarding the labor 
market return to that investment. Until somewhat recently, a college 
education produced a fairly reliable return relative to a high school 
diploma; thus, many economists viewed inequality as a problem that 
could be addressed primarily by improving access to higher education. 
Unfortunately, as Folbre explains, this optimistic view ignores the inter-
action of both supply and demand factors in market determination of 
wages; the very nature of markets puts much of wage determination 
beyond individuals’ control. Economists have struggled to use standard 
models of discrimination to explain differences in wages by race and 
gender, and these differences have been made more striking by growing 
wage inequality among white men. Folbre’s analysis of discrimination 
relates to her human capital theme because of the link between differ-
ences in human capital investment and wage inequality. Interestingly, 
over the years, the very existence of standard “Mincer” earnings equa-
tions has implied that, to the extent that wage differences can partially 
be explained within a regression framework because of differences in 
human capital, then somehow these wage differences are acceptable. 
But in recent years, as the reliability of the linkage between educational 




attainment and wages has weakened, concerns have grown both about 
the economists’ human capital narrative and about the implications for 
educated workers struggling to adapt to a changing world. 
The chapter provides a sweeping overview of the way that econo-
mists have talked about human capital throughout history and across 
types of human capital, leading to a discussion of the role of govern-
ment in encouraging and financing such investments. This link to gov-
ernment is critical, given the final portion of Folbre’s chapter: it focuses 
on what could be considered the alarming consequences of recent tech-
nological advancements, particularly with regard to information tech-
nology, which has weakened the link between a college diploma and 
high lifetime earnings. Not only is this link weakened, but, now more 
than ever, for those with college degrees, variation in the type of skills 
developed during school leads to substantial variation in earnings. This 
development ought to imply a revision in public attitudes toward higher 
education and a resultant overhaul of government policies. According 
to Folbre, the demise of the societal promise of reliable returns to a col-
lege degree may lead these workers to “identify themselves as members 
of a working class that is collectively disadvantaged by technological 
change and globalization,” potentially leading to a new, strong political 
voting bloc. 
Avner Greif, cowinner of the MacArthur Foundation Fellowship 
with Folbre in 1998, is professor of economics and Bowman Family 
Endowed Professor in Humanities and Sciences at Stanford Univer-
sity. His areas of research include European economic history and the 
historical development of economic institutions, including their inter-
relations with political, social, and cultural factors and their impact 
on economic growth. In Chapter 4, “Society and State in Determining 
Economic Outcomes,” Greif analyzes the relationship between social 
structures and government institutions, on the one hand, and economic 
outcomes on the other. He explains that, in general, sociologists tend to 
emphasize the role of culture and social structures in determining eco-
nomic outcomes, while economists tend to emphasize governments and 
markets; the latter emphasis results in behavior based on formal-rule-
driven behavior, while the former implies culturally driven behavior. 
His chapter is a rather technical historical narrative of this discussion, 
with well-placed examples to which the reader can relate. For exam-
ple, Greif talks about drivers of automobiles: how their rule-following 





behavior evolves from social expectations, possibly influenced by the 
threat of the force of law. He concludes with a thoughtful description of 
the manner in which the two approaches are interrelated. 
Greif talks extensively about rule formulation and the circumstances 
under which social rules can be formally institutionalized into rules 
enforced by the state. He returns to the example of automobile driv-
ers to characterize the manner in which socially appropriate behavior 
is best achieved when the goals of social behavior can be individually 
internalized. For example, individual automobile drivers follow rules 
of the road, in part, because they know that it is important to them that 
others follow those rules as well. He extends this discussion to include 
morality as a force behind individual behavior that may be socially 
appropriate. In this way, his chapter is perhaps the most interdisciplin-
ary of the ones included in this edited volume, with its intertwining of 
economics, sociology, psychology, and even theology. 
Greif’s chapter contains a detailed description of the nature of insti-
tutions as reflecting a collection of rules and contracts, as well as a 
description of the nature of institutions as dynamic, in the sense that 
they evolve over time. Finally, the chapter concludes almost where it 
began, with explicit comparisons between formal rule-driven behavior 
versus culturally driven behavior, from static as well as dynamic van-
tage points. Greif displays his vast appreciation for history with his var-
ied examples, including late medieval Genoa, which produced a largely 
individualist society; a comparison of the way that different cultural 
beliefs in America and Germany led to the development of very differ-
ent institutional structures in the nineteenth century; and a comparison 
of the timing of the elimination of institutionalized slavery in Chris-
tian versus Muslim societies. Greif refers to his theory of institutions 
and their evolution over time as a theory of action, explaining that the 
theory does not presuppose that behavior is rule-driven (i.e., driven by 
the state) or behavior-driven (i.e., driven by society). “From this per-
spective, asking whether society or the state is more important in deter-
mining economic outcomes understates the complexity of studying the 
sources of economic behavior,” he writes. “Society and state intertwine 
in generating behavior. . . . It is sufficient to note that a functioning state 
is an outcome, and its ability to formulate rules depends on the cultural 
beliefs of various groups regarding not only their interests but also the 
goals and expected behavior of other groups.” 







David M. Kreps is the Adams Distinguished Professor of Manage-
ment in the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University; he 
also holds a courtesy appointment as professor of economics, also at 
Stanford. In 1989, he was awarded the prestigious John Bates Clark 
Medal by the American Economic Association. This medal is awarded 
to “the American economist under the age of 40 judged to have made 
the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge.” 
His research applies theories of dynamic choice behavior to economics 
with a wide variety of applications, including human resource manage-
ment and noncooperative game theory. Kreps’s submission, Chapter 5, 
is titled “Motivating Consummate Effort.” As suggested by an earlier 
working title (“The Economics and Psychology of Worker Motiva-
tion”), this research lies at the nexus of two areas in labor economics: 
industrial relations and industrial organizational psychology. Kreps’s 
contribution to this volume lies primarily in his expansion of the previ-
ous authors’ focus on economics as the primary analytical tool into a 
more fully interdisciplinary approach. Additionally, his chapter serves 
to demonstrate to the reader the reach of economics: his theoretical 
sophistication is clearly well informed by his professional proximity to 
the real business world. 
Kreps begins by defining terms: “consummate effort” is “effort 
undertaken by a worker within an organization that goes well beyond 
any nominal job description, in a manner that is desired by the organiza-
tion.” Kreps is referring to jobs that he labels “Type-K” jobs, in which 
K stands for Knowledge: high-skilled jobs that require a great deal of 
worker independence, creativity, and multitasking, and that feature 
vaguely defined tasks and a great deal of cooperation with coworkers. 
According to Kreps, traditional theory of worker motivation rooted in 
economics is not particularly useful for Type-K jobs because it relies 
on “reward for performance,” but in Type-K jobs, worker performance 
quality can be difficult to assess. 
As a starting point, Kreps uses results from a survey that he admin-
istered to participants in the 2013 Stanford Executive Program (SEP), 
an annual six-week general management program serving top-level 
executives from around the world. In this particular summer, there were 
158 program participants, of which 124 responded to the survey. Of 
the respondents, most were male, having an average age of 45, and 
about half were chief executive officers (CEOs), chief operating offi-





cers (COOs), or other very senior executives. The survey asks what 
motivates the respondent to exert consummate effort and offers a vari-
ety of possible responses (tangible rewards such as higher pay, better 
promotion opportunities, higher status; nontangible rewards such as 
work that is interesting and exciting, organizational success, and social 
importance). Then the respondent also reports what he believes moti-
vates those who report directly to him (so-called direct reports). Kreps 
notes that current economic theory is most appropriate when tangible 
rewards motivate effort. His results show, however, that much moti-
vation is driven by nontangible rewards. Kreps analyzes other survey 
questions as well and mines the data for differences by age, gender, and 
country of origin, noting that “Europeans perceive themselves as less 
self-motivated by tangible rewards and more by organizational success 
than do U.S. citizens and Canadians, with East Asians in the middle.” 
Overall, the survey shows that worker motivation is far more nuanced 
than current economic theory can accommodate, but it fits well within 
the social psychology construct. 
Kreps moves on to present a broad overview of the social psy-
chologist’s accounts of worker motivation, revealing that it includes 
the above-noted nuance, permitting more of a place for how work-
ers perceive themselves and their roles within their organizations. He 
describes two different case studies: first, he describes nursing at Beth 
Israel Hospital and how it evolved from “primary nursing” in the 1970s 
to its current “floor nursing” model. In the 1970s, Beth Israel became 
the leading hospital in the Boston area by following the primary nurs-
ing model, in which each patient is assigned a primary nurse who is 
responsible for coordinating all care for that patient. However, in the 
ensuing years, as cost pressures mounted—partially because of changes 
in the nature of insurance reimbursement—care decisions became less 
driven by “what is best for the patient” and more driven by “what is 
cost-effective.” Care decisions now became jointly determined by the 
nurses on the hospital fl oor. The result, unfortunately, was a decline in 
nurses’ work satisfaction along with a decline in Beth Israel’s standing 
in the hospital community. The reaction on the part of the nurses can be 
described in theoretical terms as an evolution from intrinsic motivation 
to extrinsic motivation. 
The same motivational issue is described in Kreps’s second case 
study, which looks at Company Z, a tech start-up in which the founding 





tech workers were motivated intrinsically. As the company grew, sales-
people were hired, and these new employees were motivated extrinsi-
cally by being offered performance incentives with tangible rewards 
(i.e., higher pay and bonuses). As might have been predicted, having 
tech workers who were expected to continue to be motivated intrinsi-
cally while they now were working alongside those being motivated 
monetarily resulted in tech-worker performance problems. 
Kreps concludes his manuscript with a long, imagined conversa-
tion between a psychologist and an economist in which the two discuss 
the issues and evidence presented thus far. The section concludes with 
Kreps’s admission that his sympathies lie with the psychologist, largely 
because of the difficulty that current economic modeling has in incor-
porating changing worker preferences. But Kreps remains convinced 
that economists are up to the task of developing better models, and in 
his conclusion he asserts that economists should embrace the psycholo-
gist’s ideas. 
The final chapter, Chapter 6, “Efficient and Effective Economic 
Regulation in a Confusing Technological Environment,” comes from 
Michael J. Piore, the David W. Skinner Professor of Political Economy, 
Emeritus, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Piore was 
awarded the MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in 1984. He is direc-
tor of the MIT-Mexico Program and faculty cochair of the Industrial 
Performance Center at MIT. His chapter presents a thorough historical 
analysis of the role of government and regulation in a market-based 
economic system, providing illumination through several very different 
real-life examples involving the administration of labor market stan-
dards and the organization of product design and product development. 
As explained by Piore, the modern literature on this subject begins with 
the onset of much new government intervention in the private sector, 
which proliferated as a response to the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Attitudes toward government regulation have ebbed and fl owed since 
that time, with a strong push toward deregulation taking hold under then-
President Reagan in the 1980s. According to Piore, however, while atti-
tudes may shift, the arguments for and against government regulation 
remain consistent, with those who favor deregulation emphasizing the 
benefits of freely adjusting prices in response to scarcity. Piore focuses 
this chapter on work regulation, which is opposed by antiregulation 
adherents because of concerns that government labor-market interfer-








ence, with resulting wage rigidities, can produce ineffi cient allocation 
of labor across sectors. These concerns have become more focused in 
recent years in light of technological advancements that some believe 
have made existing regulation inappropriate. 
Piore’s contribution to this discussion is driven by his international 
expertise; thus, while there may be some truth to the more dire predic-
tions arising from technological change within the administrative sys-
tem of work regulations as they exist in the United States, Piore explains 
that systems of workplace regulations vary signifi cantly worldwide; 
generally speaking, workplace regulation in the United States is inflex-
ible because it is more specialized and focused on sanctions, while the 
administrative structure more common in France and much of southern 
Europe, as well as in South America, is much more flexible, thus more 
able to adapt to changing technological environments. Piore refers to 
this alternative administrative structure as the Franco-Latin system 
of work regulation, which he defines as being built on a conciliation/ 
remediation model. In other words, compliance is monitored by admin-
istrators who have a more personal relationship with the proprietor and 
a more specific understanding of the particular production process, 
and these inspectors have more individual control over how to address 
violations. “The emphasis on compliance should lead the inspector to 
look for the underlying causes of the violations and seek remedies in 
managerial practice or technology that actually address the problem at 
its root,” Piore writes. “In this way, the system encourages inspectors 
to look for support from other government programs that address these 
problems, such as manufacturing extension programs or employment 
and training. The U.S. system, by contrast, leads the inspectors to focus 
narrowly on what are, in effect, symptoms of the way the company 
does business. It is like the difference between a doctor focusing on the 
symptoms and one focusing on the disease.” 
Piore broadens his discussion of the manner in which the street-
level inspectors are trained and managed in the Franco-Latin system of 
work regulation to a more general concern: how does regulation evolve 
in the first place? He outlines various models, with a focus on one in 
which each of the different actors in the puzzle communicates well with 
the others, thereby permitting regulation to evolve in an effective and 
efficient way. This discussion is informed by the author’s studies on 
new product development—specifically, studies of the way in which 






new products can pave the way for the development of more efficient, 
flexible government regulation. The primary example is the develop-
ment of the cellular telephone. The development of this product draws 
from both radio and telephone technologies; thus, the ability of experts 
in both fields to communicate well with each other was paramount to 
the success of this important product development effort. According to 
Piore, “the cellular phone as it exists today emerged out of what I term 
in my organizational research an ongoing conversation, a conversation 
not only among the disparate engineers and managers who ultimately 
had to collaborate to produce the new product, but also between the pro-
ducers and consumers who would ultimately purchase and use it.” At its 
core, successful product development requires enormous fl exibility and 
communication, and these things also lie at the root of the success of the 
Franco-Latin system of work regulation discussed earlier. 
Following the other chapters in this volume, particularly that of 
Kreps, Piore’s discussion of both regulation and product development 
extends explicitly beyond the traditional economics narrative to incor-
porate contributions from sociology and psychology. As Piore explains, 
this is by necessity—if economists are to improve upon their ability to 
contribute to the ongoing public policy debate on critical issues relat-
ing, for example, to workplace safety, then economists need a broader-
based analysis. 
The five chapters that follow this introduction, although focusing 
on very different subjects, share more than the general theme of the role 
of economics in public policy. Each chapter reflects, to varying degrees, 
the evolution of traditional economic approaches toward more interdis-
ciplinary ones that blend economic theory with that of psychology and 
sociology. Whether this interdisciplinary result is discussed explicitly 
by the author (e.g., Kreps) or simply implied (e.g., Field, Holland, and 
Pande), each chapter displays the broader movement of applied eco-
nomics toward this more inclusive and thus real-world approach. 





Points of Promise 
Erica Field 
Duke University




Give a man a fish, he’ll eat for a day. Give a woman microcredit, 
she, her husband, her children, and her extended family will eat 
for a lifetime. 
—Bono, New York Times (2005) 
Microcredit is not the “silver bullet” to end poverty. 
—Jomo Sundaram, U.N. assistant secretary-general for economic 
development (2010) 
WHAT IS A MIRACLE? 
A majority of the world’s impoverished people lack adequate 
access to financial services. Typically, formal banks do not target the 
poor because lending without collateral is considered too risky. Poor 
households seeking credit are consequently forced into informal mar-
kets where the prices are high, the quantities limited, and the methods 
of ensuring repayment can be brutal. 
Since the poor arguably need liquidity more than anyone else, their 
impaired credit access is especially concerning. They face high levels of 
11 







12 Field, Holland, and Pande 
risk and have almost no savings buffer, which means that small income 
shocks can generate huge consequences for their well-being. Further-
more, the majority are engaged in some form of self-employment, and 
entrepreneurship often requires significant capital up front. The limited 
availability of formal savings instruments makes accumulating savings 
more difficult for the poor to do than for their richer counterparts. For 
all of these reasons, the rapid emergence of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) providing banking services to poor individuals in low-income 
countries was believed to be a potentially powerful tool for poverty 
alleviation. 
Has microfinance delivered on this promise? Perhaps the most chal-
lenging aspect of navigating the discourse surrounding microfinance 
has been the roller coaster of exuberance and disillusionment (see the 
epigraphs above). Today, the general belief is that “microfinance is not 
a miracle.” While we, as researchers who have been long involved in 
the study of microfinance, certainly support a more pragmatic perspec-
tive, the excessive optimism we have seen does raise another question: 
What is humanity’s best example of a “miracle” intervention? 
While there may be others, the discovery of penicillin and the sub-
sequent development of antibiotics is a likely contender. One estimate 
places antibiotics’ impact on average life expectancy at between 2 and 
10 years (McDermott 1982). Yet achieving this level of impact took 
decades. In the case of penicillin, Sir Alexander Fleming made his 
initial discovery in 1928, but it was not until 1945—almost 20 years 
later—that mass production and distribution began (Aminov 2010). 
This intervening period was filled with years of iterations, attempts, 
failures, intermediate successes, and a little serendipity: the penicil-
lin strain ultimately found to have the best properties for commercial 
production came from a moldy cantaloupe in an Illinois fruit market 
(Aldridge, Parascandola, and Sturchio 1999). Despite these efforts, the 
specter of drug-resistant bacteria was not far behind. Roughly three 
decades after penicillin’s discovery in a petri dish containing strains of 
Staphylococcus aureus, an estimated 25 percent of community-based 
strains of the bacterium were resistant to penicillin (Chambers 2001). 
Our advantage in this continually evolving challenge has only been 
maintained through corresponding improvements in antibiotics or other 
supporting technologies. 








Our experience with penicillin and antibiotics provides three critical 
lessons about “magic bullets.” First, the development of such products 
is far from miraculous, but rather reflects years of research and develop-
ment. Second, the application of a miracle cure may be remarkably con-
strained—antibiotic “miracle drugs” are only effective when their use 
is well-defined, targeted, and consistently applied. Third, maintaining 
the miracle is a dynamic process—continuous innovation is required to 
prolong the effectiveness of these “magic bullets.” 
Given this framework, some of the successes of microcredit are 
truly impressive. Microcredit began in the 1970s as a community-based 
antipoverty campaign predominantly targeting women. This campaign 
stood in opposition to the belief that the world’s poor were incapable 
of supporting credit (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2009). The 
Global Microcredit Summit 2011 Report estimated that by that year, 
microcredit had reached 195 million people across the globe, many of 
whom previously had lacked any kind of formal financial access (Reed 
2013). Over the past two decades, microcredit has become a key mech-
anism for providing credit to poor microentrepreneurs. Its impressive 
scale is rivaled perhaps only by its surprisingly low default rates. Pro-
ducing global default assessments gives rise to a number of problems 
stemming from varying definitions and differences in reporting. How-
ever, it is common to see MFIs report default rates of around 2 percent. 
From this perspective, the rapidity, scale, and scope of microcredit is 
real, and its success is remarkable. 
Yet the reality of microcredit still has failed to match the lofty expec-
tations for it. Critics have denounced the sector for failing to reach the 
poorest and most remote among potential clients. A typical MFI client 
is “working poor” rather than destitute. There has also been substantial 
controversy over alleged excessive pressure on clients to repay, and 
the industry is often criticized for exploiting the poor by encouraging 
them to take on high-interest-rate debt.1 Perhaps most damning, there 
is limited evidence that access to microcredit, in its current form, is 
associated with reductions in poverty through microentrepreneurship 
(Banerjee 2013). 
However, if we return to the problem-framing afforded by the anti-
biotics experience, then a different narrative emerges: namely, that the 
limited impacts on poverty that current microfinance products are hav-
ing does not make them purely failures, but rather critical lessons capa-








14 Field, Holland, and Pande 
ble of helping us redesign microcredit to better serve the poor. Given 
this perspective, one such lesson is that financial services for the poor 
can succeed when products provide the means for insuring clients while 
those clients undertake high-return but risky activities. Arguably, ele-
ments of microfinance that help provide greater insurance while relax-
ing credit constraints may be the most important for creating a signifi-
cant impact. 
In this chapter, we develop this view further, with lessons gleaned 
from our portfolio of research on the microfinance sector in India. We 
begin by providing background on the emergence and current design of 
microfinance and by explaining its theoretical underpinnings. We go on 
to highlight several points of promise: areas where our own empirical 
research suggests ways in which the delivery of microfinance might be 
changed to increase its impact on poverty and microenterprise growth. 
In particular, results from a series of field experiments that we con-
ducted with MFIs in India demonstrate that it is possible to make micro-
finance work better for the poor with a few small changes to the exist-
ing model. Based on these studies, we explore different ways in which 
the microcredit experience can be tailored to improve targeting of key 
development outcomes. 
THE IDEA OF MICROFINANCE 
Microfinance began as an attempt to address a perceived poverty 
trap: poor households, because of a lack of collateral, were unable to 
access formal loans, but without credit they could not accumulate assets 
to be used as collateral. Microfinance sought to end this cycle by pro-
viding small loans—microcredit—without the typical asset require-
ments by harnessing social rather than physical collateral. In particular, 
by requiring new clients to have social ties to existing clients, MFIs 
could better select “good” clients (because those clients more likely 
to be invited by existing group members are more likely to repay) and 
also incentivize repayment because of the threat of losing or damaging 
one’s social ties to group members in cases of default. In this sense, in 
a microcredit contract, social links are able to serve much the same pur-
pose as physical collateral does in a standard loan contract. 











The initial success of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank with social col-
lateral–based loans inspired the first wave of MFIs, largely consisting 
of nonprofit organizations providing loans to self-selected “joint lia-
bility groups” (JLGs). Each JLG member, typically female, received a 
loan “secured” by the social ties and shared responsibility of the entire 
group. If one group member defaulted, then the entire group was penal-
ized. These loans were of reasonably short duration (3 to 10 months) 
and had relatively high interest rates (30–40 percent). Loan repayment 
usually took place at regular weekly meetings between JLG members 
and a loan officer; the meetings began a week or two after loan disbursal. 
This “Grameen Bank approach” appeared to offer an attractive 
model. Taking advantage of the local knowledge of fellow JLG members 
enabled institutions to screen out the worst credit risks prior to group 
formation. If an individual member was delinquent with repayments, 
then group members could apply social pressure to end delinquency or, 
in the case of those truly unable to pay, serve as informed guarantors 
and repay the delinquent funds themselves. From an MFI operations 
perspective, the JLG structure also reduced monitoring costs.2 
Today, microfinance has expanded to encompass a range of finan-
cial products and services.3 Under this umbrella are nearly countless 
variations of savings, insurance, credit, and other financial offerings 
aimed at improving the well-being of urban and rural clients. Even 
early innovators like the Grameen Bank continue to develop and 
expand their offerings. The “Grameen Bank II” experience blends the 
structure and discipline of the original model with more breadth and 
greater fl exibility.4 The notion that microcredit is simply “loans for the 
poor” misses how significantly these products have evolved since their 
initial introduction. 
Another iconic Indian microfinance pioneer, the Self-Employed 
Women’s Association Bank (SEWA Bank), adopts a similarly broad 
perspective. Targeting poor women working in the informal sector, 
SEWA Bank seeks to address a client’s entire life cycle of potential 
financial needs. Every client has a savings account and access to a vari-
ety of structured investment, pension, insurance, and credit products 
(although strong emphasis is placed on the importance of saving).5 
These early innovators are not the only organizations updating their 
offerings. 
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As observed by Karlan and Zinman (2009, p. 3), the microcredit 
industry has developed a “second generation,” distinguished by “for-
profit lenders, extending individual liability credit, in increasingly 
urban and competitive settings.” Arguably, this distinction is not sim-
ply cosmetic, but rather reflects the fact that evidence on whether the 
joint liability structure is, itself, important remains mixed (Banerjee 
2013). Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) analyze data from 
the Microfinance Information Exchange on 346 institutions employing 
an assortment of individual and group liability models. They report that 
organizations offering individual versus group liability loans “have the 
highest average profit levels but they perform least well on measures of 
outreach” (p. F109). Meanwhile, a randomized controlled trial (RCT) 
in the Philippines in which the joint liability structure was removed ran-
domly from a set of loan groups (but the group structure remained oth-
erwise intact) revealed no increase in delinquency or default, according 
to Karlan and Zinman. 
Although much of microfinance’s success has been in demonstrat-
ing the possibility of providing loans to the poor without incurring inor-
dinate financial risk, evaluating the ability of such loans to improve the 
socioeconomic well-being of poor households is a critical part of the 
product development process. Prior to making such an evaluation, it is 
important to review the evidence on two issues. First, do poor house-
holds have access to profitable investment opportunities? If yes, this 
raises a second issue: are poor households constrained in their ability 
to accumulate funds? If so, this may be because they are destitute and 
have no spare cash to save or no place to put it aside secure from other 
household or community members—or from their own temptation. 
Experimental studies such as de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 
(2008) use randomized cash grants to small Sri Lankan enterprises 
and report real returns to capital of between 55 and 65 percent a year. 
While research in this area is certainly ongoing (Berge, Bjorvatn, and 
Tungodden 2011; Karlan et al. 2014; McKenzie and Woodruff 2008), 
there is enough evidence to suggest that our foundational assumption 
of access to profitable opportunities is not unreasonable for the aver-
age microentrepreneur and may be particularly true for men (de Mel, 
McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009). 
In terms of whether microcredit client households are destitute, the 
Global Microcredit Summit 2011 Report indicates that only 63 per-










cent of microfinance households can be characterized as coming from 
“extreme poverty,” defined as living on less than $1.25 a day (Reed 
2013). Furthermore, even those in extreme poverty are likely to have 
the capacity to save. Banerjee and Duflo (2007) utilize detailed house-
hold surveys across 13 countries to gain an in-depth perspective on the 
financial lives of the poor (those living on less than $2.16 a day) and the 
extremely poor (those living on less than $1.08 a day). Contrary to what 
one might expect, even the extremely poor are clearly not spending all 
of their money on basic needs, as their spending on food ranges between 
56 and 78 percent of household income. While it is certainly reason-
able that other, nonfood expenses could be very important, spending on 
alcohol, tobacco, and festivals typically makes up a meaningful part of 
the remaining budget as well. 
Studies on returns to savings products by Dupas and Robinson 
(2013) simultaneously support the view that poor households have the 
capacity to save and highlight the constraints they face that make it 
difficult to save. More recent evidence shows that, like the rich, the 
poor often exhibit time-inconsistent preferences. In addition, a high 
incidence of health shocks in this population greatly increases the need 
for easily accessible savings. 
Microcredit’s success at reducing poverty also depends on the 
degree to which microloans are used to finance investment. Looking 
across studies in three countries, Morduch (2013) observes that micro-
loan usage is almost evenly split between business investment and other 
objectives. While these latter purchases could be welfare-improving 
(examples include financing household expenses and paying down 
debt), they are not likely to effect a quick and permanent exodus from 
poverty. 
Given the evidence on savings and credit opportunities in particu-
lar, microloans should have the capacity to help many clients speed up 
the rate of asset acquisition, thus initiating the climb out of poverty. 
Nevertheless, a review of seven recent experimental studies reveals 
no evidence of microcredit leading to sustained increases in income 
or consumption.6 When microbusinesses are affected by microcredit 
access, it generally appears to be on the intensive rather than exten-
sive margin; i.e., improvements are seen with existing businesses, not 
from new business creation. Only two studies, Augsburg et al. (2012) 
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and Banerjee et al. (2013), demonstrate statistically signifi cant positive 
effects on business creation. 
Within existing businesses, it does appear that microcredit facilitates 
business investment, and in some cases this translates into increases in 
revenue. Unfortunately, all studies with the exception of Crépon et al. 
(2011) and Banerjee et al. (2013) fail to identify positive effects on prof-
its at standard significance levels, and in both exceptions the impacts 
are concentrated in subpopulations.7 
Another outcome often emphasized by the microcredit narrative 
is female empowerment. However, most studies report no effect on 
traditional empowerment measures. One exception is Angelucci, Kar-
lan, and Zinman (2013), who find statistically significant but relatively 
small increases in the likelihood that the female household member will 
participate in household decision making. However, we should note an 
important caveat: unlike business profits, which have a clear monetary 
defi nition, definitions of female empowerment may be context-specific, 
and reporting may be subject to social desirability concerns. To date, 
most papers rely on clients’ self-reported survey responses.8 
ENHANCING THE IMPACT OF MICROCREDIT
Despite indications that microcredit has relatively weak impacts 
on traditional socioeconomic measures, there are many reasons to hold 
out hope that microcredit products can be modified to enhance their 
effects on business investment and poverty. In particular, evidence from 
several studies that we conducted in India suggests multiple ways to 
improve microfinance through design. The research also points to alter-
native measures (aside from profit) to judge microfinance’s success or 
failure. So how can we make microfinance more relevant to the poor? 
The following subsections highlight five points of promise, areas 
where the research suggests ways to enhance or better understand the 
impact of microfinance on a variety of important development outcomes. 
These include building more flexibility into the microfinance contract, 
directly encouraging greater business investment, using microfinance 
to build social capital, anticipating and measuring a broader range of 
development outcomes, and focusing more on the rural population. 




Build Flexibility into the Microfi nance Contract 
There is increasing evidence that typical microcredit contract 
designs restrict the ways in which the poor use loan funds. Interestingly, 
many of today’s microcredit arrangements bear little resemblance to 
loans offered by organizations such as the U.S. Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA), which are also designed, ostensibly, to support the kind 
of entrepreneurial risk-taking necessary for success. As pointed out by 
Glennon and Nigro (2005), these loans typically have fi xed monthly 
(or less frequent) repayment schedules and a grace period between the 
initial loan disbursement and the beginning of repayment. The default 
rate on SBA loans is also rather high—between 13 and 15 percent. On 
this point, the gap between microcredit loans and SBA loans is stark; in 
one study by Field, Pande, et al. (2013), the default rates for individual-
liability microloans in India were around 2 percent. 
From a theoretical perspective, introducing grace periods or decreas-
ing repayment frequency may increase a microentrepreneur’s ability to 
self-insure. In more concrete terms, this would mean that a particularly 
bad performance one week could be offset by improvements the next. 
Alternatively, if a microentrepreneur knows she won’t be able to make 
a payment on time by herself, she has more time to mobilize additional 
support to avoid default, or is less likely to need to liquidate business 
assets in order to make bank payments on time. 
In a recent study, we use a field experiment to investigate directly 
the effect on business outcomes and household income of introducing 
a two-month grace period into the structure of an individual-liability 
microcredit agreement (Field, Jayachandran, et al. 2013). Introducing 
such a grace period has an immediate and positive effect: the rate of 
new business formation doubles, and a greater portion of the loan is 
invested into the business. What is more surprising is that the effect on 
poverty is even more impressive: three years on, household income is 
17 percent higher and business profi ts nearly double. Interestingly, the 
default rate on these loans increases from 2 percent to roughly 10 per-
cent, still below the 13–15 percent experienced by companies receiving 
SBA loans, but a healthy indicator that microentrepreneurs indeed are 
taking greater risks when microcredit agreements allow them to do so. 
A companion study explored the impact of switching from weekly 
to monthly repayment frequency (Field et al. 2012). The change more 
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than doubled business income, increased household income by 84–88 
percent, and caused no increase in the default rate during the study 
period. In what could be a proverbial “win-win” situation, the same 
study found that clients were 51 percent less likely to report feeling 
“worried, tense, or anxious” and 54 percent more likely to report feeling 
confident about repaying. 
These results suggest that there is significant leeway in how to 
enhance microcredit’s effectiveness by making simple changes to con-
tract design. In particular, products providing more flexible capital, 
loosening the credit constraint, and increasing the borrower’s ability to 
self-insure appear to effectively boost the entrepreneurial capacity of 
poor clients. However, these results do come with an important caveat: 
the higher default rates associated with more flexible contracts present a 
significant obstacle to for-profit MFIs, particularly in settings in which 
loan terms and interest rates are heavily regulated. 
Organizations like SBA enjoy substantial subsidies, but the politi-
cal appetite for subsidizing private-sector MFIs may be limited. One 
approach could be to improve MFIs’ ability to assess the risk of individ-
ual applicants. Credit bureaus are one such mechanism for doing so, as 
they provide lending organizations with a way to independently verify a 
potential borrower’s financial capacity. In this way, credit bureaus alle-
viate some of the customer screening burden and enable MFIs to offer 
products tailored to the needs and capabilities of individual clients. 
A key complementary lesson is the importance of not overregulat-
ing interest rates. That is, greater flexibility will generally only be pos-
sible if banks are allowed to charge higher interest rates to compensate 
for associated changes in lending risk. Constraining rates at artificially 
low levels may prevent MFIs from offering a menu of products catering 
to specific client needs, and thereby prevent MFI clients from “buying” 
more flexible loan contracts. Those seeking to protect the interests of 
the poor through microfinance regulation must be particularly careful 
on this front. Empirical research suggests that more limitations on lend-
ers are likely to restrict their ability to get the lending model right. 
Encourage Investment Directly 
As stipulated by the Grameen Bank lending model, MFIs main-
tain high levels of interaction with their clients for purposes of loan 














monitoring. This suggests that MFIs are also well placed to disseminate 
information and training efficiently, potentially enhancing clients’ use 
of microcredit. In particular, MFIs that follow the Grameen Bank model 
and interact regularly with clients have the potential to increase the like-
lihood that a particular client will take up a loan and increase the use to 
which loan funds are applied. One simple model for conceptualizing the 
role of financial literacy or business training in generating profits is that 
of perfect complements (Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden 2011). In this 
framework, training can help increase profits only to the degree that the 
skills of the entrepreneur are the binding constraint. Once other factors, 
such as social norms or access to further credit, become the limiting fac-
tor, training must be suitably modified for it to have an impact. 
Consistent with this framework, training programs that focus on 
conveying relatively basic, relevant, and concise content have seen 
significant results. Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2014) conducted an 
RCT that found that teaching clients “rules of thumb” outperformed a 
more traditional financial literacy training program, showing substan-
tial effects on sales (improvements of 30 percent or more) during bad 
weeks. Another experimental evaluation of training in simple practices, 
Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2011), found significant impacts 
of business training on profits, between 25 and 30 percent, but these 
impacts were limited to male microentrepreneurs. No impacts were 
observed among women. 
Still, many other studies find no significant effects on what arguably 
is the most important business outcome, profits. Using an experimental 
design in Ghana, Karlan, Knight, and Udry (2012) engage microen-
trepreneurs with combinations of cash grants and business consulting 
services. Despite the rather intensive nature of this tailored manage-
ment guidance, they find no evidence that the effort increases profits. 
The authors also conduct a short review of 10 other papers examining 
the effects of business training. Variations in business circumstance and 
training methods aside, only 3 of the 10 show statistically significant 
positive effects on profits. 
In the context of findings like these, one possibility for improve-
ment is to help ensure more supportive environments for entrepreneur-
ship outside the classroom, particularly for women, since many cultures 
consider work, especially risky entrepreneurial ventures, inappropriate 
for women. To shed light on some of these factors, Field, Jayachandran, 
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et al. (2013) undertook an experimental analysis of a two-day business 
counseling program for female business owners. Half of the clients tar-
geted by the training were invited to bring a friend. The counseling pro-
gram also focused on assisting attendees in identifying and developing 
a plan to achieve a medium-term financial goal (one feasibly attainable 
in under six months). 
Despite explicitly discouraging the women from acquiring debt, the 
training experience doubled the likelihood that a woman would take 
out a loan, and loan size reflected the woman’s stated goals. Women 
who attended with a friend were more than twice as likely to take out a 
business loan as they were to take out a loan to fund nonbusiness goals 
such as home improvement or education. Upon follow-up, women who 
attended the training with a friend reported 11 percent higher household 
incomes and 15 percent higher expenditures, while those who attended 
by themselves were still indistinguishable from the control group. 
Interestingly, increased business investment did not translate into 
higher defaults; both treatment groups had similarly low default levels. 
Finally, among women trained with friends, the economic effects were 
particularly pronounced for women who faced more social restrictions, 
such as more conservative caste or religious constraints (also see Field, 
Jayachandran, and Pande 2010). 
Use Microfinance to Build Social Capital 
Social capital has traditionally underpinned the design of microfi-
nance products.9 In the face of inevitable setbacks and adverse events, 
informal insurance networks supported by social capital may be a criti-
cal source of support for microentrepreneurs. Indeed, such social capi-
tal formation may be a key reason the group-lending model can reduce 
default risk. Recent research has continued to explore this area and has 
highlighted how the group meetings themselves, rather than simply 
group liability, may build social capital directly. 
One study, Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2013), uses a random-
ized experiment in the city of Kolkata (formerly Calcutta), India, to 
examine the influence of microfinance meetings on social capital and 
the resulting ability of social networks to provide informal insurance. 
Clients in this experiment were offered individual-liability loans but 
were required to meet to repay the loans in groups, either on a weekly 








or a monthly basis. Increased interaction associated with weekly meet-
ings led to a lasting change in the degree of social connections between 
group members well beyond the loan cycle. In the short run, clients 
saw one another outside meetings significantly more often, and these 
effects persisted two years later. Even after a large fraction of the groups 
had stopped meeting for loan purposes, those who had met weekly as 
opposed to monthly during their first loan cycle were signifi cantly more 
likely to remain in regular contact with fellow group members and state 
that they could rely on one another in cases of emergency. 
Furthermore, clients assigned to the weekly meetings were three 
times less likely to default on their subsequent loan, irrespective of 
payment frequency. Employing a second arm of the same experiment, 
the study used an artifactual game to isolate what appears to be driv-
ing this effect: improved risk pooling. Added to that, the more intense 
social interaction between microcredit group members appears not to 
“crowd out” a borrower’s nonmicrocredit social network, indicating 
that the microcredit experience may play an important role in improv-
ing the resilience of microentrepreneurs in the face of inevitable finan-
cial shocks and setbacks, even without the additional constraint of joint 
liability. 
Beyond this, more recent research indicates that the frequency with 
which meetings are held matters not only for first-time clients, as was 
demonstrated in Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2013), but also for cli-
ents who have been together for at least two previous loan cycles. In 
particular, a similar RCT, in which third-time borrowers were random-
ized into weekly versus monthly meetings, shows that social capital 
is significantly higher among the weekly groups, despite the fact that 
group members already know one another at the outset of the loan cycle 
(Feigenberg et al. 2014). According to these results, regular microfi-
nance meetings can continue to stimulate social contact among group 
members for several years. 
A related result is found in Karlan and Zinman (2009); the authors 
employ an RCT design in Manila, the Philippines, that randomly 
assigns access to individual liability microcredit loans to the marginal 
applicant. On balance, they find that microcredit appears to increase the 
amount individuals are able to borrow from their social networks in an 
emergency. 
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While direct comparison of these findings is difficult given the dif-
ference in settings and loan products, the key message for microfinance 
policy is more general: to maximize the economic impact of providing 
microcredit, it makes sense to focus on a delivery model that encour-
ages social interaction. Social capital appears to be stimulated in signifi-
cant and economically meaningful ways by regular microfi nance meet-
ings. While the group-lending model may be favored for other reasons, 
it is reasonable to infer that at least some of its success is a result of the 
relationships between borrowers fostered by regular meetings. 
Based on this evidence, it makes sense not only to continue with the 
group-lending model, particularly with respect to new borrowers, but 
also to target microfinance toward clients who are particularly socially 
isolated. These results also suggest that women in socially restrictive 
settings may be of particular importance in understanding the potential 
effects of microcredit/microfinance as a development intervention, a 
topic we will discuss below. 
Anticipate (and Measure) the Effect of Microfinance on Other
Development Goals 
One reason to hold out hope that microfinance can deliver on its 
promise of reducing poverty is the relative youth of the sector and 
the supporting experimental research: many of the potential channels 
through which the poor could benefit are arguably indirect and long-
term, and hence have not been rigorously assessed by existing impact 
evaluations. 
Perhaps most notably, the gendered aspect of the traditional micro-
finance model—which caters exclusively to female clients—has led 
to claims that microloans have the potential to empower women by 
increasing their bargaining power within the household.10 Increasing 
female bargaining power, in turn, has the potential to reduce poverty 
through several channels, including increasing rates of human capi-
tal accumulation (e.g., Thomas [1990], [1994]) and reducing fertility. 
While theoretically possible, it is not obvious that increasing house-
hold debt levels in female members’ names will lead to greater female 
financial control, as MFI loan funds are generally used for household 
businesses and consumption. 













To evaluate this claim empirically, Field, Pande, and Martinez 
(2015) conducted a study of female clients in Ahmedabad, India, who 
had received access to credit through one of the first microfinance 
institutions in the world, SEWA Bank. The study follows a sample of 
clients with SEWA Bank savings accounts from 1999 to 2009. Over 
this decade, about half of these women took out loans from SEWA
Bank. We make use of quasi-experimental variation in the placement 
of SEWA loan officers (female employees who collect payments door-
to-door and receive commissions on loans) in order to account for sys-
tematic differences between those who do and those do not seek credit. 
This enables us to identify the causal effect of access to microloans on 
household financial and demographic outcomes. The intuition behind 
this empirical approach is the following: Within a four-block radius, 
women that live on the same block as the loan officer have virtually 
identical finances, according to observable measures, as those who live 
slightly farther away. Yet those who live slightly farther away are much 
less likely to take out a loan over the decade. The distance of one’s resi-
dence to that of the neighborhood loan officer arguably provides a valid 
source of exogenous variation in access to credit. 
Similar to other impact evaluations of microfinance, this study also 
finds that access to microcredit is associated with no change in house-
hold income or business profits. However, there is a large and signifi-
cant increase in the household’s fraction of income earned by women 
and in female labor force participation. Most notably, access to credit 
is also associated with a significant reduction in fertility and a signif-
icant increase in the marriage age of daughters, which suggests that 
increasing women’s earning potential increases their bargaining power 
within the household. In the long run, the social and economic benefits 
of reductions in unwanted births may contribute to signifi cant improve-
ments in the lives of the poor. 
Focus on the Rural Population 
One of the greatest shortcomings of existing evidence on microfi-
nance impacts is that virtually all evaluations take place in urban set-
tings. Meanwhile, given the substantial differences between urban and 
rural areas, it seems reasonable to expect that there will be different 
constraints limiting microentrepreneurs in these two environments. 
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One common assumption is that the rural poor face far greater credit 
constraints. While studies like Crépon et al. (2011) certainly find a near 
vacuum of credit access in rural Morocco, other studies discover levels 
of credit access analogous to urban areas. Attanasio et al. (2011) find 
that more than 60 percent of rural Mongolian residents have at least one 
outstanding loan prior to their introduction to microcredit. Similarly, 
Banerjee et al. (2013) determine that 68 percent of urban residents in 
Hyderabad, India, have some kind of formal or informal loan at base-
line.11 Given this picture, it is not immediately apparent that the defining 
characteristic of the urban-versus-rural divide is simply access to credit. 
Karlan et al. (2014) consider an alternative perspective: that the con-
straining factor in rural environments may be uninsured risk rather than 
credit constraints. Using a field experiment, they randomly assigned 
cash grants and rainfall insurance offerings over multiple years and 
found significant positive effects of insurance on investment in agricul-
tural inputs. While the authors’ particular point estimates will vary with 
realized weather outcomes, the immediate results can tell us something 
about the relative cost-effectiveness of cash grants (i.e., free money) 
versus rainfall insurance. Their results note that “the cost of the rain-
fall insurance is an order of magnitude less than the cost of the capital 
grant, whereas the consequential behavior change is an order of magni-
tude more. Hence the cost-effectiveness is unambiguous and striking: 
if using subsidy money to generate higher farm investments, rainfall 
insurance grants are far more cost-effective than cash grants” (p. 628). 
Another important aspect of their findings highlights a central role 
MFIs may play in enhancing the impact of rainfall insurance. As noted 
by Karlan et al. (2014), a significant hurdle for greater adoption of insur-
ance is lack of trust between the farmer and the insurance underwriter. 
Compared to traditional financial organizations, MFIs have far greater 
access to and familiarity with impoverished rural communities. While 
strategies will certainly vary, the microcredit group experience may be 
a scalable mechanism for fostering greater trust through educating bor-
rowers as well as sharing experiences among clients. 
Calderón, Cunha, and De Giorgi (2013) reinforce the potential value 
of MFIs as a platform for disseminating knowledge and training in 
rural areas. The authors employ an RCT design in evaluating an inten-
sive six-week, 48-hour business literacy training program for female 
business owners. The training program created statistically significant 











increases in profits and revenues by roughly 23 and 28 percent, respec-
tively.12 Business practices also changed as microentrepreneurs adopted 
improved accounting techniques and became increasingly likely to for-
mally register their businesses. At least some of these practices proved 
contagious, as untreated businesses in treatment areas also adopted 
better accounting techniques. These results have also been proven to 
be rather persistent: statistically significant effects are still detectable 
more than two years after treatment. While this research focuses on 
the impact of the training program, it is important to note that business 
owners also reported having access to additional capital. Thus, these 
results are potentially subject to the availability of credit. 
In summary, protection against risk and improvements in human 
capital appear to yield significant returns in rural areas. Microcredit 
may also have an explicit complementary effect, as tested by Karlan 
et al. (2014) with the use of cash grants. Keeping this in mind, the role 
of rural MFIs becomes particularly important. With appropriate design, 
MFIs can offer precisely the sustainable and scalable platform neces-
sary to take advantage of these significant and economically important 
effects. 
CONCLUSION 
We began this chapter by arguing that the lessons of a real example 
of a “magic bullet” can provide a useful framework for understanding 
the evolution and potential promise of microfinance. With this perspec-
tive, we have experienced the same roller coaster of invention, failure, 
and reinvention as Sir Richard Fleming, who labored for years before 
penicillin’s eventual success. Similarly, current microfinance research 
has identified several points of promise for real, positive impact: adjust-
ments in microcredit agreement structure, improvements in business 
training, and changes in the social aspects of borrowing. Such promise 
confirms the importance of creating a microfinance experience that both 
encourages greater entrepreneurial risk-taking and improves microen-
trepreneurs’ ability to protect themselves against risk. As we have seen 
in results from rural areas, the role of MFIs as a sustainable and trusted 
platform for financial inclusion may be particularly important for miti-
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gating risk. Some effects may also be indirect and longer-term, as could 
be the case for a variety of female empowerment outcomes. 
The lessons learned from the penicillin “magic bullet” experience 
also carry a message for policymakers: effective regulation must be 
both smart and light-handed. Reactive policies may end up derailing the 
process of iteration and invention needed to deliver effective and effi-
cient financial access to the poor. Yet research has also exposed ways 
in which policy could spur evolution in the sector. The formation of 
credit bureaus could increase the ability of microfinance institutions to 
assess client credit risk, and regulation could encourage MFIs to offer 
a broader range of financial products. These appear to be two ways in 
which informed policy could enhance the effectiveness of microfinance 
organizations. 
Notes 
1. Examples include media attention to farmer suicides in India, which were blamed 
on microfinance debt, and the larger 2010 default crisis in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh, which led to calls for dramatic reforms to the already heavily regulated 
sector (Biswas 2010; Menon 2010). 
2. Tracking and collecting loans in a group rather than at the individual level effec-
tively lowered the cost of administering small loans to poor households. 
3. Much of the current research, as well as this review, focuses on a particular sub-
type of microfi nance, microcredit. 
4. In addition to multiple potential individual-liability loan types, a Grameen client 
now has access to life insurance, savings accounts, and pension accounts. Even 
within a loan cycle, liquidity-strapped clients can access an additional line of 
credit based on the amounts previously paid on their current loans. 
5. SEWA Bank also has strong linkages with its other sister SEWA institutions, pro-
viding access to union support, training, and housing services. This comprehen-
sive concern may be well justified. In one nonexperimental study of 900 women 
from the SEWA Bank service area in Ahmedabad, 71 percent reported at least one 
significant financial shock over the two-year study period (Chen and Snodgrass 
2001). 
6. Studies considered for this statement include Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 
(2013), Attanasio et al. (2011), Augsburg et al. (2012), Banerjee et al. (2013), 
Crépon et al. (2011), Giné and Mansuri (2011), and Karlan and Zinman (2009). 
7. In the case of Crépon et al. (2011), profits increase only in the agricultural house-
hold subsample. This appears to be driven by increased investments in hired farm-
hands. Banerjee et al. (2013) have even more nuanced fi ndings: benefits appear 
concentrated in the upper tail of microenterprises, with firms in the ninetieth per-
centile of profitability seeing a 20 percent increase in profits, but only after three 
years of exposure to microcredit. 










8. In an example of just how difficult it can be to measure female empowerment, 
Beaman et al. (2009) exploited a government program that randomly reserved 
village council seats for female candidates in India. The authors employed a com-
bination of explicit and implicit tests to determine preferences regarding female 
elected officials. Implicit tests, those unlikely to be subject to social desirabil-
ity bias, indicated that both male and female villagers had strong preferences for 
leaders of their own gender. Simultaneously, when researchers solicited explicit 
perspectives, both men and women responded with preferences for male lead-
ers. The contradictory results among female villagers encapsulate the challenge in 
assessing progress in empowering women: stated responses may not be an accu-
rate measure. 
9. For the purposes of this chapter, we apply Putnam’s definition of social capital: “fea-
tures of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993). 
10. In economics, intrahousehold bargaining power is generally about the ability of 
individual household members to assert their preferences over themselves or the 
entire household. Changing bargaining power has the potential to increase house-
hold well-being if the shift causes changes in household investment behavior. 
Thomas (1990) has published a classic treatise in this area. 
11. This number should be treated with some degree of suspicion because of baseline 
implementation challenges. 
12. These estimates reflect the program’s intention-to-treat effect, which is a conser-
vative estimate of the program’s effect. The treatment-on-the-treated effect, or the 
effect on those that actually received the training, was 1.5 times larger. 
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The Once (But No Longer) 
Golden Age of Human Capital 
Nancy Folbre 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Human capital remains both a valuable concept and a valuable 
commodity. However, both its theoretical incarnation and its economic 
value are losing some of their shine. In this chapter, I will explain why, 
emphasizing recent reversals both in the way economists think about 
human capital and in the evidence that its accumulation will continue 
to deliver rich rewards. My account begins as an exercise in intellectual 
history, goes on to argue that the U.S. economy is shifting from a regime 
of excess demand for college-educated workers to a regime of excess 
supply, then speculates on how such trends might affect both patterns 
of and political responses to the resulting increased income inequality. 
One could examine the history of human capital theory from many 
vantage points. I focus here on the way in which the theory comple-
mented the view that markets operate in both efficient and equitable 
ways. This does not imply that the theory can be reduced to an ideology, 
nor that it was intended as an ideological construct, but simply that it 
conformed to a set of principles that have been described as “belief in 
a just world” (Lerner 1980). I use the past tense here for good reason: 
both the evolution of ideas about human capital theory and the market 
rewards for it have undermined its initial ideological impact. That is, 
many current interpretations of human capital theory—as well as cur-
rent empirical trends—lead toward the conclusion that individuals are 
not necessarily fairly rewarded for their efforts. 
One could examine returns to investments in human capital in 
a variety of ways. I focus here on rates of return to a college educa-
tion, examining factors relevant to both the supply of and demand for 
college-educated workers on the national and the global level. Rather 
than mobilizing new data, I summarize existing research showing that 
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absolute rates of return to private investments in college degrees have 
declined, even though relative rates—expected earnings compared 
to those of workers without a college degree—have remained attrac-
tive. Neither private nor public investments in higher education have 
expanded as much in recent years as one might expect, given this per-
sistent college premium. I offer an explanation based on shifts in both 
the demand for the skills that higher education develops and the global 
supply of college graduates. I also predict a significant constriction of 
opportunities for all but a relatively small subset of college-educated 
workers in the near future. 
This constriction has probably already intensified inequality in the 
United States between those in the top decile of the earnings distribu-
tion and everyone else, though it seems unlikely that it has affected the 
relative earnings of the top 1 percent relative to others in the top tenth. 
A less explored but perhaps politically more important question is how 
it will affect earnings inequality between those with and those without 
college degrees, who are currently located at very different ends of the 
so-called “middle” class. If a declining rate of return on a college educa-
tion diminishes the average economic distance between the median col-
lege graduate and the median high-school graduate, it could lead to the 
emergence of new political coalitions. Depending on how one defines 
the “working class,” that group may be increasing both in relative num-
bers and in relative credentials. Changes in returns to college could also 
complicate the impact of race and ethnicity, diminishing the advan-
tage that young white non-Hispanics have accrued from their superior 
access to educational credentials. In general, diminishing rewards to 
higher education, combined with slow economic growth, may under-
mine the confidence in upward mobility through “self-investment” that 
characterized the golden age of human capital. 
A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
In 1964, Gary Becker published a book with the simple title Human 
Capital. Neither the basic concept nor the phrase was novel (Folbre 
2009). But the Beckerian version—complemented by the convergent 
insights of Jacob Mincer and Reuben Gronau—quickly gained adher-
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ents for two reasons: it was 1) methodologically consistent with the 
mainstream emphasis on individual choice and 2) easily adaptable for 
detailed econometric analysis. Becker’s book laid the foundation for the 
subsequent development of his Treatise on the Family, widely consid-
ered a masterpiece of modern microeconomics. 
Placed in historical context, the rise of human capital theory repre-
sented an important new episode in an ongoing ideological drama. Clas-
sical political economy pointed to significant conflict between capital 
and labor. Both Ricardian and Marxian theories treated profits as a form 
of surplus essentially expropriated from workers. Even the neoclassi-
cal theories that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century treated 
profits above and beyond the cost of capital and entrepreneurship as a 
rent that would, under perfect competition, be competed away to zero. 
John Bates Clark and Philip Henry Wicksteed offered a more pointed 
justification for factor payments by developing a more specific theory 
of distribution, arguing that wages represented the marginal product of 
labor, just as profits represented the marginal product of capital. The 
normative implications were clear: each factor of production was remu-
nerated according to its contribution. 
Still, the theory of marginal productivity clearly shows that an indi-
vidual worker’s wages can be adversely affected by circumstances com-
pletely outside of her or his control. An increase in the supply of labor 
drives down the equilibrium wage. Firms will hire more workers, but 
the fact that the marginal worker is paid for her or his marginal prod-
uct offers little consolation to the average worker who experiences a 
drop in living standards. The greater the prospect of labor market trends 
that may worsen the position of workers, the greater the incentive to 
collectively organize in ways that might prevent an overall increase in 
labor supply. One conspicuous manifestation of such collective efforts 
is strict limits on immigration (a subject to which this chapter will later 
return). 
The theory of human capital offers a much stronger ethical justifi-
cation for wages by emphasizing the link between the quality of labor 
supplied and the wage earned. Indeed, the notion that a worker’s skills 
represent an animate form of capital elides the very distinction between 
capital and labor as factors of production. It also implies a far more 
egalitarian distribution of assets than one based on ownership of finan-
cial capital alone. As the journalist Noah Smith put it, “For most of 





modern history, inequality has been a manageable problem. The reason 
is that no matter how unequal things get, most people are born with 
something valuable: the ability to work, to learn, and to earn money” 
(Smith 2013). 
The first generation of human capital models designed for econo-
metric analysis treated earnings as a function of education and experi-
ence, controlling for other factors. Under these models, everyone is a 
capitalist with the potential to make investments in her or his own pro-
ductive skills that will pay off in increased future earnings. The theory 
effectively diverted attention from the earlier problem of class con-
flict by emphasizing differences among workers, rather than between 
workers and owners. In other words, it primarily offered an explana-
tion of relative wages (why some earned more than others) rather than 
an explanation of the absolute level of wages. Changes in productivity 
drop out of the picture except insofar as technological change might 
affect the rate of return to specifi c skills. 
This new emphasis was particularly well suited to an era in which 
higher education in the United States was rapidly expanding, along 
with opportunities for professional and managerial employment. In the 
1960s, a college degree became a ticket to ride on a train that was rap-
idly gaining momentum. Nor were neoclassical economists the only 
ones turning their attention to differences among “workers.” Both jour-
nalists and sociologists influenced by Marxian political economy soon 
began to explore the meaning of a professional-managerial class occu-
pying an intermediate position between labor and capital—similar, in 
that respect, to the older category of petite bourgeoisie or owners of 
small businesses (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979). 
The human capital approach also provided a timely framework for 
understanding earnings inequalities based on race and gender, just as 
these inequalities were provoking new forms of political mobilization. 
The presumption that individual earnings are determined by education 
and experience invited consideration of “unexplained” variation as a 
measure of discrimination. In Becker’s authoritative formulation, such 
discrimination could be conceptualized as a taste or preference held 
by employers, fellow workers, or consumers that reduced the demand 
for workers with particular characteristics for reasons unrelated to their 
level of skill. Among employers, a taste for discrimination could prove 
costly, since firms that were more narrowly focused on profi t maximiza-
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tion and that were uninhibited by any concerns other than productivity 
should be able to deliver superior performance and outcompete dis-
criminators in the long run. 
Ironically, however, the vast empirical literature based on human 
capital assumptions that quickly proliferated seemed to document rather 
deep and persistent differences in earnings based on race and gender. 
In this sense, its internal logic led to an unintended—or at least unan-
ticipated—direction, away from a tidy legitimization of wage inequal-
ity toward evidence of widespread irrationality (and, one might argue, 
dysfunctionality) in the form of discrimination that might (or might 
not) prove persistent. However, by emphasizing one particular form of 
potential injustice that linked the economic grievances of blacks and 
women, it deflected attention from wage inequality among white men, 
increasingly pictured as a relatively privileged—because “undiscrimi-
nated” against—component of the labor force. 
In retrospect, the methodological naiveté of early efforts to measure 
discrimination is shocking. Researchers offered up simple regression 
models with earnings on the left-hand side and education and experi-
ence on the right-hand side, along with some standard demographic 
controls, referring to unexplained variance in wages as evidence of 
discrimination, as though no other significant variables could possibly 
have been omitted and no residual was to be expected. Such an estimate 
could be construed as a serious overestimate of discrimination. On the 
other hand, the standard approach also underestimated the effects of 
discrimination by ignoring problems of endogeneity: while earnings 
are clearly influenced by education and experience, expected earnings 
also influence decisions to invest in education and experience. Many 
women accumulated less experience on the job than men did, for the 
simple reason that they were paid significantly less; thus, they had less 
to gain from it. Had their wages been higher, they would have remained 
employed longer. It was rather disingenuous, then, to explain their 
lower earnings by their lack of experience. The same reasoning applies 
to education: discrimination has the indirect effect of lowering returns 
to education, and therefore reducing incentives to invest in education, 
as well as directly lowering earnings. 
Still, the basic human capital–based earnings equation raised a kind 
of meritocratic standard, implying that earnings should be based on the 
individual worker’s own productive characteristics. In this sense, it was 





politically consistent with efforts to outlaw explicit discrimination. It 
was also consistent with efforts to improve access to schooling, clearly 
revealed as a major determinant of earnings differences by race and 
ethnicity. Earnings differences by gender were more strongly explained 
by women’s lower level of labor force experience, a fi nding that urged 
women to seek access to higher-paying occupations and improve their 
continuity on the job. 
However simplistic the basic model, it directed economists’ atten-
tion to an aspect of labor supply that had not, until then, received much 
attention: educational attainment. And while Becker’s original theory 
concerned “self-investment” (i.e., the decision by young adults to 
forgo current earnings in order to continue their education beyond high 
school), Becker himself moved rather quickly to acknowledge that fam-
ily decisions to invest in the schooling of young children represented 
an important antecedent. In this sense, his Treatise on the Family repre-
sented a logical extension of Human Capital, and in it he acknowledged 
a significant market failure: parents might lack access to suffi cient cap-
ital to make the optimal investment in their children’s education. In 
a “Supplement to Chapter 11” coauthored with Kevin Murphy on the 
relationship between the family and the state, he suggested that this 
market failure helped explain the emergence of public investment in 
education as part of an intergenerational contract in which the working-
age population would repay their elders by helping finance public pen-
sions (Becker 1993, pp. 362–379). 
Looking back on this intellectual trajectory, it almost seems as 
though the internal logic of human capital theory directed it away from 
the utility-maximizing choices of autonomous adults (where it had ini-
tially pointed), in nearly the opposite direction: consideration of the 
consequences of public policies in determining children’s income secu-
rity and access to education. By the early twenty-first century, James 
Heckman, a colleague of Gary Becker at the University of Chicago, had 
begun to make the case that limited access to early childhood education 
means that many students from poor families are unlikely to achieve the 
academic success necessary to attend college, even if it is affordable for 
them. In his words, 
Never has the accident of birth mattered more. If I am born to 
educated, supportive parents, my chances of doing well are totally 
different than if I were born to a single parent or abusive parents. I 
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am a University of Chicago libertarian, but this is a case of market 
failure: children don’t get to ‘buy’ their parents, and so there has to 
be some kind of intervention to make up for these environmental 
differences. (Stille 2001, A:5) 
This statement doesn’t augur the end of the human capital paradigm, 
but it does signal a major inflection point, a new emphasis on social 
rather than personal choice. It also points to two theoretical issues that 
were largely undeveloped in the Chicago-school approach to human 
capital—1) externalities or positive spillovers from education and 
2) distributional conflict over who would pay for them. 
The notion that education generates positive externalities (even 
beyond solving the other market failures alluded to above) strength-
ens the supposition that the social benefits exceed the private ones, and 
that public investment yields a rich—if diffuse—payoff. Emphasis on 
such externalities was implicit in the early work of Theodore Schulz on 
the role of human capital in development. It received far more detailed 
theoretical elaboration in theories of endogenous growth developed 
by David Romer and in microeconomic models developed by Daron 
Acemoglu (1996), among others. It has been explored empirically by 
scholars including Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Moretti (2004).1 
The most important positive spillovers include increases in labor mar-
ket productivity (suggested by the effect of the percentage of college 
graduates in an urban labor market on the earnings of individual grad-
uates), reduced incidence of crime, and improved child health (Hout 
2012). 
Economic historians have also emphasized this positive macroeco-
nomic perspective. Countries that developed successful public edu-
cation systems in the nineteenth century, including the United States, 
enjoyed more sustained and rapid development than those that did not. 
Goldin and Katz (1999) refer to the years from 1900 to 2000 in the 
United States as the “human capital century” and note that the early 
expansion of secondary education was followed by a rapid expansion of 
postsecondary education after World War II, funded both by the expan-
sion of the GI Bill, which provided subsidies for veterans, and by the 
development of a state-financed public higher education system. 
Goldin and Katz (1999) rely largely on the “canonical” Beckerian 
model that emphasizes individual utility maximization, and they fur-
ther assume that technological change has been and will continue to 











be skill-intensive (Acemoglu and Autor 2012). They focus, as Becker 
himself did in Treatise on the Family, on the extent to which govern-
ment intervention may be required to reduce the capital constraints that 
may prevent parents from making an optimal investment in their chil-
dren’s education. Indeed, they argue that a reduction in public efforts to 
improve educational opportunity helps account for a signifi cant slow-
down in the growth of U.S. high school and college graduate rates in the 
latter decades of the twentieth century. In other words, both individual 
and public choice play an important part in their story. 
The public choice dimension emphasizes the social benefits or pub-
lic gains from investments in human capital, and its political implica-
tions resemble those of Keynesian approaches that offered a macro-
economic rationale for redistributing resources from the affluent to the 
poor in order to increase aggregate demand. The “everybody benefits 
from investments in education” rubric suggests that the interests of both 
employers and society in general are closely aligned with the interests 
of forms of redistribution that might improve educational outcomes. 
From this perspective, distributional conflict is unlikely—or at least 
misplaced—because increased equity in access to education is so likely 
to yield increased economic efficiency. In ordinary language, taxpayers 
may see their slice of the economic pie reduced by their contributions to 
public provision, but in the long run the pie itself will grow so dramati-
cally that these taxpayers will be more than compensated. 
Less theoretical or empirical attention has been devoted to measure-
ment of the actual or perceived costs to increased public investment 
in education, despite the obvious possibility that these costs are likely 
to be disproportionately borne by relatively affluent families or those 
whose children have already completed the most vital stages of their 
own human capital accumulation. A contemporary illustration is offered 
by the most famous campaign promise made by William de Blasio, the 
mayor of New York City elected in 2014: to impose additional taxes on 
families earning more than $500,000 to finance universal early child-
hood education (Hernández 2013). 
The historical literature is peppered with observations suggest-
ing that fiscal distributional conflict comes into play. Those who have 
achieved relatively high levels of affluence in any form of capital are 
generally reluctant to help finance its acquisition by others. Those who 
lack adequate access to education for themselves or their children or 
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grandchildren are generally supportive of increased public investments. 
Cross-national studies show that, in the early twentieth century, the 
greater the percentage of men who voted—all else being equal—the 
higher the level of primary schooling (Lindert 2004, p. 106). 
The extended, intense, and ongoing political controversies over 
efforts to equalize per-student spending in primary and secondary 
schools on the state level testify to a distinctly human capital–specific 
ingredient in the so-called tax revolt (Folbre 2001). In the United States, 
both primary and secondary schools funded by local taxes generally 
received more generous funding in communities where wealth was 
broadly distributed, with a more homogeneous population (Goldin and 
Katz 1999). 
Largely as a result of financing based on local property taxes, the 
United States is one of the few countries that spends more on K–12 edu-
cation for affluent than for poor children (Porter 2013). The historical 
trajectory of support for publicly funded state universities shows that 
it has been lowest in those states with privately endowed institutions 
already in place to provide a fine education to the affluent (Goldin and 
Katz 2008). 
Racial or ethnic inequalities tend to shape political coalitions that 
determine public investments in human capital. Race-based collective 
action can take an implicit as well as an explicit form: the externalities 
generated by public education represent a public good, and, in general, 
racial and ethnic diversity tend to lower contributions to public-good 
provision (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). As Poterba (1997) famously 
showed, government spending on K–12 education is negatively related 
to the fraction of the population aged 65 and above, especially when 
the fraction of the nonwhite population aged 5–17 and 65 and over is 
included among the controls. More recent research updates this finding, 
controlling for the possibility that elderly voters have simply relocated 
toward lower tax communities (Figlio and Fletcher 2012). 
As Daniel Lichter emphasizes in his recent presidential address 
to the Population Association of America, recent demographic trends, 
including faster fertility decline among white non-Hispanic families, 
are increasing the minority share of children—especially compared to 
the predominantly white composition of the population over age 65. 
As of 2013, minorities accounted for the majority of the U.S. popula-
tion under age 1 (Lichter 2013). While increased public investment in 






education may promise large returns for the United States as a whole, 
it would offer particularly signifi cant benefits for blacks and Hispanics, 
possibly undermining racial and ethnic earnings differences that have 
proved remarkably persistent and consistently advantageous for whites. 
The distributional consequences of public investments in education 
are by no means limited to the incidence of taxation or the anticipated 
receipt of direct benefits to family members in the form of subsidized 
services. They also include effects of increases in the supply of highly 
educated labor on job opportunities and earnings, especially in cir-
cumstances where human capital “rents”—that is, premiums related to 
excess demand in the face of limited supply—are declining. They may 
also be affected by employers’ projections of the anticipated demand 
for specific skills, and the potential for expanded sources of labor sup-
ply outside the United States. 
The human capital intellectual paradigm is sometimes mistakenly 
labeled a purely individualist approach. But while it does emphasize 
self-investment, it clearly acknowledges the role of market failures and 
the need for public provision. A more distinctive feature of the paradigm 
is its optimistic emphasis on convergent interests in which both private 
and public actors benefit from increased education, because technologi-
cal change voraciously demands ever higher levels of skill. As the next 
section will show, this assumption is misplaced: evidence that we may 
be entering an era of relative oversupply of college-educated workers 
now looms large.  
A BRIEF SUMMARY OF RECENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
In their magisterial history of the expansion of education in the 
United States, Goldin and Katz (2008) describe a race between educa-
tion and technology that is, effectively, a race between shifts on the 
supply side and the demand side of the market for highly skilled work-
ers. During most of the latter half of the twentieth century, demand 
grew faster than supply, generating significant earnings premiums for 
the college-educated in particular. Hence there arose the “golden age” 
of human capital, one in which individuals willing and able to invest in 
their own productive skills through higher education could be assured 
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of a generous reward, and countries willing and able to develop their 
public higher education systems could capture significant economic 
gains. 
It is worth noting that educators—at every level and in every nook 
and cranny of the education system—stand to gain both psychologically 
and economically from the promise that human capital will always be 
a scarce commodity. Yet today that promise is beginning to seem quite 
shaky. Four stylized facts illustrate the problem: 
1) The absolute earnings of college graduates are declining. 
2) The college premium—or the earnings of college graduates 
relative to high school graduates—has not increased in recent 
years. 
3) College completion rates long ago leveled out for men (though 
not for women). 
4) Evidence of mismatch between educational credentials and 
occupational requirements is growing. 
As Figure 3.1, Panel A, indicates, college-educated women saw 
their median inflation-adjusted earnings fall after 2002, even though 
their advantage relative to women with only a high-school diploma 
increased. These figures understate the downward trend because (for 
the sake of historical continuity) the estimates for college graduates 
include all those with a college degree or higher, and postgraduate 
degrees were richly rewarded over much of this time period. College-
educated men fared even worse in absolute terms, with a median in 
2011 lower than that in 1971. College-educated men experienced a high 
relative premium only because the earnings of men with only high-
school diplomas fell so drastically. The relative earnings premiums for 
both college-educated women and men changed most visibly between 
the early 1980s and the late 1990s and have since evened out. Figure 
3.2 shows that the average annual earnings of all young college gradu-
ates aged 25–34 with a bachelor of arts degree (BA) but no other degree 
began to rise in 2013 but remained lower in 2016 than they were in 
2002. 
Many influential estimates of the college premium emphasize 
cumulative differences in lifetime earnings (Baum 2014; Baum, Ma, 
and Payea 2013; Carnevale, Rose, and Cheah 2011). But such estimates 


















Figure 3.1  Median Earnings by Education for Young Women and Men 
Panel A: Young women’s median earnings by education, 1971–2011 
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Panel B: Young men’s median earnings by education, 1971–2011 
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NOTE: Inflation-adjusted in 2011 $; full-time year-round workers aged 25–34. 
SOURCE: Baum, Ma, and Payea (2013). 
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Figure 3.2  Average Annual Earnings of Individuals Aged 25–34 Working 














SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), March Supplement of the Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement (ASEC). 
are essentially projections based on the past relationship between edu-
cation and earnings, which may or may not hold over years to come. 
The stock of college-educated Americans is high, which makes 
it difficult to see differences in the flow over time unless attention is 
focused on the younger cohorts. As Figure 3.3 shows, the percentage 
of young men with a bachelor’s degree or higher leveled off in the 
late 1970s, but it began moving up again in about 2006; over the same 
period the percentage of young women attaining this degree or higher 
increased fairly steadily, albeit at a slower rate after the late 1970s. This 
trend may well reflect the problems on the supply side—a more het-
erogeneous population, school quality problems, and higher education 
costs—that Goldin and Katz (2008) emphasize. But this highlights the 
public choice problem: why didn’t the business community, or state 
and federal governments, take steps to solve the supply-side problem? 
Perhaps because the demand side was also sagging. 




Figure 3.3  Percentage of Men and Women Aged 25–29 with a Bachelor’s 












SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2016). 
Evidence of mismatch between education credentials and job 
requirements became apparent even before the Great Recession of 
2007. In 1970, only 1 in 100 taxi drivers and chauffeurs in the United 
States had a college degree, compared to about 15 out of 100 today; 
a similar trend is evident in other occupations such as bartending and 
firefighting (Vedder, Denhart, and Robe 2013). Andrew Sum and Paul 
Harrington of the Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern Uni-
versity estimate that in 2010, fewer than half of all BA holders aged 25 
and below held a job requiring a college degree (Sum 2010). 
Unemployment rates may be much lower among college gradu-
ates than others, but they remain high by historic standards. Nor is the 
United States the only country in which a once-privileged sector of the 
labor force finds itself at the mercy of the unemployment line. Youth 
unemployment is at record levels in southern Europe, where college 
graduates have been very hard hit. According to a recent article in the 
New York Times, “An estimated 100,000 university graduates have left 
Spain, and hundreds of thousands more from Europe’s crisis-hit coun-
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tries have gone to Germany, Britain, and the Nordic states for jobs in 
engineering, science, and medicine” (Alderman 2013). 
The rate of return to a college degree has always varied signifi-
cantly by institution, choice of major, and personal characteristics. 
But a robust demand for the general college credential and for general 
rather than job-specific skills once overshadowed these differences, and 
it also reduced the risk to an individual college student of choosing the 
“wrong” major. Today, the variance in rates of return is so high that 
some economists widely regarded as advocates for public investments 
in human capital, such as Isabel Sawhill, warn that not everyone should 
go to college (Owen and Sawhill 2013). 
The apparent mismatch between the credentials that colleges and 
universities are supplying and what the labor market is demanding 
could be explained by the poor performance of our institutions of higher 
learning or the self-indulgent choices of students who insist on major-
ing in English or philosophy despite the implications for both personal 
and social returns on investment. Some economists suggest that a col-
lege degree is simply not as good a measure of “skill” as it has been 
in the past (Cowen 2013). Others insist that students who major in sci-
ence, technology, engineering, and math (the so-called STEM fields) 
are guaranteed a rosy economic future. On the other hand, a growing 
chorus of voices suggests that even homegrown STEM majors are in 
oversupply (Anft 2013). 
One unfortunate legacy of the human capital literature is its ten-
dency to refer to human capital, skill, and educational credentials as 
though they all represent one relatively undifferentiated substance that 
can be easily measured in quantitative terms such as years of education. 
Now it seems apparent that we need to pay more attention to specific 
differences in specific skill sets needed for specific tasks. Our changing 
technological environment has intensified our intellectual division of 
labor, increasing the need for specialization in some areas and decreas-
ing it in others. 
The title of a recent analysis of the impact of information technol-
ogy by Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011) is telling: Race against the 
Machine tells a story rather different from that told by Goldin and Katz 
in The Race between Education and Technology. Education is not racing 
to keep up with technology; rather, individuals are racing to cope with 
their own potential obsolescence. The digital revolution is not increas-




ing the demand for skill in general but rather offering bigger rewards 
for high skill and lower rewards for what might be termed medium 
skill, bringing about a polarization of demand. Polarization does not 
necessarily imply an overall decline in the demand for college-educated 
workers; one could imagine a scenario in which declining demand for 
medium skill is completely counterbalanced by increasing demand for 
high skill. That is not the scenario they describe. Rather, Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee argue that the overall demand for labor has declined, and 
will likely continue to decline, as a result of information technology. 
The implications for job growth, earnings inequality, and the canoni-
cal human capital model are spelled out in more detail by Acemoglu and 
Autor (2012) in their gently critical review of Goldin and Katz. They 
point to overreliance on the assumption that technological change is 
always skill-intensive, and they emphasize that distinct forms of human 
capital realize their value only in the performance of specific tasks. In 
other words, technological change can lower the demand for certain 
types of human capital, which becomes far less productive when dis-
sociated from those tasks. Furthermore, Acemoglu and Autor (here, and 
in other research) offer evidence of a declining demand for “mid-level” 
skills that is almost certainly affecting rates of return to a college degree. 
Further evidence along these lines is offered by Beaudry, Green, 
and Sand (2013), who add a stock/flow analysis to the argument, sug-
gesting that burgeoning information technology required large inputs of 
skilled labor but, once a stock of it was put in place, began to require far 
less to maintain itself. They also offer a simple and direct explanation 
for why the college premium remains high despite declining demand 
for college-educated workers, based on a queueing theory of the labor 
market. High-skilled workers go to the head of the employment line, 
accepting lower-level jobs and pushing less-credentialed workers down 
the line or out of the labor force. 
The precise impact of declining demand for college-educated 
workers is difficult to measure because shifts in the supply of college-
educated workers on the global level have also been momentous. Digi-
tal outsourcing, facilitated by the very trends in information technology 
that may have affected the demand side of the labor market, is one of 
three major avenues by which global educational trends affect the U.S. 
labor market. The other two are immigration and offshoring, or reloca-
tion of production facilities overseas. 
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The sheer pace of expansion in the global supply of college gradu-
ates—a process that economist Richard Freeman terms “human capital 
leapfrogging”—is astounding. In 2005, Chinese universities awarded 
five times as many bachelor’s degrees as they did in 1999 (Freeman 
2006). Indeed, Freeman reports that the abrupt increase in supply cre-
ated a domestic political crisis in China in 2008, when a large percent-
age of the graduating class—about 20 percent—was unable to find 
employment within a year. In 1970, the United States accounted for 29 
percent of the world’s college students (despite representing only about 
6 percent of the world’s population). By 2005–2006, the U.S. share 
had dropped to 12 percent. Almost 75 percent of global postsecondary 
education enrollments were in developing countries, including China, 
India, and Mexico. 
Much of the expansion in higher education in China and elsewhere 
was driven by national political priorities rather than by individual deci-
sions. The econometric link between private rates of return to educa-
tion and both college graduation and higher degree completion rates is 
not very strong. This finding corroborates the Goldin and Katz (2008) 
argument that decreased public spending on higher education (and the 
unequal structure of education funding in general) may have constricted 
the supply of college graduates in the United States in recent years. 
Institutional factors, in other words, have proved quite infl uential com-
pared to individual decisions to “self-invest.” 
At the same time, the finding suggests that educational outcomes in 
the United States may matter less for businesses than increased access 
to college graduates and highly trained science and technology PhDs 
from other countries. Discussing trends in immigration to the United 
States, Freeman (2009, p. 21) notes that “the supply of highly able pro-
grammers from India and other developing countries willing to work 
at lower pay than Americans has dampened the growth of supply of 
programmers in the U.S.” Many other economists, including Blinder 
(2006), have emphasized the potential labor market impact of offshor-
ing, noting that it may reduce the demand for highly educated labor and 
put a greater premium on jobs that require face-to-face contact and are 
therefore more difficult to relocate. Tonelson (2002, p. 100) argues per-
suasively that “a substantial share of outsourcing-produced job flight 
is high-tech job flight, and not even the most sophisticated U.S. indus-
tries—and workers—have been exempt.” 





Increased access to global college graduates can influence U.S. 
labor market outcomes directly by contributing to slower employment 
and wage growth. But it may also have the indirect effect of reducing 
incentives for the business community to support increased spending on 
public higher education (Folbre 2010). Economists like Richard Vedder 
who are bearish on human capital are already warning of public overin-
vestment in education (Vedder, Denhart, and Robe 2013). As the pros-
pect of a persistent oversupply of college-educated workers begins to 
loom large, the narrow economic rationale for greater collective invest-
ments in human capital begins to weaken. This is perhaps the most omi-
nous signal that the golden age of human capital has come to an end. 
A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
So what? College professors will, of course, feel demoralized by 
lack of enthusiasm for the products they produce. But the potential 
political implications reach much deeper, into the very heart of beliefs 
in a just world and promises of upward mobility for the smart and hard-
working. Getting a college education in the United States will no longer 
be a ticket to ride the train to economic prosperity—and certainly not in 
the first-class compartment. Much recent debate has focused on declin-
ing earnings and opportunities in the middle class, with Acemoglu and 
Autor emphasizing the role of technological change, and Bivens and 
Mishel (2013) placing more blame on political and institutional factors 
that have lowered the bargaining power of wage earners in general.2 
But the causes of increased earnings inequality are probably of less 
interest to most Americans than the consequences of diminished 
opportunity. 
The golden age of human capital itself encouraged everyone to 
think more about climbing the ladder than studying its length or posi-
tion. But if the ladder is lifted visibly out of reach, attention is likely 
to shift. One result could be heightened political conflict, with intensi-
fied competition for the fewer rungs remaining within reach. In general, 
periods of economic growth and increased opportunity have tended to 
reduce distributional conflict. The years between the end of World War 
II and 1970 are sometimes dubbed the golden age of American capital-
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ism for that reason (Marglin and Schor 1990). Alba (2009) has written 
hopefully of a new age of declining racial and ethnic inequality as baby 
boomers retire and create more space for younger workers. However, 
the economic trends described above may outweigh the demographics 
of retirement. Slower economic growth and persistent unemployment 
in Western Europe have fostered a new populist politics there based on 
opposition to immigration and globalization. 
On the other hand, the decline of the professional-managerial class 
concomitant with a reduced payoff to a college degree could lead to 
political realignment. Increased inequality between the top 10 per-
cent and everyone else could be accompanied by decreased inequality 
between those at the 70th percentile and those at the 30th. The middle 
class is declining in size only if it is defined in terms of some absolute 
standard. Defined instead as the middle four deciles of the income dis-
tribution, its size is fixed, even if its relative income—and the variance 
of that income—declines. 
Individuals who see no clear path to upward mobility through the 
labor market tend to become less enthusiastic about market forces. 
College-educated workers in the United States may begin to identify 
themselves as members of a working class that is collectively disad-
vantaged by technological change and globalization. As they begin to 
occupy an ever larger share of relatively low-wage jobs, the relative 
college premium may decline, a factor that could diminish racial and 
ethnic inequalities by bringing down the wages of many white workers. 
So the golden age may be over. What comes next? Perhaps the clas-
sical succession of the Ages of Man in Greek mythology, from gold to 
silver to bronze to iron, as chronicled by the poet Hesiod, should be aug-
mented by a new term: silicon. Perhaps, as Isaac Asimov envisioned, 
robots will come to the fore. Human capital will never entirely lose its 
value. In Race against the Machine, Brynjolfsson and McAfee cite a 
1965 National Aeronautic and Space Administration report explaining 
why astronauts were so useful: “Man is the lowest-cost, 150 pound, 
nonlinear, all-purpose computer system that can be mass-produced 
by unskilled labor.” The big question is whether these nonlinear all-
purpose computer systems can work together to configure an economic 
system that will treat them as valuable outputs rather than merely as 
useful inputs. That system would invest heavily in human capital what-
ever its private rate of return in the labor market. 





The title of this chapter derives from a blog post I wrote for the New York Times Econo-
mix blog on June 10, 2013, which outlined some of the issues raised here. 
1. Moretti (2005) provides an excellent summary of his research on this topic. 
2. For a readable account of this debate, see Davidson (2013). 
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A core question in the social sciences is whether culture, political 
power, or networks explain economic outcomes. Two important lines 
of research have provided distinct answers to this question. Economic 
sociology has argued that the main determinants of economic outcomes 
are interactions among economic actors and the culture and networks 
that coordinate and enable them. In contrast, comparative political eco-
nomics has asserted that the state’s power is the main determinant of 
economic outcomes. Many empirical analyses have substantiated the 
merit of both these forces—society and state—in shaping economic 
outcomes. 
What is the relative importance of the society and the state in deter-
mining economic outcomes? Do culture and social networks on the one 
hand, or the state’s power on the other, shape behavior and outcomes? 
Do rules regulating economic behavior reflect interactions among 
economic or political actors? Addressing these questions promises to 
enhance our understanding of the determinants of economic outcomes. 
In micro terms, these questions ask, “What causes people to take the 
actions they do? Is behavior culturally driven or formal-rule-driven? 
What are the relationships between behavior that reflects cultural 
beliefs, norms, and networks, and behavior that reflects formal rules, 
laws, and procedures?” To advance toward addressing these questions, 
we need to have a theory of action, which this chapter presents, that 
accommodates both formal-rule and culturally driven behavior. 
First the chapter asks why economic institutionalists—who in the 
past considered only formal-rule-driven behavior—have developed a 
theory of institutionalized behavior that also accommodates culturally 
driven behavior. The chapter then, in the following two sections, pres-
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ents this theory and the associated theory of institutional dynamic.1 This 
presentation highlights the variety of interrelationships between formal-
rule and culturally driven behavior. In the section following that, the 
chapter then provides some empirical examples of the importance of 
these interrelationships. These examples particularly suggest that cul-
ture influences the sources and details of formal rules, while the result-
ing rules further reinforce the cultural aspects that they embody and 
refl ect. The conclusion is a discussion of some of the implied research 
questions. 
INSTITUTIONS AS RULES AND CONTRACTS 
According to institutional economists, behavior reflects institu-
tions. Until the early 1990s, these economists’ main approach to posi-
tive institutional analysis defined institutions as either rules or contrac-
tual relationships. This approach, dating back to Adam Smith, posits 
that the operation of markets is the key to growth (Smith [1776] 1991), 
and that their operation depends on a clear specification of property 
rights (Coase 1960). The most important rules, therefore, are those that 
allocate property rights (North 1981). Given an allocation of property 
rights, economic agents use contracts and establish organizations to 
minimize the transaction costs of exchange (Coase 1937; Williamson 
1985). Contractual relationships among individuals and within and 
across organizations are established based on the attributes of the rel-
evant transactions in an optimal manner. Distinct property rights alloca-
tions, however, can have distinct efficiency implications because of the 
transaction costs of transferring rights to those who can use them most 
efficiently. Rules influencing the cost of transferring rights, and more 
generally exchange, are thus important in determining outcomes. 
Following Hobbes’s assertion that without a state, life would be 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short,” the emphasis in this chapter 
has been on rules specified and enforced by the state. The state has been 
conceptualized as an entity—a decision maker—with a monopoly over 
coercive power. The rules that the state advances, in turn, reflect a polit-
ical economy process centered on rules governing collective decision 
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making in organizations, such as Congress, and the political influence 
of organizations, such as interest groups and labor unions.2 
The perspective that defines institutions as rules that minimize 
transaction costs (henceforth, institutions-as-rules) has contributed a 
great deal to institutional analysis. It is a departure from a long research 
tradition that considered institutions as exogenous and historically 
determined. In contrast, conceptualizing institutions as politically 
determined rules and contractual relationships led to studying them 
as endogenous by examining the political process of rule making and 
the relationship between the attributes of transactions and individu-
als’ choices of contracts. In short, the institutions-as-rules perspective 
advanced institutional analysis by integrating two additional variables 
into the analysis—1) political rules and 2) transactions and their attri-
butes—and by providing analytical frameworks (particularly those of 
political economy and transaction-cost economics) for their analyses. 
While the contributions of the institutions-as-rules approach are 
beyond doubt, the approach has serious limitations. For one thing, treat-
ing rules as analogous to behavior limits the scope of the issues the 
approach could address. Why, for example, are some state-mandated 
rules followed but not others? As a first approximation, one can assert 
that individuals follow rules because there are other rules specifying 
punishment if they fail to do so. However, this amounts to pushing the 
question of institutional effectiveness backwards one level. It assumes 
that those who are supposed to enforce the rules are able and moti-
vated to do so. But then who monitors the monitor? A comprehensive 
understanding of the influence of state-mandated rules requires exam-
ining how the motivation and ability to follow and enforce them are 
endogenously created. More generally, focusing on rules can only go so 
far toward understanding the relationship between the environment and 
behavior. Why are some behavioral rules followed while others are not? 
Rules are behavioral instructions that can be ignored, implying that for 
any prescriptive rules of behavior to have an impact, individuals must 
be motivated to follow them. 
More generally, examining endogenous motivation is necessary for 
studying a host of critical issues, because motivation mediates between 
the environment and behavior. In past and contemporary economies, 
social order characterized by exchange and property rights security has 
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often been achieved in situations in which the state was only partially 
effective, if at all. 
Such situations prevail when there is no state, when the economic 
agents expect the state to expropriate rather than protect their property, 
and when the state is unwilling or unable to provide the enforcement 
required for exchange and securing property rights, because of such 
factors as asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, legal costs, or 
organizational limitations. Studying economic outcomes in these situ-
ations requires examining social norms where motivation is endoge-
nously created through the interactions among the economic agents. To 
understand the institutional foundations of markets, we need to exam-
ine private-order institutions based on social norms and their interrela-
tionships with public-order institutions provided by the state. 
Similarly, studying the state itself—and, more generally, the pol-
ity—requires that we consider endogenous motivation. (Henceforth, 
I use the terms state and polity interchangeably.) The institution-as-
rules approach adopted Max Weber’s definition of the state as having 
a monopoly over coercive power. But in reality, political actors can, 
and sometimes do, resort to violence and invest in obtaining coercive 
power, the use of which leads to political disorder or overturning the 
state. The welfare implications of political order or disorder, and exactly 
how political order is achieved, are immense. Similarly, understand-
ing the impact of the state on economic behavior necessitates examin-
ing the motivation of its agents. The effectiveness of state-mandated 
rules depends on two things: 1) the endogenous provision of motiva-
tion to agents in the bureaucracy and 2) the legal system responsible 
for enforcing them. An analysis of political order and the behavior of 
the state’s agents must view the behavior of its political agents and the 
state’s agents as endogenous outcomes rather than exogenous. Examin-
ing the institutional foundations of the state is therefore necessary. 
In short, the institutions-as-rules approach has not provided an 
appropriate framework for studying the endogenous provision of moti-
vation to follow a particular rule of behavior. Yet studying endogenous 
motivation is central to understanding social order, political order, and 
the effectiveness of the state in influencing the behavior of its subjects 
and agents. 
Similarly, neither the view of institutions as rules nor reliance on 
the political economy and on analytical frameworks that looked at the 
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efficiency of contracting proved satisfactory in studying institutional 
dynamics. Political economy concentrates on the formation of rules 
within the political system. It postulates that rules governing economic 
life change when the lawmakers consider the benefits of changing them 
to be larger than the costs. Transaction-cost economics argues that con-
tractual and organizational forms are altered in response to technologi-
cally determined changes in the attributes of transactions designed to 
optimize transaction costs. The merits of these insights notwithstand-
ing, they nevertheless fall short of accounting for why societies often 
fail to adopt the institutions of more economically successful societies, 
and why they evolve along distinct trajectories of institutional develop-
ment. Arguably, this is the case because the institutions-as-rules frame-
work does not consider how and why institutions enable, guide, and 
affect behavior in addition to constraining it. 
Studying endogenous motivation and how institutions enable and 
guide behavior, however, promises to further the examination of the 
questions regarding institutional dynamics that are at the heart of social 
science and history. Is institutional dynamics a historical process in 
which past institutions influenced the rate and direction of institutional 
change? If so, why and how do we study this historical process? These 
questions have bedeviled institutional analysis in economics, politi-
cal science, and sociology for a long time, because addressing them 
requires simultaneously accounting for stability, change, and the influ-
ence of the past on subsequent outcomes (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
North 1990; Scott 1995; Thelen 1999). 
INSTITUTIONS: A DEFINITION 
In response to these concerns, it has become apparent that we 
need to study institutions from a broader, socioeconomic perspective 
that captures the role of institutions not only as motivating but also as 
enabling and guiding behavior.3 The resulting approach goes beyond 
the economic and political variables emphasized in the institutions-as-
rules approach. Instead, it focuses more generally on the behavioral 
implications of factors that are social by virtue of being man-made, 







nonphysical factors that are exogenous to each individual whose behav-
ior they influence.4 
An institution is a system of social factors that conjointly generate 
a regularity of behavior (in a social situation).5 Together, these factors 
motivate, enable, and guide individuals in various social positions to 
follow one behavior among the many that are technologically feasible 
in social situations.6 (It is convenient to refer to such social factors as 
institutional elements.) Analysis of institutions from this perspective 
emphasizes the importance of rules, beliefs, and norms as well as their 
manifestation as organizations. Thus, we can slightly adapt the word-
ing of our definition at the beginning of this paragraph to say that an 
institution is a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that 
conjointly generates a regularity of (social) behavior. Each of these ele-
ments satisfies the conditions stated above. 
Considering an institution as a system departs from the common 
practice of considering it a monolithic entity such as a rule.7 Yet to 
understand regularities of behavior in the most general case, we need 
to study a system of interrelated elements, because in an institution, 
different elements have distinct roles. Each has a distinct contribution 
to generating regularities of behavior. Rules specify norms and pro-
vide a shared cognitive system, coordination, and information, whereas 
beliefs and norms provide the motivation to follow these rules, whether 
this behavior is rational, imitative, or habitual. Organizations, whether 
formal, such as parliaments and firms, or informal, such as communities 
and business networks, have three interrelated roles: they 1) produce 
and disseminate rules, 2) perpetuate beliefs and norms, and 3) influence 
the set of feasible behavioral beliefs. In situations where institutions 
generate behavior, rules correspond to the beliefs and norms that moti-
vated the behavior, while organizations contribute to this outcome in 
the manner mentioned above. 
How, for example, do regularities of behavior prevail among driv-
ers? The rules of the road create a shared cognitive understanding of the 
symbols drivers encounter (red lights, yield signs) and defi nitions of 
various concepts and situations (passing, yielding, having the right-of-
way). Rules also include prescriptive instructions on expected behavior 
in various situations by individuals with different social positions, such 
as law enforcement offi cials, pedestrians, and other drivers. The belief 
that others will follow these rules of behavior motivates most drivers 
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most of the time to follow them also, and thus regularities of behavior 
are generated. Motor vehicle departments and law enforcement agen-
cies are organizations that generate and disseminate these rules and 
facilitate the creation of the corresponding beliefs. To comprehend 
drivers’ behavior requires studying the three institutional elements that 
constitute the interrelated components of an integrated system in which 
rules correspond to beliefs about behavior and the behavior itself. 
In this conceptualization of institutions, socially articulated and dis-
seminated rules are central in providing individuals with the cognitive, 
coordinative, and informational microfoundations of behavior. These 
social rules provide an individual with the information and the cogni-
tive model (mental models or internalized belief system) required to 
choose or mimic behavior. Similarly, social rules coordinate behavior 
by providing a public signal regarding the behavior that is expected of 
individuals in various circumstances. In short, social rules constitute the 
heuristics that enable and guide behavior by helping individuals form 
beliefs about the world around them and what to expect from it. 
Commonly known social rules enable and guide behavior, and ret-
rospective individuals with limited rationality and cognition respond to 
them. On the one hand, each individual takes the cognitive, coordina-
tive, and informational content of institutionalized rules as a given; he 
responds to, or plays against, the rules, accepting them as they are. On 
the other hand, because each individual responds to these rules based on 
his private information, knowledge, and preferences, these rules aggre-
gate information and knowledge and distribute it in a compressed form. 
The only social rules that can be institutionalized—that can be con-
sidered to be common knowledge, expected to be followed, and that 
correspond to behavior—are those that each individual, by and large, 
finds optimal to follow given his private information, knowledge, and 
preference. In situations in which institutions generate behavior, insti-
tutionalized rules and the associated beliefs and norms correspond to 
self-enforcing behavior. Finally, because behavior corresponds to the 
institutionalized rules and associated beliefs, these rules and beliefs are 
reproduced—not refuted—by behavior. 
In situations in which institutions generate behavior, institutional-
ized rules, the corresponding beliefs regarding causal relationships and 
others’ behavior, and the behavior that these beliefs motivate, consti-
tute an equilibrium. A structure made up of institutionalized rules and 






beliefs enables, guides, and motivates the self-enforcing behavior that 
reproduces it. Most individuals, most of the time, follow the behavior 
that is expected of them. 
The discussion so far has ignored the social and normative founda-
tions of behavior. But humans are social, moral creatures whose behav-
ior is also shaped by the impact of institutions on the social and moral 
underpinnings of behavior. Everything else being equal, people seek to 
act in a manner that generates positive social responses from the people 
they know, elevates their social status and esteem in the broader society, 
provides them with an identity, and is consistent with their (internalized) 
norms.8 In modern sociology, the argument over the behavioral impor-
tance of social exchange, belief in others’ social responses, or the loss 
of esteem following a particular action is associated with Granovetter 
(1985), Homans (1961), and Wrong 1999. Another line of research, 
associated with Parsons (1951), emphasizes the importance of norms in 
motivating behavior by influencing intrinsic utility.9 Internalization of 
norms, or the incorporation of behavioral standards into one’s superego, 
essentially means to develop an internal system of sanctions that sup-
ports the same behavior as the external system.10 In this theory, “values 
and norms were regarded as the basis of a stable social order” (Scott 
1995, p. 40).11 
The extension of the above discussion to incorporate these impor-
tant considerations is straightforward. Extending the analysis to incor-
porate social considerations, for example, recognizes that individuals 
care about others’ perceptions of them and hence are motivated by 
beliefs regarding these perceptions. In institutionalized situations, such 
beliefs constitute an equilibrium in these social relationships, given the 
social and materialistic implications of various technologically possible 
actions. 
For a long time, the difficulty of analytically and empirically study-
ing institutions from this equilibrium perspective was due to the dual 
nature of social factors as endogenous to society yet exogenous to 
each of the individuals whose behavior they influence. Their analy-
sis therefore has had to combine two seemingly contradictory views 
of institutions. The first is the “agency” view, common in economics 
and political economy, which emphasizes that institutions are produced 
by individuals to constrain behavior. These are “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions” 
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(North 1990, p. 97). In contrast, the second, called the “structural” view 
of institutions, is common in sociology and emphasizes that institutions 
transcend individual actors. Institutions enable and motivate behavior 
while constituting the properties of societies that “impose themselves 
upon” individuals (Durkheim [1895] 1950, p. 2), and they “consist of 
cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that pro-
vide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott 1995, p. 33). 
The difficulty of developing an analytical framework that could 
bridge the agency and structural views proved daunting to those who 
advocated integrating factors such as beliefs and norms into institu-
tional analysis. Durkheim ([1895] 1950, p. 45), for example, defined 
institutions as “all the beliefs and modes of behavior instituted by the 
collectivity,” while Parsons (1951, pp. 38–40) has taken the position 
that full institutionalization of a behavioral standard requires its inter-
nalization—namely, its transformation into a norm. Yet, since they 
have not combined the agency and structural views, they have not pro-
posed a way to analytically restrict the set of admissible beliefs and 
norms. Hence, because beliefs and norms are not directly observable, 
any behavior can be justified based on ad hoc assertions regarding the 
beliefs and norms that motivated it. 
In recent years, however, analytical frameworks and empirical meth-
ods suitable for studying institutions from an equilibrium perspective 
have been developed. They rely extensively on microlevel models that 
enable researchers, particularly by using classical, experimental, and 
evolutionary game theory, to restrict the set of admissible institutional-
ized outcomes in social situations.12 The related empirical frameworks 
mostly use context-specific case studies that utilize models to capture 
the particularities of the transactions under consideration and recognize 
the importance of the broader institutional context and history.13 
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AS A HISTORICAL PROCESS 
The study of the dynamics of institutions has gone through three 
phases in economics. Traditionally, economic institutions were consid-
ered immutable cultural features. In the 1970s, the “new institutional 
economics” challenged this view. It considered them as rules, organiza-






tions, contractual forms, or patterns of behavior and employed the tools 
of microeconomic theory to argue that institutions change in response 
to environmental changes. Property rights, contracts, and behavior, for 
example, would adjust to changes in relative prices in an optimal man-
ner or in a way that best served those who dictated rules or chose con-
tracts. More recently, attention has been given to factors causing insti-
tutions to exhibit path-dependence. This view emphasizes that once a 
particular institution prevails, it will tend to perpetuate itself in a chang-
ing environment because of such factors as sunken costs in specifying 
rules, learning effects, or activities of the interest groups to which the 
existing rules give rise. 
Endogenous Institutional Change 
Recognizing the distinction between an institution and institutional 
elements and studying institutions from an equilibrium perspective 
highlight why and how institutional dynamics is a historical process in 
which past institutions influence the rate and direction of institutional 
change. Analytically examining institutions as self-enforcing captures 
how particular beliefs, norms, and behavior can reproduce each other 
and hence the institution. Beliefs and norms motivate behavior, and 
observed behavior confirms the relevance of beliefs and the appro-
priateness of the norms that led to this behavior. Taken together, self-
enforcing beliefs, norms, and behavior are in a steady-state equilibrium. 
The analysis thereby exposes which exogenous changes in the environ-
ment or knowledge bring this reproduction process to an end. 
Studying institutions as self-enforcing and reproducing does not 
seem to be a promising starting point for studying endogenous institu-
tional dynamics. After all, if all beliefs and behavior are self-enforcing 
and confirmed by their observable implications, one would imagine that 
all changes must have an exogenous origin. However, this is not the 
case. A theory of institutional stability facilitates studying how institu-
tions can endogenously change. 
An institution is reinforcing (undermining) when its implica-
tions, beyond behavior in the governed transaction, (weakly) increase 
(decrease) the range of situations (parameters) in which the behavior 
associated with the institution is self-enforcing. Reinforcing processes 
can reflect, for example, individuals’ intentional responses to the incen-
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tives the institution entails, or the unintentional feedback from behav-
ior to factors that influence behavior in the situation under consider-
ation, such as preference and habit formation, knowledge, information, 
demography, ideology, wealth distribution, political power, or social 
networks. 
To illustrate this idea, consider the following example. Suppose that 
belief regarding collective punishment within a community leads to a 
particular regularity of behavior (e.g., as in Greif [1993]). To study the 
institution, we must examine this community, its beliefs, and its behav-
ioral rules as a self-enforcing system of institutional elements that gen-
erated this behavior. We must examine why each member of the com-
munity is endogenously motivated to retain his membership in it, why 
he holds these beliefs, follows the behavioral rules, and participates in 
collective punishment. But even when this is the case at a particular 
point in time, the institution can still undermine itself. For example, 
the economic success of the community implied by collective punish-
ment may lead to its growth over time. This can undermine the self-
enforceability of beliefs in collective punishment, because information 
transmission within a larger group may be too slow to deter deviation. 
Similarly, each member of the community can become, over time, suf-
ficiently wealthy so that the threat of communal punishment will no 
longer be enough to make past patterns of behavior self-enforcing. 
The argument can be seen more clearly by resorting to a game-
theoretic framework. The game-theoretic analysis of institutions 
focuses on studying the relationships between the rules of the game 
and how regularities of behavior—cooperation, wars, political mobili-
zation, social unrest—affect the particular transaction under consider-
ation. When we say that an institution is self-enforcing, we mean that 
the behavior and expected behavior in the transaction under consider-
ation corresponds to an equilibrium. Yet, an institution usually has other 
ramifications that go beyond the behavior it implies in the transaction 
under consideration. Institutions influence factors such as wealth, iden-
tity, ability, knowledge, beliefs, residential distribution, and occupa-
tional specialization that are usually assumed as parametric in the rules 
of the game. 
Although it is not possible to prove that institutions generally have 
such ramifications, it is difficult to think of any institution that in the 
long run does not have implications beyond the behavior in the trans-
Kimmel 2016.indb  68 11/1/2016  10:18:59 AM 
 
68 Greif 
action it governs. In the game-theoretical framework, this influence 
implies a dynamic adjustment of variables that, had this infl uence been 
ignored, would have been considered as parameters in the stage game. 
Game theorists have long recognized that game theory does not pre-
dict a behavioral change following a parametric change. If a strategy 
combination is an equilibrium, it will generically be an equilibrium in 
some parameter set. As long as the actual parameters are in this set, 
game theory does not predict that the associated beliefs and behavior 
will not prevail. Indeed, as Schelling’s (1960) seminal work on focal 
points reminds us, there are good reasons for individuals to continue 
to follow past patterns of behavior even under conditions of marginal 
parametric change. This is the case for at least three interrelated rea-
sons: 1) knowledge, 2) attention, and 3) coordination. 
Recall that institutionalized rules constitute an equilibrium in 
individuals’ responses to them. They not only assist individuals when 
choosing behavior, but they also aggregate, in equilibrium, each indi-
vidual’s dispersed information. In other words, these rules not only 
provide individuals with the information they need to make decisions 
regarding how to act, they also aggregate the information privately held 
by each decision maker. Institutional rules similarly reflect and embody 
knowledge. The information compressed in socially transmitted rules 
permits individuals without knowledge of all the relevant parameters 
and causal mechanisms, and with limited computational ability, to act 
in a manner that leads to equilibrium behavior. Because individuals 
do not observe the relevant parameters and lack full comprehension 
of causal relationships—because they play against a social rule rather 
than follow the rules of the game—the best they can do is perceive the 
world as stationary as long as observations (including those conveyed 
through others’ behavior) do not contradict this perception. 
Regarding the above implies that the persistence of past behav-
ior despite marginal parametric changes occurs because institutional-
ized rules enable individuals with limited knowledge and information 
to choose behavior. Behavioral rules learned in the past are the best 
predictors of future behavior. As long as the behavior of others does 
not reflect a change in the parameters or causal relations that one does 
not observe, one will not change his own behavior, either. Similarly, 
acquiring additional knowledge is demanding. An observed marginal 
parametric shift is not likely to induce decision makers to devote the 
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necessary cognitive resources to consider whether to change their own 
behavior. People don’t stop to consider the optimal response to every 
choice they make in their lives (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
Past patterns persist as well because what one sees, knows, and 
understands in a given situation also reflects the amount of attention 
one devotes to the task. Attention is a scarce resource. Institutionalized 
rules come to the rescue. They enable one to choose behavior in com-
plicated situations without paying much attention, so that one’s limited 
attention resources can be devoted to decision making in noninstitu-
tionalized situations. Because we pay little attention to institutional-
ized situations, parametric shifts that might have been noted, had more 
attention been devoted to observing them, may go unnoticed, further 
contributing to the lack of behavioral change in response to marginal 
parametric changes. Moreover, those who do observe parametric shifts 
and bring this to the attention of others may have little incentive for 
doing so. People will be induced to devote attention to a situation only 
if the behavior or observed outcomes of others differ suffi ciently from 
the expected. 
Coordination failure is the third reason a marginal parametric shift 
does not necessarily lead to behavioral change. When one observes that 
a situation marginally changes, the problem arises of how to behave 
in the new situation, given the multiplicity of self-enforcing behav-
iors. Because people do not share expectations that a new equilibrium 
behavior will be followed, they are likely to rely on past rules of behav-
ior to guide them and continue to follow past patterns of self-enforcing 
behavior. With that expectation, one is likely to continue following the 
past patterns of self-enforcing behavior as well. 
Coordination problems prevail even when there are individuals and 
organizations with the ability to coordinate on new behavior. There 
are many reasons for even beneficial coordination to fail to transpire. 
Sunken costs associated with coordinating change, free-rider problems, 
distributional issues, uncertainties, limited understanding of alterna-
tives, and asymmetric information can all hinder coordination on new 
behavior. 
Hence, the many features that are usually taken as parameters in the 
repeated game formulation share two properties: first, they can gradu-
ally be altered by the implications of the institution under study, and 
second, their marginal changes will not necessarily cause the behavior 





associated with that institution to change. These two properties imply 
that we can consider them as parametric—exogenous and fixed—when 
studying the self-enforcing property of an institution in the short run, 
but we must consider them as endogenous and variable when studying 
the same institutions in the long run. These features can be referred to as 
“quasi-parameters.” We can ignore their long-run implications in study-
ing self-enforceability when these long-run implications are not ex ante 
recognized or appropriately understood and in situations in which such 
recognition will not influence behavior in the short run for the reasons 
stated above. 
Changes to an institution’s quasi-parameters can reinforce or under-
mine it. An institution reinforces itself when, over time, the changes in 
the quasi-parameters it entails imply that the associated behavior is self-
enforcing in a larger set of situations (parameters) than would otherwise 
have been the case. A self-enforcing institution that reinforces itself is 
known as a “self-reinforcing institution.” But a self-enforcing institu-
tion can also undermine itself when the changes in the quasi-parameters 
it entails imply that the associated behavior will be self-enforcing in a 
smaller set of situations. 
The dynamics of self-enforcing beliefs and behavior are therefore 
central to endogenous institutional changes. An institutional change is 
one of changing beliefs, and it occurs when the associated behavior is 
no longer self-enforcing and leads individuals to act in a manner that 
does not reproduce the associated beliefs.14 Undermining processes can 
cause previously self-enforcing behavior to cease being so, leading to 
institutional change. A sufficient condition for endogenous institutional 
change is that the institution’s implications constantly undermine the 
associated behavior. Conversely, a necessary condition for an institu-
tion to prevail over time is that the types of situations in which the 
associated behavior is self-enforcing do not decrease over time: the 
institution’s behavioral implications must reinforce it, at least weakly. 
Hence, unless an institution is (weakly) self-reinforced, it will even-
tually reach a point where its associated behavior is no longer self-
enforcing. Endogenous institutional change will follow. 
Considering reinforcement highlights the importance of another, 
indirect way in which an institution endogenously influences its own 
change—when it influences the magnitude and nature of the exogenous 
shocks that are necessary to cause the associated beliefs and behavior 
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to change. When an institution reinforces itself, its associated behav-
ior does not change. But the reinforced institution is nevertheless more 
robust than the previous one. The behavior associated with it will be 
self-enforcing even in situations where this would not have been the 
case previously. The opposite holds true in cases where an institution 
undermines itself. An institution, whether by reinforcing or by under-
mining itself, indirectly influences its rate of change by determining the 
size of the external parametric change required to render its associated 
behavior as no longer self-enforcing. 
Institutions can change because of endogenous processes, exog-
enous shocks, and combinations of both. The exact mechanism that 
brings about institutional change, once the associated institutional 
behavior is no longer self-enforcing, depends on the nature of the quasi-
parameters that delimit self-reinforcement. If these quasi-parameters 
are observable and their importance well understood, decision makers 
may actually realize that past behavior is no longer self-enforcing, and 
institutional change will be intentional. Intentional selection of alter-
native behavior, specification of new rules through collective decision 
making, and the intentional introduction of organizations are common 
manifestations of the ways in which intentional selection comes about. 
But an institution can cease to be self-enforcing because of changes 
in quasi-parameters that are unobservable, uncertain, and unrecogniz-
able. In such cases, the mechanism of institutional change is likely to 
be unintentional. It may reflect individuals’ willingness to experiment 
and risk deviating from past behavior, or it may reflect the actions of a 
few individuals with better knowledge of the situation. In either case, 
learning is slow and institutional change is rare. It may take a long time 
for self-undermining to lead to new behavior. 
The Influence of Past Institutions on the Direction of 
Institutional Change 
Recognizing the distinction between institutions and institutional 
elements provides the basis for studying how past institutions influence 
the direction of institutional change. Institutional elements inherited 
from the past, such as shared beliefs, networks, political and economic 
organizations, and internalized norms, transcend the situations that led 
to their emergence. They are what members of a society bring with 










them to new situations, providing them with the motivation to bring 
about various new situations through technological, organizational, and 
institutional inventions. New institutions do not simply emerge in the 
context of existing ones; they draw on the historical heritage encapsu-
lated in institutional elements inherited from the past. 
Past institutional elements influence the direction of change because 
there is a fundamental asymmetry between these past institutional ele-
ments and those alternatives that are technologically possible. Past 
institutional elements reflect and embody shared beliefs and knowledge 
among members of the society and constitute legitimate mechanisms to 
coordinate their actions and expectations. They are embodied in their 
utility functions and shared cognitive understanding of the environ-
ment. Unlike rules of the game that reflect physical possibilities, past 
institutional elements are properties of individuals and societies. There-
fore they do not vanish once a new situation prevails, but rather they 
influence the processes that lead to new institutions. Indeed, relying 
on institutional heritage confines the complexity of new problems that 
people face to an order they can cope with. 
Hence, new institutions do not reflect only environmental condi-
tions and the interests of relevant decision makers. They evolve over 
time in a spiral-like manner, building on existing institutional elements. 
For example, communities, networks, and political organizations that 
were formed in the past constitute part of the (“endogenous”) rules of 
the game in new situations. Beliefs that were crystalized in the past and 
embodied within existing institutions become the cultural beliefs that 
individuals bring with them to new situations and influence the selec-
tion of new institutions. They are part of the initial conditions in pro-
cesses selecting among alternative self-enforcing behavior and beliefs 
in new situations. Although agents thus act strategically and pursue 
their interests in these processes, they do so within the context implied 
by past institutions. Past institutions and institutional elements present 
both constraints and opportunities to individuals who are attempting to 
pursue their interests in new situations. 
Specifically, past institutions influence the direction of institutional 
change—they impact the details of new institutions—through what can 
be referred to as environmental, coordination, and inclusion effects. 
First, past institutions and institutional elements constitute part of the 
environment within which processes leading to new institutions tran-
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spire. This environment is composed of other institutions and institu-
tional elements (such as marriage or political institutions) that are para-
metric in relation to the new institution. Second, past institutions and 
institutional elements provide the means to coordinate within this envi-
ronment. This coordination may be unintentional, occurring through the 
impact of cultural beliefs inherited from the past (Greif 1994), or inten-
tional, occurring through coordinating organizations inherited from the 
past, such as parliaments or the council of elders. The ability to coor-
dinate, in turn, depends on the norms of legitimacy inherited from the 
past. A legitimate coordinator’s ability to influence behavior depends, 
however, on the network and organizations inherited from the past that 
the coordinator can draw on in disseminating the new rules of behavior. 
Third, past institutional elements bias the processes leading to 
new institutions. Creating new institutional elements, such as shared 
cognitive systems, shared beliefs, and shared organizations (which 
themselves include such systems and beliefs), is a time-consuming 
and costly endeavor with uncertain results. Similarly, institutions that 
embody existing norms are much more likely to emerge and are easier 
to establish than those that do not. 
Consider, for example, two identical societies that differ only in 
their contract-enforcement institutions. In the first, economic exchange 
has always been supported by legal contract enforcement. This society 
has the appropriate legal organizations (a court and a police force), and 
the prevailing belief is that people will not renege on their contrac-
tual obligations because they fear legal sanctions. In the second soci-
ety, however, exchange is supported by an informal collective punish-
ment, a social network for the transmission of information, and a shared 
understanding of what actions constitute a breach of contract. Now sup-
pose that in these two societies a new transaction is possible and in both 
societies it is technologically feasible to govern it, either by legal or 
communal contract-enforcement institutions. 
It is intuitive that legal enforcement and communal enforcement 
will be used to govern the new transaction in the first and the second 
societies, respectively. After all, members of the first society share the 
knowledge that the legal system can provide contract enforcement, the 
belief that it will enforce contracts, and the confidence that the punish-
ment is sufficient to deter contractual breaches. Introducing an alterna-
tive contract-enforcement institution based on communal punishment 









would require creating an appropriate network making the members’
identity and their past actions common knowledge so that one can be 
punished when necessary. 
Furthermore, it would require generating a shared understanding 
of what actions constitute a breach of contract and the belief that indi-
viduals would participate in communal punishment and that the threat 
of such punishment would deter cheating. Yet the process of building 
relationships, knowledge, and reputations is costly, time-consuming, 
and uncertain. Similarly, in the second society, establishing an impartial 
legal system requires much more than knowledge of how to accomplish 
it, hire judges and policemen, and specify a code of conduct: it also 
requires that the system gain a reputation for operating effectively and 
impartially. In other words, people must believe that the legal system 
will function properly. 
However, past institutions and institutional elements influence but 
do not determine new institutions. This is so because environmental 
factors and functional considerations, such as simplicity, effi ciency, and 
distribution, also direct institutional change. The extent of their influ-
ence, in turn, depends on institutions inherited from the past. This is 
the case because existing institutions influence the institutional transac-
tion costs involved in changing institutional elements inherited from the 
past. Belief in religious law prevailed in the Ottoman Empire but not 
in premodern Japan. Adopting Western laws was correspondingly more 
difficult in the former than in the latter. Finally, unless institutional ele-
ments inherited from the past become part of a new self-enforcing insti-
tution, they will decay and vanish over time. Institutions are outcomes 
that emerge from within and interact with the legacy of past institu-
tional elements, but for these elements to persist, they must become a 
part of the new institutions. 
This view of institutional evolution as a historical process does not 
deny the importance of agency (the pursuit of institutional change by 
goal-oriented actors) in influencing institutional selection. It recog-
nizes, however, that history provides agents—even political agents— 
with constraints and opportunities in their ability to influence the insti-
tutional dynamic. The past influences the future, not because agents are 
passive but because they find it necessary, useful, and desirable to draw 
on the past. They do so to determine the best way to behave in new situ-
ations when intentionally pursuing institutional change, when contem-




Society and State in Determining Economic Outcomes 75 
plating the development or adoption of institutional and organizational 
innovations, or when they are engaged in conflicts over institutional 
selection. Analytically, it is possible to capture important aspects of the 
interplay between history and agency by recognizing that past institu-
tions and institutional elements constitute beliefs in and the rules of the 
game within which interactions lead to new institutions (see discussion 
in Greif [2006], Chapter 7). 
Past institutional elements are incorporated into new institutions, 
and new institutions emerge within the context of—and hence are com-
plementary to—existing institutions. This implies that they will form 
an institutional complex, which is a set of institutions that govern vari-
ous transactions, share common institutional elements, and are comple-
mentary to each other. The exact attributes of such complexes, in turn, 
also influence both the rate and direction of institutional change. These 
attachments determine, for example, the speed and scope of change, 
whether it will be continuous and encompass many institutions, and 
whether new institutions will be more or less likely to include past insti-
tutional elements. This implies the need to study a society’s institutions 
from a holistic, systemic perspective. 
This view of institutional dynamics considers endogenous insti-
tutional change and the impact of institutional heritage on individu-
als’ abilities to infl uence the direction of institutional change. As such, 
this view occupies a middle ground between alternative positions. In 
economics, transaction-cost economics assumes that institutions are 
instrumental transaction costs optimizing responses to environmental 
conditions (e.g., Williamson [1985]), but in evolutionary economics it 
is common to identify them with history-dependent, and not necessar-
ily functional, behavior (e.g., Hodgson [1998]). Similarly, in political 
science, rational choice analysis examines institutions as instrumental 
outcomes using equilibrium analysis, while historical institutionalism 
emphasizes that they reflect a historical process (Thelen 1999). 
CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
The importance of integrating the “cultural” and “social” factors 
into institutional analysis has been recognized by many students of 





institutions in economics, sociology, and political science (Hall and 
Taylor 1996; North 1990; Scott 1995; Williamson 2000). Yet, as noted 
by Williamson, the social and cultural factors were either ignored or 
taken as exogenous in the institutions-as-rules perspective. Recogniz-
ing that institutions are composed of social factors breaks the conceptual 
divide between studying institutions as formal rules and studying them 
as cultural phenomena. In both cases, behavior is guided and enabled 
by rules providing shared cultural frames, cognition, and behavioral 
instructions; is motivated by beliefs and norms; and is facilitated by 
social structures (such as networks and bureaucracies) and procedures. 
Consider, for example, beliefs. Whether behavior is formal-rule 
or culturally driven, one’s choice of behavior is constrained by shared 
beliefs regarding actions that others, such as agents of the state or eco-
nomic agents, will take in various circumstances. In both cases, when 
the underlying situation is one of pure coordination, the institutional-
ized beliefs are self-enforcing. Each decision maker’s best response to 
believing that others will follow the rules is to follow them also. In 
other situations, such as when the underlying situation is characterized 
by a free-rider problem, the behavior specified by the rules is not self-
enforcing. Hence, rules will be followed only if the decision makers 
believe that failing to follow them will entail sufficiently costly sanc-
tions imposed by the relevant agents. The credibility of the threat of 
punishment and its magnitude are essential. 
Yet the sources, and hence the nature of rules, beliefs, and norms, 
differ between the formal-rule-driven and the culturally driven cases. 
Again, consider beliefs. When behavior is formal-rule-driven, the rules 
articulated by the state coordinate on beliefs regarding how others will 
behave. This requires the state to have the organizational capacity to 
generate and disseminate rules and the necessary legitimacy to induce a 
sufficient number of individuals to believe others will follow the behav-
ior the rules specify. 
When behavior is culturally driven, it is motivated by cultural 
beliefs.15 Cultural beliefs are the shared ideas and thoughts that gov-
ern interactions among individuals and between them, their gods, and 
other groups. Cultural beliefs differ from knowledge in that they are 
not empirically discovered or analytically proved. They usually evolve 
spontaneously without purposeful design and become identical and 
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commonly known through the socialization process by which culture is 
unified, maintained, and communicated. 
Such differences notwithstanding, recognizing that a unifi ed theory 
of action underlies behavior in both cases highlights the many inter-
relationships between the analysis of formal-rule and culturally driven 
behavior. Indeed, the analysis of each of these cases complements— 
rather than substitutes for—the other. 
There are two types of interrelationships—1) static and 2) dynamic— 
between formal-rule-driven and culturally driven behavior. When study-
ing formal-rule-driven behavior, understanding actions and outcomes 
requires examining the microprocess by which rules and beliefs are 
enacted. After all, if rules specified by the state are to be followed, it is 
not enough for them just to be announced. They must be acted upon by 
the economic agents and, if necessary, enforced by agents of the state. 
The agents’ cultural, social, and organizational attributes and capacities 
thereby will influence whether the formal rules will be followed or not. 
The opposite is also true: cultural and social features that were inte-
grated into formal rules are reproduced by the associated behavior. In 
other words, a society’s cultural and organizational aspects are embed-
ded in formal rules that lead to the reproduction of these aspects. 
In terms of their dynamic interrelationships, the fundamental asym-
metry implies that the past matters, whether behavior is culturally or 
formal-rule-driven. In either case, beliefs, norms, and social structures 
inherited from the past affect the processes, leading to new institutions. 
In particular, they affect the behavior through which the formal rules 
regulating economic life are enacted, and they have an effect on the 
resulting rules on behavior. Indeed, the process of reaching formal rules 
and the rules that are thereby articulated reflect a society’s cultural and 
social features. 
This historical heritage influences politically determined rules, is 
integrated into the resulting institutions, and influences the rate and 
direction of subsequent institutional change. 
The opposite causal relationships also prevail. Formal rules shape 
culture and social features by influencing behavior and incentives. They 
have an impact on the formation of networks and other social structures 
by influencing whose interests are aligned, who interacts with whom, 
when, and in what contexts. The associated behavior implies particu-





lar role models, the motivation to socialize one’s children in a specific 
manner, perceptions of fairness, feelings of entitlement, informational 
feedback, and the development of knowledge and beliefs. 
To understand economic outcomes, the static and dynamic interplay 
between formal, state-mandated rules and a society’s cultural and social 
features must be examined.16 In particular, the rules articulated by the 
state, and the effectiveness of such rules, reflect social and cultural fea-
tures inherited from the past. Conversely, past rules influence the trajec-
tory of cultural and social development. Ample evidence reveals such 
causal relationships. 
The following few examples illustrate the impact of cultural beliefs, 
social structures, and norms on political institutions and the rules the 
state articulates. Cultural beliefs regarding the objectives and intentions 
of various groups in a society influence the set of political institutions 
that support political order. In late medieval Genoa, for example, each 
of the city’s two main clans expected the other to be willing to use mili-
tary force to gain control over Genoa if the opportunity arose. These 
beliefs limited their ability to cooperate in the expansion of Genoa’s 
commerce because such expansion threatened to alter the balance of 
military power between them. After a long and costly learning period, 
this problem was mitigated by hiring an outside noble with a military 
force that provided a balance of power among the clans. While suc-
cessful in the short run, this arrangement sustained the beliefs and clan 
structure that made the arrangement necessary (Greif 1998, 2006). 
Distinct cultural beliefs create different demands for formal-rule 
behavior supported by state-provided formal contract-enforcement 
institutions. For example, Greif (1994) documented how, during the 
late medieval period, collectivist cultural beliefs among Maghribi trad-
ers led to an economic self-enforcing collective punishment, horizontal 
agency relations, segregation, and an ingroup social communication 
network. In this collectivist society, individuals could be induced to 
forgo “improper” behavior by credibly threatening informal collective 
economic punishment. This implied there was relatively little demand 
for state-provided contract enforcement. 
This was not the case among the contemporary Genoese, however. 
Their individualistic cultural beliefs led to an individualist society with 
a vertical and integrated social structure, a relatively low level of com-
munication, and no economic self-enforcing collective punishment. In 
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this society, a relatively low level of informal economic enforcement 
could be achieved because there was an absence of economic self-
enforcing collective punishment and networks for information trans-
mission. Furthermore, the integrated social structure and low level of 
communication hindered social and moral enforcement mechanisms. 
To support collective actions and to facilitate exchange, individualist 
societies need to develop formal enforcement mechanisms. Further-
more, a formal legal code is likely to be required to facilitate exchange 
through coordinating expectations and enhancing the deterrence effect 
of formal organizations. 
The impact of cultural beliefs on the role of the state did not end 
in the premodern world. In the nineteenth century, different cultural 
beliefs in America and Germany led to distinct forms of legislation 
and laws regulating the interrelations among corporations. Americans 
believed large corporations were corrupt in nature. They were per-
ceived to be motivated by greed and likely to collude and influence 
officials to increase their profits. Strict antitrust laws and regulations to 
curtail their power were therefore enacted in the United States, but in 
Germany, the opposite view was held. There, corporations were consid-
ered responsible entities whose prosperity would benefit the nation as 
a whole. Antitrust legislation was absent; indeed, collusive agreements 
were legally binding. 
Distinct cultural beliefs regarding the relationship between effort 
and material success have led to different welfare policies in the United 
States and Europe. In the United States, the prevailing belief has been 
that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to 
enjoy the fruits of their efforts. The political economy outcome has 
therefore been one of low distribution and low taxes. In equilibrium, 
effort is high and the role of luck is indeed limited. Consequently, out-
comes are relatively fair, and beliefs are reproduced. In Europe, how-
ever, the initial beliefs were that luck, birth, connections, and corruption 
determined wealth. The political economy outcome was therefore one 
of high taxation and distorted allocations that reproduced these beliefs 
(Alesina and Angeletos 2005). Platteau and Hayami (1998) argued that 
inefficient sharing norms in Africa reflected the belief that personal gain 
was due to luck and not effort. 
The set of rules that a state can effectively enact (and that can be 
followed with relatively low enforcement costs) is limited by legiti-





macy norms—i.e., norms specifying the confines of the domain within 
which the state has regulatory rights over behavior. The failure of Pro-
hibition in the United States, which was in effect between 1920 and 
1933, reflects more than a love of drinking alcohol. It reflects the belief 
by individuals that they had the right to consume alcohol and that the 
government was illegitimately regulating its consumption. Prohibition 
is much more effective in some contemporary Muslim countries, where 
different beliefs and norms prevail. 
In Muslim countries, legitimacy norms have hindered changes in 
other rules. Consider slavery, for example. Slavery was eliminated de 
facto within Europe during the late medieval period. Later, of course, it 
was reintroduced in the European colonies and only abolished de jure 
and de facto around the mid–nineteenth century. The elimination of 
slavery in Europe was “one of the great landmarks in labor history” 
(Duby 1974, p. 40). This profound change—the early endogenous 
elimination of slavery—did not occur in many Muslim countries, where 
legal slavery remained until after World War II. Some Muslim countries 
abolished slavery as late as 1962, and the institution still exists de facto 
in various contemporary Muslim countries (Lewis 1990; Segal 2001). 
Why did the Christian world lead the Muslim world in abolishing 
slavery? The reason concerns the distinct institutional complexes of the 
two civilizations. The historical roots of this distinction date back to the 
rise of Christianity within the Roman Empire. Since the Roman Empire 
had a unified code of law and a rather effective legal system, Christian-
ity did not have to provide a code of law governing everyday life when 
creating its own communities of believers. Christianity developed as a 
religion of orthodoxy and proper beliefs; in earthly matters, Christians 
followed Roman law and later other secular laws. During the late medi-
eval period, this legacy enabled the new European states to gradually 
reassert control over civil legal matters, including slavery. 
Islam followed a very different process, in which Muhammad estab-
lished both a religion and a political, economic, and social unit. Islam 
therefore had to provide and oblige adherents to follow the Islamic code 
of law, Sharia law. Like Judaism, therefore, Islam is a religion that regu-
lates its adherents’ behavior in their everyday economic, political, and 
social lives. 
The Christian and Islamic holy scriptures discuss behavior toward 
slaves, giving it moral legitimacy (see, e.g., Leviticus 25:46, Ephesians 
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6; Quran 16:71, 4:36, 30:28). But in each civilization, the institutions 
governing slavery were part of distinct institutional complexes. In the 
Christian world, laws governing slavery fell within the institutional 
complex, at the center of which were legal and political organizations. 
Given the European tradition of man-made law, abolishing slavery did 
not alter the central organization, beliefs, or norms of Christianity. 
This was not true in the Islamic world, where slavery was part of 
an institutional complex at the center of which were beliefs regarding 
the holiness of religious law. The legal tradition in Islam considers law 
as “the moral status of an act in the eyes of God” while “assessing 
the moral status of human acts was the work of the [religious] jurists” 
(Crone 2004, p. 9). Sharia law recognized slavery; thus, abolishing it 
implied an action that contradicted a central internalized belief of Mus-
lims—that the Sharia is a sacred law sanctioned by God. Abolishing 
slavery challenged the faith’s moral authority, the legal authority of the 
Sharia, and the stature and power of those responsible for administrat-
ing it.17 A difficulty in abolishing slavery was that “from a Muslim point 
of view, to forbid what God permits is almost as great an offense as to 
permit what God forbids—and slavery was authorized and regulated by 
the holy law” (Lewis 1990, p. 78). The institutional elements relevant 
to slavery were central to Muslim religious beliefs. 
Past institutional elements provide opportunities as well as con-
straints in the process of institutional change for able rule makers. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt insisted that the U.S. Social Security system be 
defined as insurance and not a welfare system. This was much more 
than semantic. Framing the issue in a way that linked the system to 
beliefs associated with the institution of insurance (the belief that one 
has the right to be paid after paying one’s premiums) was intentional. 
Roosevelt knew that this would render Social Security self-enforcing in 
a larger set of circumstances in the future (Romer 1996). 
Effective rules also change cultural and social features, which, in 
turn, influence what other rules can be effectively enacted. Consider, for 
example, the case of premodern Venice, which, unlike Genoa, devised 
rules that reduced, over time, the political importance of clans and fos-
tered beliefs in cooperation rather than confrontation. The history of 
Venice during its early days parallels Genoa’s. After an initial period of 
interclan cooperation, Venetian history was characterized by interclan 
rivalries over capturing the office of the Doge (Lane 1973; Norwich 







1977). Originally the Doge was a Byzantine official, but shortly after 
Venice was established in 679, the post became that of an elected mon-
arch. For the next few hundred years, clans fought in Venice for control 
of the Doge’s post. As in Genoa, economic cooperation was hindered 
by the lack of an institution to contain interclan rivalry. 
Changes around the Mediterranean increased the cost of these con-
frontations. Toward the end of the eleventh century, the decline of Byz-
antine naval power increased the gains to the Venetians, leading to the 
formation of a political institution enabling cooperation. As a response 
to this opportunity, they established a new self-enforcing institution. At 
its center was the belief that clans would join together to fi ght against 
any renegade clan that would attempt to gain political dominance over 
the city and its economic resources. This belief was sustained by a set of 
rules whose prescribed behavior was made self-enforcing by that belief. 
The rules limited the Doge’s power to distribute economic and political 
rents, curtailed each clan’s ability to influence the election of a Doge (or 
any other officer), established tight administrative control over gains 
from interclan political cooperation, and allocated rents fairly among 
all the important Venetian clans so that all had a share regardless of 
clan affiliation. This allocative rule therefore did not provide clans with 
incentives to increase their military strength and plan interclan military 
conflicts. 
The belief that clans would join together to confront those that 
attempted to use military power to gain control over the city was made 
self-enforceable because each clan had a stake in the implementation of 
these rules. But these rules and the associated beliefs were also reinforc-
ing: they provided clans with few incentives to invest their resources in 
fortifying their residences or instilling norms of clan loyalty in their 
members rather than loyalty to the city. 
There was therefore a positive feedback from rules to culture. By 
weakening the clans and fostering a common Venetian identity, Ven-
ice’s republican magistracy over time increased the range of situa-
tions in which it was self-enforcing. This institution also prevented the 
endogenous formation of a political faction among nonnoble elements 
of the city, the popoli, because the magistracy as an institution did not 
motivate clans to establish patronage networks that would have chan-
neled rents from political control over Venice’s overseas possessions to 
nonnoble clans.18 
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Similar interplay between state-mandated rules and cleavage struc-
tures operate in modern states (Greif and Laitin 2004). Rules reflect 
existing social structures and cultural beliefs, which, in turn, repro-
duce these structures. In newly independent Nigeria, which gained its 
independence in 1960, political parties were regionally based, and they 
catered to the needs and aspirations of the majority tribal groups in 
their regions. In the Western region, the Action Group catered to the 
interests of the dominant Yoruba population, and Yorubas largely asso-
ciated themselves as supporters of that party. Within the Yoruba region, 
factions of the Action Group represented the interests of Yoruba’s sub-
tribes, associated with different ancestral cities. Similarly, the NPC, the 
party of the Northern Region, catered to Hausa interests, and the NCNC, 
the party of the Eastern Region, catered to Ibo interests. We can sum-
marize the dominant cleavage structure of newly independent Nigeria 
as tribally based, with three principal groups dividing the political pie. 
In Nigeria, political leaders present platforms and lists of candi-
dates that reflect the interests of nationality constituencies, and voters 
tend to respond to symbols and messages that speak to them as mem-
bers of a particular tribal or nationality group. This cleavage structure is 
sustained by beliefs that have been dubbed “everyday primordialism” 
(Fearon and Laitin 2000). Primordialism reflects the belief that ethnic or 
nationality differences are biologically established and ultimately more 
important than any other possible identification when it comes to social, 
political, or economic transactions. Primordial beliefs of this sort are 
hardly universal and were inherited from Nigeria’s history. They were 
created and sustained under previous political structures. British colo-
nialism ruled “indirectly” through tribal chiefs, who were paid by the 
British colonial state. These tribal chiefs were granted levels of author-
ity they had rarely achieved in the precolonial period, and Nigerians 
had to petition through tribal authority structures to get a hearing from 
the British overrulers. Thus, colonialism played an important role in 
delineating tribal boundaries, clarifying tribal cleavages, and generat-
ing primordial beliefs. 
Federal institutions that were built into the constitution rati-
fied at the time of independence responded to the existing cleavages 
and beliefs. Political distributions were made based on formulae that 
returned federal funds to the original three regions. In 1967, the eastern 
region (whose leaders were opposed to the formula for the distribution 




of newly gained oil revenues) attempted secession, but the region lost 
a bloody three-year war fought against federal forces. Subsequently, 
several minority tribes were given their own federal units (then called 
states). Each of the 12 states had a budget supported in large part by 
federally collected oil revenues. Since each state got a base allocation 
to cover the provision of public goods, smaller and smaller nationality 
groups, spurred by this incentive, demanded their own states. By 1999, 
there were 36 separate states, almost all dominated by a single tribal 
group. 
While the above discussion emphasizes the importance of social 
structures and cultural beliefs, the same argument can be made regard-
ing norms. Laws protecting labor evolved in Europe for various eco-
nomic and political reasons following World War II. After prevailing 
for a long period, however, such laws began to be viewed by people not 
as a protection but as an entitlement. As the recent labor riots in France 
indicate, this drastically altered the ability of the state to change them 
by fiat. These laws became a right, not a privilege. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This chapter provides a sketch of a theory of action (Greif 1994, 
2006) that accommodates both formal-rule and culturally driven behav-
ior. In both cases, the same social factors—rules, beliefs, and norms that 
often manifest themselves as organizations (social structures)—gener-
ate regularities of behavior. This theory of action does not presuppose 
that behavior is formal-rule or culturally driven. It restricts the set of 
permissible behavior by requiring that each individual is guided, able, 
and motivated to adopt a certain behavior, given the social factors influ-
encing his actions, while these social factors must be reproduced in a 
similar manner. 
From this perspective, asking whether society or the state is more 
important in determining economic outcomes understates the complex-
ity of studying the sources of economic behavior. Society and state 
intertwine in generating behavior. In particular, for the formal-rule 
approach to influence behavior, the state has to be suffi ciently effective 
in formulating and disseminating rules and creating the self-enforcing 
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and reproducing beliefs, norms, and organizations that are required to 
motivate and enable the corresponding behavior. Yet, society—its cul-
tural beliefs, norms, networks, and other social structures—infl uences a 
state’s effectiveness in achieving this task. The ability to institute rule-
driven behavior is affected by culturally driven behavior. The converse 
also holds: effective formal rules shape society. 
It is sufficient to note that a functioning state is an outcome, and 
its ability to formulate rules depends on the cultural beliefs of various 
groups regarding not only their interests but also the goals and expected 
behavior of other groups. The difficulties in creating a functioning gov-
ernment in Iraq after the American occupation reveal the extent of this 
problem. Similarly, compliance with state-mandated rules depends on 
cultural beliefs and norms regarding sources of legitimacy, appropriate 
behavior, and obligations toward kin and members of other social struc-
tures, such as tribes and ethnic groups. The limits the modern state faces 
in ensuring compliance to formal rules in the absence of complemen-
tary beliefs and norms is well reflected in the large size of the informal 
sector and the prevalence of corruption in many modern economies. 
Studying the many varieties of capitalism is an important line of 
research in comparative political economy and sociology (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Focusing on developing countries, this research has suc-
cessfully examined the distinct formal rules that enabled various types 
of capitalism to flourish. The argument presented above suggests that a 
complementary useful line of analysis would be to explore the common 
factors in these societies that render these formal rules relatively effec-
tive in influencing behavior. Such an investigation would be likely to 
enhance our understanding of why capitalism—in any form—has failed 
to emerge in so many societies, leaving their members in relative, if not 
absolute, poverty. 
Notes 
1. The discussion in this chapter draws on Greif (2006) and, more generally, on an 
approach to institutional analysis known as comparative and historical institu-
tional analysis. For related discussions of this approach, see also Greif (1997, 
1998) and Aoki (2001). 
2. Barzel (1989), North (1990), Eggertsson (1990), Furubotn and Richter (1997), and 
Williamson (1985, 1996) are classic expositions in economics. 
3. This approach is sociological in nature because it accommodates the four main 







distinctions between the economic and the sociological views as summarized by 
Smelser and Swedberg (1994, pp. 4–8) in the Handbook of Economic Sociology. 
The socioeconomic perspective does not presuppose methodological individual-
ism (namely, that actors’ preferences can always be studied as uninfl uenced by 
the actions of others); rather, it holds that the allocation of resources refl ects only 
formal rationality adopted in neoclassical economics, that social structures and 
meaning are not important in constraining behavior, and that the economy is not an 
integral part of the society. As a matter of fact, the perspective adopted here—as is 
now so common in economics in general—accepts that preferences and rationality 
are socially constructed, that social structures and meaning are important, and that 
the economy is an integral part of the society and has to be studied accordingly. 
4. In a sense, this analysis follows a well-established sociological tradition (e.g., 
Berger and Luckmann [1967]) by concentrating on the social construction of what 
each individual considers the environment in which he acts. 
5. I use the term system to highlight the interrelations among an institution’s various 
elements, but an institution that need not have all of the elements of the system 
(rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations). 
6. The term guide, in this case, means to provide the knowledge required to take and 
coordinate a particular action. The term motivate here means to induce behavior 
based on external or intrinsic rewards and punishments. 
7. Scott (1995, p. 33) advances a different, nonunitary notion of institutions, accord-
ing to which institutions “consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative struc-
tures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior.” Chapter 
5 clarifies the relationships between the two definitions. 
8. Sociologists have explored this foundation (for reviews, see Wrong [1999] and 
Scott [1995]). Its importance has also been stressed by many prominent econo-
mists, including Akerlof (1984), Arrow (1981), Becker (1974), Hirshleifer (1985), 
Lal (1998), North (1990), Platteau (1994), and Samuelson (1993). 
9. Psychologists define an intrinsically motivated act as one that is taken without any 
reward but the value of the action itself (see Frey [1997], pp. 13–14). 
10. On norms and their transmission, see Cavalli-Sforza, Luca, and Feldman (1981); 
Davis (1949); and Witt (1986). 
11. I use the term norms to note both the values specifying the preferred or the desir-
able (e.g., winning the game) and norms specifying the legitimate means of 
achieving these goals (e.g., winning by playing fair). 
12. The classical game-theoretic framework, for example, assumes a complete model 
and common knowledge and focuses on equilibrium strategies played by highly 
rational individuals. This corresponds to a situation in which institutionalized 
rules that aggregate private knowledge and information provide shared cognition, 
information, and coordination. The analysis thus restricts the set of admissible 
rules, beliefs, and behavior to those in which each limitedly rational individual, 
responding to the cognitive, coordinative, and informational content of the insti-
tutionalized rules, follows the behavior expected of him. In situations in which an 
institution generates behavior, the knowledge and information that are compressed 
into the institutionalized rules enable and guide individuals, despite their limited 
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perception, knowledge, and computational ability, to act in a manner that leads 
to behavior (and reflects the constraints on admissible beliefs and behavior) that 
the game-theoretic equilibrium analysis captures. Classical game theory can be 
usefully employed to study situations in which it is reasonable to assert that social 
rules were institutionalized. See Greif (2006, Chapter 5). 
13. For an extensive recent discussion, see Greif (2006), Chapters 10–11 and the ref-
erences therein.
 14. The focus here is only on the issue of endogenous institutional change due to 
self-reinforcement and undermining, but the above observations regarding the 
nature of institutions, institutionalized rules, and beliefs also enable addressing 
related issues—e.g., intentional, coordinated action by individuals to change oth-
ers’ beliefs, draw attention to change, coordinate actions by some to influence 
others’ optimal behavior, and establish organizations to foster or halt reinforce-
ment or undermining. 
15. On cultural beliefs in general, see, for example, Davis (1949, in particular pp. 
52ff., 192ff.). Regarding their importance in influencing institutional change, see 
Greif (1994) and Nee and Ingram (1998). 
16. Even symbols, terms, and gestures associated with past institutions, such as “sign-
ing a contract” or “the crown,” influence institutional selection. They constitute 
commonly known external representations of encapsulated knowledge on which 
individuals condition their behavior. Sociologists have long emphasized the 
importance of a shared cultural understanding (script, cognition, or interpretive 
frames) in constraining the behavior that leads to new institutions by determining 
what actors can conceive (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Dobbin 1994; Meyer and 
Rowan 1991; Scott 1995). 
17. I do not argue that the laws specified in the Sharia were static and immutable to 
change. This definitely was not the case. The argument is that different constraints 
and opportunities for legal changes exist in societies with and without religious 
law. More broadly, legal dynamics are distinct among systems in which the law 
has different normative contents and in which different decision makers influence 
legal development. 
18. This group had been extended several times to absorb emerging nonnoble fami-
lies. The system therefore had the flexibility required for its perpetuation. 
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5 
Motivating Consummate Effort 
David M. Kreps 
Stanford University 
What is the best way to motivate consummate effort? 
By “consummate effort,” I mean effort undertaken by a worker 
within an organization that goes well beyond any nominal job descrip-
tion, in a manner that is desired by the organization, at a job that has 
some if not all of the following characteristics: 
• The individual worker must attend to several different tasks and 
must allocate her time among them. 
• The tasks to be done are, ex ante, ambiguous. What to do next 
involves the results of work done so far and the resolution of 
environmental uncertainty, in ways that neither the worker nor 
her supervisors can anticipate initially. 
• The tasks involve creativity by the worker or, at least, thinking 
and then acting “outside the box” on occasion. 
• Outcomes are hard to describe, let alone measure, in the short 
run. 
• Insofar as outcomes can be measured, they are the result of the 
efforts of multiple workers. 
• Cooperation among workers is important to the organization. 
• The worker has substantial effective autonomy; the technology 
is such that she makes on-the-job choices with little supervision 
or even guidance from her supervisors. 
For lack of a better term, let me call such jobs Type-K jobs, for 
Knowledge (or Knowledge Worker). Such jobs are particularly preva-
lent in organizations in the so-called new economy. But even in the 
old economy of manufacture, a firm that employs high-commitment 
human-resource management (see Baron and Kreps [1999], Chap-
93 
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ter 9) will have workers assigned to jobs with at least some of these 
characteristics. Therefore, the question that leads off this chapter is of 
importance, both to practicing managers who wish to be successful 
and to economists (and other social scientists) who wish to understand 
the practice-performance link in both new-economy organizations and 
organizations that embrace high-commitment human resources (HR). 
Unhappily, the dominant economic theory of motivation—incen-
tive theory, a.k.a. agency theory—is of little help. Or, more accurately, 
agency theory is of negative help. Starting from the basic agency-
theory model—i.e., rewards for (apparent) performance that balance 
effort and risk aversion (Grossman and Hart 1983; Holmstrom 1979)— 
analyses of job models that incorporate some Type-K characteristics 
generally come to the conclusion that rewards-for-performance will be 
ineffective.1 
Let me be clear here: I’m not saying that mainstream economics 
cannot explain how to motivate consummate effort. But, at least as 
formulated in much of the literature, it tells us that, for Type-K jobs, 
schemes based on pay (and other forms of tangible personal rewards) 
for performance as measured by outcomes are difficult to get right and, 
if gotten right, expensive for the level of motivation provided. 
So, what are the alternatives? Social psychologists propose a num-
ber of motivational channels beyond tangible personal rewards, and 
they offer theories as to how effective these channels are. Inspired by 
their theories, I report some survey data in which successful executives 
are (essentially) asked to give their impressions about what is the best 
way to motivate consummate effort. After a brief recounting of two 
things—1) various psychological theories of motivation and 2) some 
data on human resource management (HRM) practices in high-tech 
start-ups—I compare and contrast how an economist and a social psy-
chologist might explain these data. Many of the perspectives I attribute 
to the psychologist can be incorporated into economics, but one impor-
tant feature of some psychological theories—the notion that, in terms 
an economist would use, employee preferences are malleable—goes 
beyond orthodox economic theory. I close by arguing that this impor-
tant feature of real-life motivation of consummate effort should become 
part of economic orthodoxy. 
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SOME MOTIVATING SURVEY DATA 
The ideal research strategy to address the opening question of this 
chapter, on how to motivate consummate effort, is (probably) to con-
duct controlled field experiments. But organizations are rarely willing 
to allow social scientists to experiment in a controlled fashion with the 
motivational channels the organizations employ.2 So, bearing in mind 
the many deficiencies of retrospective survey research, we can instead 
ask successful managers how effective (in their view) are some possible 
alternatives. 
Each summer for the past 15 years or so, I’ve surveyed the par-
ticipants of the Stanford Executive Program (SEP) on this matter. The 
SEP is a six-week general-management program, typically bringing to 
Stanford between 120 and 160 top-level executives.3 The summer of 
2013 was fairly typical: of 158 participants, 124 responded to my sur-
vey. Table 5.1 gives some demographics volunteered by the 124 respon-
dents, but here are some quick summary statistics: The participants are 
from around the world, with 20 to 30 percent each from three areas: 
1) the United States and Canada, 2) Europe, and 3) East and South Asia. 
The median age is around 45. Most (85 percent) are men. About half 
hold ranks in their home institutions of chair or chief executive offi-
cer, chief operating offi cer, or head of a staff function; the rest are less 
senior (but, we infer, are rising in their organizations, since their orga-
nizations paid the exorbitant fees that Stanford charges participants).4 
Functionally, half consider themselves to be general managers, with the 
rest in a variety of specialized functions (only 2.4 percent are in HRM). 
And they come from a variety of different industries. 
The survey has several parts, but the part of immediate interest 
begins with the following prologue: “The next five questions concern 
what motivates ‘best work’ or ‘consummate effort’ in your organization 
back home. To be clear, by ‘best work’ or ‘consummate effort,’ I mean 
effort that goes above and beyond the nominal specs of the job. I’m 
interested both in what motivates you and in what motivates your direct 
reports, and in this part of the survey, I am interested in the following 
sorts of motivators: 
Kimmel 2016.indb  96 11/1/2016  10:19:03 AM 
96 Kreps 




United States/Canada 31 25.0 
Latin America 10 8.1 
Europe 37 29.8 
East or South Asia 27 21.8 
Africa/Middle East 4 3.2 
Australia/New Zealand/Pacifi c Islands 15 12.1 
Age 
Less than 40 18 14.5 
40 to 44 45 36.3 
45 to 49 35 28.2 
50 and older 26 21.0 
Sex 
Men 105 84.7 
Women 19 15.3 
Rank 
Chair/CEO/managing partner/president 25 20.2 
COO 11 8.9 
Head of a staff function: CFO/CPO/CIO/etc. 26 21.0 
Senior VP/senior partner 14 11.3 
VP/partner 23 18.5 
General manager 25 20.2 
Functional field 
General management 54 43.5 
Finance 15 12.1 
Accounting 2 1.6 
Marketing 9 7.3 
Operations/production/manufacturing 10 8.1 
Information technology 5 4.0 
Human resource management 3 2.4 
Strategic planning 8 6.5 
Other 18 14.5 
Industry 
Financial services/investments 17 13.7 
IT/Electronics/computer technology 27 21.8 
Manufacturing/construction 24 19.4 
Health care/pharma/biotech 2 1.6 
Marketing/retail 12 9.7 
Public sector 6 4.8 
Consulting/advisory/education 5 4.0 
Other 31 25.0 
SOURCE: Author’s compilation. 
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• a direct connection between providing consummate effort and 
tangible rewards for the individual, such as higher pay, better 
promotion prospects, higher status, and so forth 
• work that is personally interesting and exciting 
• a direct connection between providing consummate effort and 
success for the organization (or work group) 
• work that contributes to society, transcending both the personal 
interests and rewards of the individual doing the work and the 
well-being of associates and the organization for which the indi-
vidual works. 
Then, concerning these four motivational channels, I ask four 
questions: 
1) How effective are each of the four motivational channels in 
motivating the best work of the people that report to you? The 
survey provides respondents with a five-point scale on which 
to respond: “Not at all effective”; “Of limited effectiveness”; 
“Effective, but not very effective”; “Very effective”; and 
“Only this is effective for eliciting best work.” 
2) Which of the following statements is most descriptive of what 
motivates the best work of your direct reports? 
• They do their best work when they perceive a direct 
connection between providing consummate effort and 
personal rewards for them. 
• They do their best work when the work is personally 
interesting and exciting. 
• They do their best work when they see a direct connec-
tion between their consummate effort and success for 
the organization. 
• They do their best work when their work contributes to 
society, transcending . . . both the personal interests and 
rewards of the individual doing the work and the well-
being of associates and the organization for which the 
individual works. 
3) This question is the same as Question 1 but asked in terms of 
motivating the respondent’s own best work. 





4) The final question reprises Question 2 but, as in Question 3, in 
the context of motivating the respondent’s own best work. 
Of course, we have no guarantee that the jobs of either the SEP
participants or those who report directly to them are Type-K jobs. But 
because the participants are generally members of upper management 
in their organizations, as are their direct reports, I believe it is safe to 
assume that most of the jobs have some if not all of the characteristics 
of a Type-K job. Be that as it may, the responses collected are shown 
in Table 5.2. Note that the upper half of the table contains the answers 
given to Questions 1 and 2—that is, answers concerning the respon-
dents’ perceptions of their direct reports. It also gives mean scores for 
answers to the first question, averaging over all responses, where “Not 
at all effective” = 1, “Of limited effectiveness” = 2, and so on. And, in 
similar format, the bottom half gives the responses for Questions 3 and 
4—i.e., for the respondent’s own sense of what motivates him or her. 
There is a lot going on in these data (some of which concerns cor-
relations in responses, which I’ll get to in a bit), but here are a few 
(relevant) highlights: 
• The economic theory of incentives is best represented by the tan-
gible rewards responses, and while tangible rewards as a motiva-
tional device are perceived as having some power, they are cer-
tainly not the be-all and end-all of motivational channels: over 
40 percent of respondents say that when it comes to motivating 
their direct reports or themselves, tangible rewards are less than 
“very effective.” Moreover, tangible rewards as motivator are 
“most descriptive” (of the four channels) around 20 percent of 
the time for the direct reports and 10 percent of the time for “own 
motivation.” 
• In contrast, for direct reports, exciting work as a motivator is per-
ceived as being at least “very effective” by nearly 80 percent of 
the respondents; for the respondents themselves, exciting work 
is at least “very effective” for nearly 85 percent. And exciting 
work wins as “most descriptive” in both halves of the survey. 
• Motivation by success of the organization is perceived to be 
especially effective for the respondents themselves, being “very 
effective” or better in 90 percent of the cases. 
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Table 5.2  Responses to the Survey on Motivation by SEP Participants, 2013 
What motivates best work by the people who report directly to you? 
Only this Most 
Not at all Of limited Effective, Very is effective descriptive 
effective effectiveness but not very effective for eliciting Mean (n = 123) 
(n = 124) (%) (%) effective (%) (%) best work (%) score (%) 
Tangible rewards 0.8 8.9 32.3 54.0 4.0 3.52 21.1 
Exciting work 0.0 1.6 9.7 78.2 10.5 3.98 40.7 
Success of organization 0.0 3.2 30.6 53.2 12.9 3.76 24.4 
Work is socially important 4.8 38.7 33.1 21.8 1.6 2.77 13.8 
And what motivates your own best work? 
Only this Most 
Not at all Of limited Effective, Very is effective descriptive 
effective effectiveness but not very effective for eliciting Mean (n = 123) 
(n = 120, 121) (%) (%) effective (%) (%) best work (%) score (%) 
Tangible rewards 0.8 12.5 28.3 55.0 3.3 3.48 10.8 
Exciting work 0.0 0.0 5.8 79.3 14.9 4.09 33.3 
Success of organization 0.0 0.8 9.2 63.3 26.7 4.16 32.5 
Work is socially important 1.7 18.3 38.3 36.7 5.0 3.25 23.3 
SOURCE: Author’s compilation. 
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• Motivation by socially important work is seen by many respon-
dents as being less effective in both halves of the survey than 
the other three motivational channels. However, nearly a quar-
ter of the respondents saw socially important work as being 
“most descriptive” of what motivates them—more than double 
the number who saw tangible rewards as the most descriptive 
self-motivator. 
• One expects that perceptions of what motivates oneself would be 
“nobler” than perceptions of what motivates others. We see some 
of this in the data: organizational success and socially important 
work are perceived as being more effective on self than on direct 
reports.5,6 
• One might attribute this difference in perceptions to differences 
in rank in the organization: The more senior “self,” being higher 
in the organization and, presumably, older and wealthier, is bet-
ter able to afford being motivated by the work, or by success 
of the organization, or by doing something regarded as socially 
important. If this is true, it should (presumably) show up in how 
the mean scores for self-motivation change as we move across 
the various demographic characteristics of the respondent. That 
is, chief executive officers (CEOs) or chairs should be less 
self-motivated (on average) by tangible rewards than are those 
respondents who identify as general manager. See Table 5.3; the 
data on mean scores don’t support this explanation, although the 
“most descriptive” data do, especially for the category of moti-
vation by organizational success. 
• There could also be some selection bias at work: the respondents 
chose to spend six weeks away from their homes, families, and 
jobs to take courses at Stanford University. While Stanford is 
a very nice place to spend six weeks in the summer and par-
ticipants are treated extraordinarily well in terms of creature 
comforts, the cost of this program—both the dollar cost and the 
personal cost to the participant of being away from home and 
work for six weeks—is substantial. The participants, by choos-
ing to attend the program despite its costs, are clearly indicating 
“unusual” aspects of their characters and preferences, which is 
(of course) the hallmark of sample selection bias. 
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• But, in line with the results of Heath (1999) (in which the selec-
tion bias explanation cannot be applied), I conjecture that these 
differences in the top and bottom halves of Table 5.2 reflect a 
misperception of what motivates either others or oneself or both. 
In fact, my prejudices (and they are just prejudices) are that there 
is misperception on both sides: the participants are somewhat 
“flattering” themselves as being more organizational- and social-
minded than they really are, while they are being too harsh in 
this respect on their direct reports. 
• More generally, we can wonder whether any of the demographic 
characteristics have a discernible impact on either the average 
scores or the percentages of the most effective channel, for self 
or for direct reports. See Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for the numbers; 
make of them what you will.7 
• In due course, I’ll explain why, but for now let me stipulate that 
it is interesting to look at the correlations in how respondents 
answered Questions 1 and 3 and how they responded to Questions 
2 and 4. For Question 1 versus Question 3, the correlation matrix 
is given in Table 5.5, Panel A. We see that the strength of motiva-
tor X on direct reports (as perceived by a respondent) is strongly 
correlated with the strength of X on self in all cases of X, while 
the mixed correlations (X on direct reports versus Y on self for 
X ≠Y) are much less positive—and are, in many cases, negative. 
Panels B and C report on the internal correlations of answers to 
Question 1 and Question 3. 
As for Questions 2 and 4, we can look, say, at the conditional fre-
quency that X is most descriptive as the best motivator for self, given 
that it is most descriptive for direct reports, and compare this to the 
marginal frequencies. We get the following: 
• For “Tangible rewards,” the conditional frequency is 25 percent, 
versus 11 percent on the margin. 
• For “Exciting work,” the conditional frequency is 45 percent, 
versus 33 percent for the entire population. For “Success of orga-
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Table 5.3  Cross-Tabulations of Mean Score for the Motivators and Percentages of “Most Descriptive” Motivator
for Self against Demographic Characteristics 
Average impact on five-point scale % saying this is most effective 
Tangible Interesting Organiz. Social Tangible Interesting Organiz. Social 
n rewards work Success importance rewards work Success importance 
United States/Canada 27 3.67 4.94 3.96 3.00 18.5 33.3 25.9 22.2 
Latin America 9 3.44 4.33 4.44 3.56 11.1 22.2 33.3 33.3 
Europe 35 3.26 4.03 4.17 3.29 2.9 31.4 37.1 28.6 
East or South Asia 24 3.46 4.13 4.33 3.50 12.5 33.3 25.0 29.2 
Australia/New Zealand/Pacifi c Islands 14 3.57 4.07 4.00 2.93 14.3 28.6 42.9 14.3 
Less than 40 years old 17 3.47 4.06 4.18 3.34 0.0 47.1 41.2 11.8 
40 to 44 years old 39 3.72 4.21 4.03 3.00 15.4 38.5 35.9 10.3 
45 to 49 years old 33 3.36 4.03 4.12 3.55 15.2 21.2 24.2 39.4 
50 and older 24 3.21 4.00 4.38 3.21 4.2 25.0 33.3 37.5 
Male 98 3.49 4.07 4.14 3.21 10.2 33.7 33.7 22.4 
Female 15 3.33 4.20 4.20 3.53 13.3 20.0 26.7 40.0 
Chair/CEO/managing partner/president 23 3.35 4.13 4.26 3.43 4.3 21.7 47.8 26.1 
COO 11 3.45 4.09 4.18 3.36 0.0 45.5 45.5 9.1 
Head of a staff function: CFO/CPO/ 25 3.28 4.08 4.16 3.36 0.0 40.0 28.0 32.0 
CIO/etc. 
Senior VP/senior partner 13 3.54 4.08 4.00 3.15 30.8 15.4 23.1 30.8 
VP/partner 19 3.89 3.95 4.05 3.16 15.8 36.8 31.6 15.8 
General manager 22 3.41 4.18 4.18 3.05 18.2 31.8 22.7 27.3 
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General management 50 3.42 4.20 4.22 3.32 8.0 26.0 44.0 22.0 
Finance 14 3.36 4.14 4.07 3.00 14.3 57.1 21.4 7.1 
Marketing 7 3.29 4.14 4.00 3.29 14.3 28.6 14.3 42.9 
Operations/production/manufacturing 9 3.78 3.78 4.00 2.78 11.1 55.6 22.2 11.1 
Strategic planning 8 3.50 4.00 3.75 3.50 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Other 16 3.69 3.88 4.25 3.06 12.5 31.3 31.3 25.0 
Financial services/investments 16 3.75 4.44 4.38 3.19 0.0 50.0 37.5 12.5 
IT/electronics/computer technology 24 3.42 3.96 4.08 3.42 16.7 12.5 25.0 45.8 
Manufacturing/construction 22 3.50 4.14 4.14 2.86 13.6 36.4 22.7 27.3 
Marketing/retail 12 3.58 4.00 4.17 3.58 16.7 8.3 58.3 16.7 
Public sector 6 3.00 4.17 4.17 3.33 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Other 28 3.46 4.00 4.11 3.25 10.7 42.9 32.1 14.3 
NOTE: Only those characteristics for which there are six or more respondents are given. Please note carefully: the demographic charac-
teristics are those of the respondent and not (necessarily) his or her direct reports. 
SOURCE: Author’s compilation. 
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Table 5.4  Cross-Tabulations of Mean Score for the Motivators and Percentages of “Most Descriptive” Motivator
for Direct Reports against Demographic Characteristics 
Average impact on five-point scale % saying this is most effective 
Tangible Interesting Organiz. Social Tangible Interesting Organiz. Social 
n rewards work Success importance rewards work Success importance 
United States/Canada 31 3.68 3.97 3.61 2.61 25.8 38.7 22.6 12.9 
Latin America 11 3.73 4.27 3.91 3.00 10.0 50.0 20.0 20.0 
Europe 38 3.39 3.89 3.76 2.58 10.5 39.5 36.8 13.2 
East or South Asia 27 3.63 3.96 4.04 3.04 33.3 25.9 22.2 18.5 
Australia/New Zealand/Pacifi c Islands 16 3.00 4.00 3.63 2.94 12.5 62.5 18.8 6.3 
Less than 40 years old 18 3.50 3.83 3.72 2.56 16.7 55.6 22.2 5.6 
40 to 44 years old 47 3.57 4.06 3.79 2.57 23.9 41.3 28.3 6.5 
45 to 49 years old 35 3.40 3.91 3.66 3.11 20.0 31.4 25.7 22.9 
50 and older 27 3.56 3.96 3.89 2.81 22.2 37.0 22.2 18.5 
Male 108 3.52 3.94 3.79 2.71 23.1 39.8 25.9 11.1 
Female 19 3.47 4.11 3.63 3.11 11.1 38.9 22.2 27.8 
Chair/CEO/managing partner/president 25 3.48 4.04 3.76 2.76 16.0 40.0 24.0 20.0 
COO 11 3.36 3.91 4.18 2.73 18.2 36.4 45.5 0.0 
Head of a staff function: CFO/CPO/ 28 3.32 3.96 3.75 2.89 21.4 46.4 21.4 10.7 
CIO/etc. 
Senior VP/senior partner 14 3.50 4.07 3.71 2.79 21.4 42.9 14.3 21.4 
VP/partner 24 3.71 4.00 3.67 2.54 25.0 45.8 16.7 12.5 
General manager 25 3.64 3.84 3.72 2.88 25.0 25.0 37.5 12.5 
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General management 55 3.53 4.02 3.80 2.69 18.5 38.9 27.8 14.8 
Finance 16 3.56 3.88 3.56 2.56 31.3 50.0 18.8 0.0 
Marketing 9 3.11 4.00 3.89 3.33 22.2 33.3 22.2 22.2 
Operations/production/manufacturing 10 3.90 3.80 4.00 2.60 30.0 30.0 20.0 20.0 
Strategic planning 8 3.50 3.88 3.25 3.00 25.0 50.0 0.0 25.0 
Other 19 3.53 3.95 3.89 2.63 26.3 36.8 31.6 5.3 
Financial services/investments 17 3.71 3.82 3.65 2.65 29.4 29.4 29.4 11.8 
IT/electronics/computer technology 27 3.41 4.04 3.63 2.78 30.8 38.5 11.5 19.2 
Manufacturing/construction 25 3.44 4.08 3.88 2.52 12.0 48.0 32.0 8.0 
Marketing/retail 12 3.75 4.00 4.08 3.00 25.0 16.7 33.3 25.0 
Public sector 6 2.83 4.00 3.67 3.17 33.3 33.3 0.0 33.3 
Other 33 3.67 3.85 3.73 2.73 18.2 48.5 27.3 6.1 
NOTE: Only those characteristics for which there are six or more respondents are given. Please note carefully: the demographic charac-
teristics are those of the respondent and not (necessarily) his or her direct reports. 
SOURCE: Author’s compilation. 
Kimmel 2016.indb  106 11/1/2016  10:19:05 AM 
106 Kreps 
Table 5.5  Correlations in Effectiveness of Different Channels on Direct 
Reports versus Self (Panel A), on Self versus Self (Panel B), 
and on Direct Reports versus Direct Reports (Panel C) 
Panel A: Correlations of score for self-motivation versus direct reports 
Score for self 
Work is 
Exciting Success of socially 
Rewards work organization important 





















Panel B: Correlations of score for self-motivation versus self-motivation 
Score for self 
Exciting Success of Work is socially 
work organization important 
Tangible rewards 0.007 −0.038 −0.300 
Score Exciting work 0.080 0.057 
for self Success of 0.249 
organization 
Panel C: Correlations of score for direct-report motivation versus direct-report 
motivation 
Score for direct reports 
Exciting Success of Work is socially 













SOURCE: Author’s compilation. 
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• For “Social importance,” while only 23 percent of the respon-
dents said it was most descriptive of the best way to motivate 
themselves, a whopping 88 percent of those who said it was most 
descriptive of the best way to motivate their direct reports said 
the same for themselves. 
There are some other interesting “descriptive statistics” buried in 
the data from this survey, but this is enough: I’m not going to claim 
that this is a scientifically conducted survey (but I will point out that 
the respondents took the survey long, long before they heard from me 
on any of these topics). But having run similar surveys on the SEP par-
ticipants in previous summers, I’m confident that the main results (not 
those reported in Note 7) replicate themselves, at least for SEP partici-
pants. And I strongly hypothesize that they will be replicated for other 
groups of senior executives.8 
I reiterate that retrospective survey data of this sort—in particu-
lar survey data on what respondents believe motivates them and their 
direct reports—should be taken with a large grain of salt. But in what 
follows, I take these descriptive statistics at face value and ask: What is 
driving them? And, since this is meant to be an essay in economics, how 
do we explain them (if at all) using economics? 
Colleagues who are social psychologists have no problem explain-
ing these data. Their explanations derive from various theories they 
have about motivation in general, theories that are generally unfamil-
iar to economists. So before giving their possible explanations of these 
data, and comparing those explanations to what an orthodox economist 
might say, I fi rst briefly describe some of the psychological accounts of 
motivation, with special attention given to one of these, self-perception 
theory. Then I describe some further data gathered by colleagues of 
mine concerning the HR practices (and subsequent economic outcomes) 
of high-tech start-ups in Silicon Valley. And then I have these data dis-
cussed by a fictional economist and a fictional social psychologist. 




A FAST TOUR OF SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS 
OF MOTIVATION 
Economists like to show how things that seem different are really 
the same. Psychologists like to show how things that seem the same are 
really different. —Dale Miller (professor, Stanford Graduate School of 
Business), in discussion with the author, 2014 
Economics—or, at least, mainstream economics—is based on one 
model of human behavior: utility maximization. Hence, the dominant 
account in mainstream economics of motivation is incentive theory. The 
theory may be applied to a diverse array of (modeled) circumstances— 
to jobs where relative-performance evaluation is possible, or where the 
agent must attend to several tasks—but the basic model of behavior 
stays the same. 
Psychologists—and, in particular, social psychologists who are 
concerned with work settings—have a number of distinct accounts of 
on-the-job motivation, based on what drives behavior. Some accounts 
involve conscious analysis and choice by the worker; others appeal 
more to subconscious and unconscious behaviors. My specific interest 
is in one particular account, called self-perception theory. But here is a 
quick tour of some of the other accounts:9 
Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory presents a conscious-cognition model of how 
people decide what to do or how hard to work. 
• The employee has expectations about whether effort or specific 
actions on her part will lead to the results that (she perceives) 
management wants. This is called expectancy. 
• She has expectations concerning whether fulfilling what is per-
ceived as management’s desires will lead to rewards for herself. 
This is instrumentality. 
• She attaches value to the rewards she thinks she may get. This is 
called valence. 
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The actions she will take are, roughly, those that maximize her 
chances of receiving the rewards that she values the most. Some formu-
lations of this hypothesis try to make this prediction exact, by taking the 
product of the two probabilities times a measure of value of the prize. 
But we don’t need anything so rigid. We simply note that, everything 
else being equal, she will take action A instead of B if she believes that 
A is more likely to lead to what she perceives as management’s desires; 
she will take action C over D if she believes that the likely outcome of 
C is more likely to be rewarded; and she will take action E over F if the 
rewards associated with E are more valuable to her. 
This is a theory about employee expectations.10 Accordingly, the 
managerial implications of this theory begin with clarity: 
• Clarity or transparency of what management desires and what 
will be the rewards the employee will receive if she performs 
well enhances instrumentality, hence helps to motivate desired 
behavior. 
• While the theory emphasizes expectations, it is something of a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition that employees can in fact 
achieve the desired outcomes. Beyond this, employees should 
believe that they are capable of achieving the outcomes manage-
ment desires if they behave as desired, enhancing expectancy. 
• The rewards that are on offer should be valued by the employees, 
enhancing valence. Note in this regard that insofar as employees 
engage in social comparisons or otherwise value procedural and 
distributive justice, rewards should be equitably awarded (see 
the subsection “Equity Theory,” further on). 
• Insofar as an employee’s conscious expectations drive his or her 
behavior, management should keep close tabs on those expecta-
tions. And management should strive to understand what employ-
ees value, rather than assuming that it is monetary compensation. 
Expectancy theory is illustrated by Tracy Kidder’s classic book 
The Soul of a New Machine (Kidder 1981). The young engineers who 
were working on designing a next-generation computer (by designing 
both the hardware and the microcode that would run it) worked long 
hours, because they believed that this is what it would take to get the 
machine ready for market in the time required (expectancy). They were 
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convinced that this was what management wanted. They believed that 
if they succeeded in these terms, they would be allowed to work on 
yet another new machine (instrumentality)—what Kidder calls “pinball 
effects.” And, for reasons that we’ll try to explain later in this chap-
ter, they valued the opportunity to work on a new machine (valence). 
This last part may seem mysterious: the story essentially is that they 
are willing to work incredibly hard for the opportunity to keep working 
incredibly hard. Why would they value that? It was not for any finan-
cial reward that they had been promised. So that is what remains to be 
explained. 
Goal-Setting Theory 
Goal-setting theory is a version of expectancy theory in which the 
reward is achievement of some artificial goal: Management sets for the 
employees a goal to achieve, and, if certain conditions are met, achiev-
ing the goal is, for the employees, its own reward. 
The acronym SMART as a modifier of the goals describes some of 
the conditions that should be met if goal setting is to be effective: The 
goal should be Specific (not vague), Measurable (you know when you 
get there and, along the way, you know when you are making progress 
toward the goal), Achievable (you should be able to get there), Rel-
evant (the goal should “make sense” as something that is important 
to achieve), and Time-bound (the time it will take to achieve the goal 
should be relatively clear; “you’ll get there eventually” is not SMART). 
In addition, goals should be somewhat challenging; if the employee 
is to feel a sense of satisfaction from achieving the goal, it can’t be 
something that requires little or no effort. (But, it can’t be so challeng-
ing that the individual doubts that she can achieve it.) And, at least in 
some accounts, the goal should be viewed as legitimate (which may be 
subsumed under Relevant); it may enhance perceptions of legitimacy to 
have the employee participate in the setting of her goals. 
The notion that achieving a goal that has been set provides its own 
satisfaction seems quite reasonable to me, at least based on my own 
behavior (which, I hasten to add, is a terrible way to validate psycholog-
ical theories; be assured that the proponents of this theory have backed 
it up with a lot of careful empirical work). But I have some issues with 
this theory when it comes to Type-K jobs. These issues are, roughly, 
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related to the multitasking issues that arise in the economic theory of 
incentives: When the employee’s job involves several distinct tasks, 
how does one set a goal that encompasses all the tasks? Presumably, 
you set goals related to each task, but does that then cause the indi-
vidual to allocate her time so as to increase her chances of meeting them 
all? And is that necessarily what the organization desires? Goal-setting 
theory (I’m told by colleagues) has been criticized along precisely these 
lines (although I haven’t consumed the relevant literature yet). So my 
bottom line on goal setting is that I believe it can be a good, even pow-
erful motivational tool if you can meet the requirements of SMART, 
plus challenge and legitimacy. But in some jobs and for some employ-
ees—for Type-K jobs, in particular—this isn’t going to be easy. 
Equity Theory 
Equity theory posits that employees are demotivated by inequitable 
distributions of rewards. Very roughly speaking, each employee looks 
at the ratio of the rewards received by herself and her fellow workers to 
her perception of how much she and they have contributed to the orga-
nization, and she is demotivated when those ratios are quite different 
from each other. In operationalizing this, “rewards” is broadly defined; 
we include not only financial compensation, but things like praise and 
recognition. And the hypothesized demotivation is meant to occur at 
both ends of the spectrum: someone who receives too much reward in 
proportion to her contributions feels shame or embarrassment and is 
demotivated, while someone who receives too little feels anger. In fact,
according to this theory, someone whose ratio is in the middle will be 
demotivated, if she sees peer A with a much higher ratio than peer B.11 
Variations on this basic theme involve 
• a distinction between distributional and procedural equity— 
the first concerns the rewards actually received by the different 
employees, while the second concerns whether the process that 
determines rewards is judged to be fair, even if it sometimes pro-
duces results that seem skewed; 
• social comparisons, where individuals in comparing the ratios 
for various employees tend to confine their attention to those 
who are socially similar to themselves;12 
Kimmel 2016.indb  112 11/1/2016  10:19:06 AM 
 
 
112  Kreps 
• the confounding effects of social distinctions: partners in, say, 
a law firm may be disproportionately rewarded relative to legal 
associates, but this may be “okay” if legal associates view their 
current efforts as moving them up to the ranks of partnership. 
If you buy this theory, the obvious managerial implication is to 
engage in equitable rewards. But this is not always easy to do, because 
it is the perception by individuals of these ratios that is important in the 
theory, and perceptions of different employees about who is making 
what level of contribution do not always agree. 
Reinforcement Theory 
In comparison with expectancy theory, goal-setting theory, and 
equity theory, reinforcement theory involves (perhaps!) less conscious 
forms of behavior. The term operant conditioning is used; behavior of 
a certain sort triggers a change in one’s “conditions.” If the change is a 
net positive, the form of behavior is strengthened; if the change is a net 
negative, the behavior is weakened. 
• Positive reinforcement is where a valued behavior is rewarded, 
strengthening the behavior; e.g., if a rat pushes the appropriate 
lever, it gets food. So it “learns” to push the lever. 
• In negative reinforcement, a desired behavior causes a nega-
tive condition to stop or lessen, also strengthening the behavior. 
Example: a rat is subjected to mild electrical shocks, which cease 
for a while if it pushes a lever. So it learns to push the lever. 
• Punishment is where an undesirable behavior leads to a nega-
tive condition (the punishment), which lessens the undesirable 
behavior. Example: When a rat pushes a lever, it receives a 
shock. It learns not to push the lever. 
• Extinction is where a (formerly desirable and now undesirable) 
behavior that previously was rewarded is no longer rewarded, 
lessening the behavior. Example: The rat in the positive rein-
forcement story suddenly finds that pushing the food lever no 
longer results in food. So it learns that it is no longer worthwhile 
to push the lever. 
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Note the parenthetical “(perhaps!)” in the first sentence of this sec-
tion; I don’t know enough about the intelligence of rats to know whether 
a conscious connection is made, or whether the rat is just conditioned 
to push the lever. 
Applied to employees, presumably the odds are higher that a con-
scious connection is made; my (perhaps uneducated) understanding is 
that the basic theory is agnostic as to whether the learned behavior is 
learned (or unlearned) through conscious reasoning or a less conscious 
process. 
To be effective, reinforcement rewards (or punishments, or cessa-
tion of negative conditions) should be clearly connected to the behav-
ior being strengthened or weakened. This means, for one thing, that 
the “rewards” should be temporally contiguous with the behavior—in 
employment settings, shorter review-and-reward periods would be bet-
ter. Some accounts hold that, for job-related applications, the key to 
positive reinforcement is transparency—i.e., more information about 
what’s expected and what’s rewarded. This suggests that applications to 
on-the-job motivation are probably more of the conscious variety. 
Self-Determination Theory 
In the theories explored so far, motivation is tied to external stimu-
lus of some sort or other: In expectancy theory, behavior is consciously 
undertaken to fulfi ll what is perceived by the employee to be the orga-
nization’s desires, leading (one hopes) to a valued reward. Goal-setting 
theory, at least in employment contexts, seems to be rooted in the idea 
that a goal is set externally (although I imagine the theory works in 
similar fashion for self-set goals). In equity theory, rewards are deter-
mined by an external authority. In reinforcement theory, good behavior 
is rewarded and bad behavior punished by an external party. 
Self-determination theory concerns motivation that, in contrast, 
is intrinsic to the individual. The individual acts in a particular way 
because she wants to do so, even absent external rewards or stimulus. 
In particular, the theory holds that the more an individual is likely to be 
self-motivated (hence perform better?), the greater are 
• her ability to act with autonomy—the ability to control her own 
actions; 
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• her ability to gain and exhibit competence—to control the out-
come and exhibit (if only to herself) her mastery of the situation; 
and 
• her ability to be socially related to others—to interact with, be 
connected to, and to help others and be helped in turn.13 
Essentially, the managerial implications are that, to enhance per-
formance through intrinsic motivation, one should increase employee 
autonomy, give employees greater opportunities to enhance their skills 
and demonstrate competence with those skills, and increase a sense of 
“belonging” and “helping” others. 
Given the problems in incentive systems that fit under the rubric of 
multitasking (and other problems in getting externally applied incen-
tives “right”), intrinsic motivation might seem like a silver bullet (i.e., a 
simple and seemingly magical solution to a complicated problem) when 
it can be enlisted: the employee does the right thing, all by herself. 
Of course, it isn’t that simple, which explains the parenthetical 
“(hence perform better?)” in the second paragraph of this section. An 
employee who is intrinsically motivated is motivated to do those things 
for which she has a lot of intrinsic motivation—that’s a tautology— 
which may or may not be the things that the organization desires her to 
do. If the employee’s intrinsic motivation aligns with what the organi-
zation wants, it can be the proverbial silver bullet mentioned a moment 
ago. But that’s a mighty big if. If employees come intrinsically moti-
vated to do what the organization desires, great. But, in other cases, a 
key to enlisting intrinsic motivation is to find ways and means to get 
the employee’s intrinsically motivated behavior aligned with what the 
organization values. Which takes us to my favorite among the psycho-
logical accounts I discuss: 
Self-Perception Theory 
Self-perception theory (Bem 1972) has a very different account of 
behavior from the usual utility maximization of economics; it is based 
on a process of retrospective justification leading to future behavior. 
The basic notion is that individuals sometimes (often?) act without hav-
ing clearly defined objectives; after the action is taken, the individual 
looks for a “story” that explains why she acted as she did, and the story 
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she adopts affects her future behavior. If, for example, she justifies her 
efforts with the story that the work she did serves some social goal and 
that she cares about achieving that goal, then, in the future, her behav-
ior will reflect enhanced care for that social goal.14 
Consider the young engineers in The Soul of a New Machine. At 
first, perhaps, working long and onerous hours was no big deal; per-
haps they were carried along by enthusiasm for a new project. But as 
they continued to work under exhausting and stressful conditions, they 
looked for a reason: How could they rationalize to themselves why they 
were doing this? They weren’t going to be paid a big bonus if they suc-
ceeded, so that wasn’t it. At least as Kidder tells the story, they didn’t 
have a lot of affection for the firm for which they worked (although they 
did have affection for each other and for the leadership of their group). 
No particular social purpose was served by what they were doing. But a 
story that did scan for them is, they were working those onerous hours 
because the work itself was fun, interesting, and exciting. And, if they 
perceived that this was what had motivated them in the past, it becomes 
a piece of their “identity”; they perceive that the work is fun, hence they 
desire to continue to have the opportunity to do it. This fills in the miss-
ing piece of the expectancy-theory story of their behavior. 
Employees in some cases will have a choice of how they rationalize 
their past behavior; depending on their choice, we get different values, 
hence different future behavior. Salience of a particular “story” makes it 
more likely to be the chosen rationale; hence, to the extent that manage-
ment wishes to employ self-perception theory to its own ends, it should 
determine which story is the one it wants employees to embrace, and it 
should set conditions to make that story the most salient. 
Primary Nursing at Beth Israel Hospital 
An anecdotal example illustrates how this process is meant to work, 
as well as problems it can cause. In the 1970s, Beth Israel Hospital in 
Boston embraced the then-new practice of primary nursing.15 In primary 
nursing, each admitted patient (referred to here as “he”) is assigned a 
primary nurse (a senior registered nurse [RN], referred to here as “she”) 
from the fl oor or ward in which the patient will stay. Each nurse given 
such duties is, at any point in time, assigned as primary nurse for a small 
handful of patients—three would be a typical number. A patient’s pri-
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mary nurse is responsible for coordinating all care for the patient. When 
the patient is admitted, he meets with his assigned primary nurse, who 
takes the full history of the patient. When she is on duty, she performs 
most routine nursing duties for “her” patients. When off duty, she is still 
on call for her patients. She works closely with the admitting doctor and 
other docs and staff who might be providing services to the patient, but 
she is “in charge” (of course, in consultation with the admitting doc and 
attending specialists for decisions that require the approval of a physi-
cian); it is her name and not that of the doc that is on the patient’s bed. 
If a patient is readmitted to Beth Israel, every effort is made to assign 
to him the RN who was his primary nurse during his earlier stay. The 
culture strongly encourages her to make a personal connection with her 
patients and, indeed, to think of them as “hers.” 
Nursing is, of course, a Type-K job.16 Primary nursing, by encour-
aging a personal connection between a patient and his primary nurse, 
leads the nurse to internalize strongly the welfare of her patients, which 
in turn leads her to go above and beyond her normal duties in giving 
and securing the best possible care (in a caring manner) for them. The 
practice worked like a charm: Beth Israel gained a reputation in Boston 
as being the best hospital at which to be a patient because of the extraor-
dinary level of care it provided; among RNs, it gained a reputation as 
the best hospital at which to work. A psychologist could appeal to self-
determination theory to explain this outcome: primary nursing scores 
well in providing the RN with autonomy, by giving her opportunities 
to exhibit competence and to be socially related. And a psychologist 
could appeal to self-perception theory: over time, an RN, for whom 
primary nursing means hard work, attributes her efforts as “I really do 
care about the welfare of my patients,” which, going forward, lessens 
the cost and increases the personal benefit she perceives in going above 
and beyond the normal effort and hours. 
This story has a less-than-happy ending.17 Because a patient’s pri-
mary nurse was motivated first and foremost to help her patients, she 
directed care for them based on her perception of what was best for 
them. In the fee-for-service financial environment of the 1970s, this was 
not a major problem. But as insurance companies moved from fee-for-
service to diagnosis-resource-group and capitation-based reimburse-
ment schemes, Beth Israel, now called (following a merger with Dea-
coness Hospital) Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (BIDMC), faced 
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considerable financial pressure to cut costs. Primary nurses were asked 
to make “financially sensible” decisions about services provided to their 
patients; BIDMC considered schemes that would take this decision-
making authority out of the hands of the RNs altogether or, at least, 
would make it a shared authority of all nurses on a floor or ward. The 
patient load placed on the primary nurses was increased; the ability of a 
primary nurse to make a personal connection with each of “her” patients 
was weakened. One can imagine that, given the culture of nursing that 
had built up over decades of primary nursing, this was far from easy. 
The Undermining Effect: Does Extrinsic Motivation Drive Out 
Intrinsic Motivation? 
A well-established meme within psychological theories of moti-
vation is that the imposition of extrinsic motivation can dull intrinsic 
motivation, to such an extent that valuable intrinsic motivation virtually 
disappears. A typically cited manifestation of this concerns blood dona-
tions: historically, donating blood has been done for no particular com-
pensation, except (perhaps) the ability to draw on the blood bank, if a 
donor finds himself in need at some later date. At one point in England, 
blood banks, seeking to increase donations, decided to offer a small 
monetary payment for a donation, the idea being that people would be 
more likely to give blood if some extrinsic motivation was loaded on 
top of whatever intrinsic motivation caused people to give blood pre-
viously. But instead, blood donation rates decreased. Making a small 
payment for donations caused something adverse to happen to whatever 
was motivating folks to give blood previously. 
Both self-determination and self-perception theory give accounts 
that can explain this. Taking self-determination theory first, it might be 
that autonomy is perceived as having been reduced, insofar as potential 
donors feel that the financial reward is an attempt to control their behav-
ior. The sense of social relatedness may be reduced. Before the extrinsic 
payment was offered, donating one’s blood was a very social act; now it 
seems more of a market exchange, motivated by a desire for payment. 
And the sense that blood donation achieves something important and 
valued is, at least, shifted, on much the same grounds. 
As for self-perception theory, loading on extrinsic rewards in a set-
ting where individuals come with significant intrinsic motivation gives 
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the individual a number of “stories” to explain why she acted as she 
did. Before, perhaps she rationalized her behavior by attributing it to the 
enjoyment she takes from the task, or because she values the success 
of the organization and is willing to sacrifice her self-interest to some 
extent to help the organization succeed, or because she perceived that 
her efforts were helping to achieve some greater goal. Now, competing 
with her previously held self-perception is the story that she did it for 
the reward. Indeed, when the extrinsic reward is added, its novelty may 
enhance its salience. Hence her self-perceived reason for acting as she 
did changes, and now (perhaps) she strives to maximize her extrinsic 
rewards, and the silver bullet of intrinsic motivation is minimized. In 
a word, the extrinsic rewards undermine the intrinsic motivation she 
might have had; hence, this is called the undermining effect.18 
A variation on undermining concerns the impact of extrinsic rewards 
on intrinsic motivation when the extrinsic rewards are removed. To give 
an example, many readers will know of work done by Roland Fryer and 
associates concerning the motivation of inner-city schoolchildren to 
achieve more in their studies; see, for instance, Fryer (2011). Much of 
the attention in this work has been on what a psychologist would think 
of as enhancing expectancy: rewards for grades worked less well in 
improving grades than did rewards for reading books, because the stu-
dents were unclear on what to do to improve their grades. But also from 
a psychologist’s perspective, Fryer’s work raises questions about what 
will happen when the experiment ends. While his financial rewards for, 
say, reading books have worked in the short run, should we be con-
cerned that the learned behavior by students is that you read for the 
financial rewards and not for pleasure or knowledge? 
Attribution Theory and the Sad Tale of Company Z 
Self-perception theory is a subset of attribution theory. In the basic 
account of attribution theory, Person X observes Person Y taking some 
action A. Person X then tries to answer the question for herself: why 
did Y do A? She tries, in other words, to attribute Y’s action to some 
underlying motive M. And, having attributed the behavior to M, her 
expectations about future actions by Y are that Y will continue to act in 
ways that serve motive M. Self-perception theory, then, is attribution 
theory for the special case of X = Y.19 





Motivating Consummate Effort  119 
When X is distinct from Y, X’s attributions about Y’s motives can be 
extended to third parties, especially third parties who are, in X’s view, 
similar to Y.20 But, at least in some accounts, X’s attributions about Y
can affect X’s self-perception. 
The sad tale of Company Z illustrates this.21 Company Z is a reason-
ably young company (on the order of five years old) that was founded 
to accomplish a “mission”: to change the face of Industry I. Industry I 
provides services to various companies, but it does so in particularly 
opaque fashion: most clients of Industry I are in the dark when they 
shop for the services that firms in Industry I offer; they don’t know 
where to find the best quality-to-price ratios for specific services that 
they require. 
Company Z’s mission is to change this by bringing transparency to 
Industry I. The firm hired both professionals who understand the intri-
cacies of Industry I and professionals who design web-based informa-
tion systems, and set for these two groups the task of designing acces-
sible web-based tools that would allow the clients of Industry I to shop 
intelligently and knowledgeably. 
Company Z paid these professionals submarket wages, giving them 
no stock options or other forms of incentive pay. And this all took place 
in a local labor economy where the professionals employed by Com-
pany Z had lots of outside opportunities. Nonetheless, Company Z got 
from its employees consummate effort, with minimal turnover. The rea-
son: Company Z stressed the “mission” it was on, and it hired profes-
sionals who bought into this mission. “Changing the face of Industry 
I” became the strong motivator of these employees, a motivator that 
(according to self-perception theory) grew even stronger, as the profes-
sionals in Company Z could only justify their efforts with the attribu-
tion “I’m doing this because the mission is important to me.” And the 
fact that employees of Company Z were surrounded by and interacted 
with peers, all of whom seemed to be acting for the same reason, further 
strengthened this effect. 
Recently, Company Z has developed its product and, after some 
testing with a few lead clients, is seeking to sell the product broadly. 
This takes salespersons, and the leadership at Company Z decided that 
the mission demanded the best sales force they could fi nd. The choice 
of company leaders was not salespersons who bought into the mission, 
but salespersons with proven track records of success in sales of related 




products. Salespersons come from a professional culture whose mem-
bers expect incentive pay in the form of commissions on sales made, 
with the further expectation of making a lot of money if they succeed. 
Since that is what it takes to get the best salespersons (i.e., those that 
have compiled the most successful track records in the past), that is what 
Company Z offered. The salespersons hired had base salaries higher 
than the salaries other professionals in the firm made, with incentive-
pay possibilities that would lead to total compensation far in excess of 
what those other professionals could obtain. 
Of course, to be effective, the salespersons had to interact with the 
other professionals, both to learn about Industry I and about how the 
product worked. And when the other professionals learned how much 
the salespersons were making, inevitable social comparisons were 
made, and the other professionals became demotivated. Indeed, the 
company’s HR folks surveyed all employees to gauge satisfaction, and, 
department by department, the closer the staff in a department was to 
the sales staff (in terms of both social categories and frequency of inter-
action), the lower was their self-reported level of satisfaction. 
Equity theory provides one simple account of what happened at 
Company Z: the other professionals looked at the ratios of contribu-
tions to compensation and saw blatant (distributive) inequities. But the 
attribution-theory account also provides an explanation: When sur-
rounded by other employees, all of whom were mission-driven, the 
mission was a powerful motivator for each employee. When faced with 
(socially similar) employees who seemed to require personal rewards to 
motivate them, the previously mission-driven employees at Company Z 
began to question their own motivation. 
THE STANFORD PROJECT ON EMERGING COMPANIES 
A second set of data will finish setting the table for the discussion to 
come between the psychologist and economist. These data come from 
the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies (SPEC).22 
SPEC was a project conducted by three colleagues, James Baron, 
Diane Burton, and Michael Hannan. They assembled a sample of 154 








Motivating Consummate Effort  121 
high-tech start-ups in Silicon Valley and, through a combination of ret-
rospective interviews and available financial data, tried to answer ques-
tions such as “What clusters of human-resource-management (HRM) 
practices are prevalent in these firms?” “What is the HRM practice-
performance link?” and “How do changes in HRM practices (as the 
firms grow and evolve) affect performance?” 
They started, through interviews with the firms’ founders, by identi-
fying the founders’ HRM vision. They characterized what they learned 
from the interviews in terms of three questions and a set of answers. 
Then, based on the interviews with the founders, they chose for each 
question the answer that best fit what they had heard: 
1) What was (the founder’s vision of) the basis of attachment of 
employees to the fi rm? Was it 
a) love of the firm or coworkers, 
b) the interesting and exciting work that the employee was 
doing, or 
c) the money the employee received? 
2) How were employees selected? Was it 
a) on the basis of cultural fit, 
b) based on the possession of skills needed to perform a 
list of immediately required tasks, or 
c) based on the individual’s longer-run potential to 
contribute? 
3) How were employees coordinated or controlled? Was it 
a) by adherence to professional norms of appropriate 
behavior, 
b) by adherence to a set of organizational norms specifi c to 
the firm, 
c) by adherence to a set of formal rules and procedures, or 
d) by direct oversight by one’s superior? 
This gives 3 × 3 × 4 = 36 different “founding visions” or models for 
the start-ups. The data revealed that nearly 60 percent of the 154 firms 
in the sample conformed to one of only five models, with characteristics 
and names (given by the researchers) as shown in Table 5.6. The most 









Table 5.6  The Five “Pure Type” Models from the Stanford Project on 
Emerging Companies 
Dimensions 
Name of model Attachment Selection Control method 
Engineering Work Skills Organizational norms 
Commitment Love Fit Organizational norms 
Star Work Potential Professional norms 
Bureaucracy Work Skills Formal rules 
Autocracy Money Skills Direct 
SOURCE: Author’s compilation. 
popular by far was the Engineering model, accounting for 32.5 percent 
of the firms.23 But both the Commitment and Star models appeared fre-
quently: 7.1 percent of the firms were Commitment model fi rms; 8.4 
percent were Star model firms. 
These five “pure types” or models were created in part based on 
the data, but also because they conformed to the researchers’ sense of 
bundles of HRM practices that are internally consistent. Following the 
work of Milgrom and Roberts (1990), the term complementary might 
be used, but the complementarity here is at least as much psychological 
as technological: the idea is that employees at a firm adhering to one of 
these five types would see the different practices as conforming to com-
mon organizational models; e.g., the Commitment model resembles a 
family, the Star model an academic department at an elite university. 
The SPEC research explores a number of questions with this typol-
ogy as a starting point; for instance, it looks at how the initial (or found-
er’s) vision influenced the evolution of HRM practices. But two ques-
tions addressed by this research will come into play in the dialogue of 
the next section: 
1) What correlations did the research find between the founder’s 
vision and the product strategies of the firm? 
2) Did the founder’s vision have any effect (on average) on the 
subsequent financial performance of the firm? 
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A PSYCHOLOGIST AND AN ECONOMIST DISCUSS THE 
SURVEY DATA, COMPANY Z, SPEC, AND MORE 
We can now listen in as a (fictional) psychologist (P) and an (equally 
fictional) orthodox economist (E) discuss the survey results and related 
matters. Since (I assume) most readers of this chapter will be econo-
mists, I will have the psychologist use terms that are not typically in 
a psychologist’s standard vocabulary but that “translate” into the lan-
guage spoken by economists. 
P: The data from the SEP survey are not in the least bit surprising. Peo-
ple can be motivated in many different ways, so I’m not surprised 
that we see as much variation in the answers as we do. But surely 
these data are surprising to an economist like you. Doesn’t econom-
ics hold that only money (and perhaps power) can motivate people, 
since that is the only thing they value? 
E: That’s a bad misreading of what economics says. Economics is based 
on the idea that people act in a way that maximizes their “utility.” 
But many arguments can enter into an individual’s utility function in 
a positive way (that is, with a positive partial derivative), including 
the joy of working on a challenging problem, a desire to see one’s 
team or organization succeed, or the achievement of some goal that 
is socially valuable. 
P: I don’t remember those sorts of things in the utility functions in my 
old economics textbooks. 
E: It’s true that textbook models tend to emphasize money or, even 
more fundamentally, goods that are literally consumed. But that’s 
just textbook stuff, done to keep the story simple. Utility is a reflec-
tion of what the individual values, and no one can deny that different 
people value different things. Economists even have a bit of Latin to 
describe the situation: De gustibus non disputandum est (“There is 
no arguing about tastes”). 
P: Okay, I’ll accept that. But not everyone values challenging problems 
or success of the organization or contributing to social good, while 
surely almost everyone values more income and other forms of tan-
gible, personal rewards. So why don’t all these high-powered execs 








see tangible rewards as the best all-purpose way to motivate their 
direct reports? 
E: That’s a good question, and the answer is actually provided by the 
economic theory of incentives. If we are talking about Type-K jobs, 
all those characteristics that make for a Type-K job are characteris-
tics that make “pay for performance”–style incentives hard to devise 
and ineffective in practice. If you can find another way to motivate 
workers, a way that avoids some of the problems with pay-for-
performance schemes, that other way may well be superior in terms 
of motivational bang for the buck. 
Let me give you a “for instance.” Two of the characteristics of a 
Type-K job are 1) what economists call multitasking—the need for 
the worker to do several things and to allocate her time among the 
tasks—and 2) outcomes that are hard to measure or can only be mea-
sured in the somewhat distant future. Both of these characteristics 
can be killing to a pay-for-performance incentive scheme.24 Now 
suppose—and it is a strong supposition—the individual worker has 
a good sense of what she should be doing from the perspective of 
the organization at the time that she must take action; that is, she 
knows what sorts of efforts are in the best interests of the organi-
zation, including her allocation of time among different activities. 
An employee who knows these things and who has internalized the 
welfare of the organization—who wants to see the organization suc-
ceed—will do the right thing (more or less) automatically, avoiding 
agency costs, as long as the firm doesn’t screw things up by trying 
to load an ill-fitting rewards-for-results scheme on top. That is, even 
if this worker has a utility function that is much more responsive 
to personal rewards than to doing right by the firm, if her personal-
rewards compensation is insensitive to measures of performance, 
she’ll choose to do right by the firm. Of course, if the fi rm could find 
a personal-rewards incentive scheme that reinforced doing the right 
thing, that would improve matters. But the latter is hard to do (the 
theory tells us), so why not rely on the “second order” desire to see 
the fi rm succeed? 
And, in this regard, note that there are two keys here: The individual 
must understand how her efforts connect with organizational suc-
cess. And she must value the organization’s success. The first of 
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these fits in well with how the survey phrased things: It asks for the 
relative efficacy in terms of motivation of establishing a direct con-
nection between providing consummate effort and success for the 
organization. It isn’t just an appeal to the employee to “do right by 
the organization.” Implicitly it is that, but, explicitly, it is about being 
sure that the employee recognizes what that entails. 
P: And the second key? Are we to believe that so many workers have 
internalized in their preferences the success of the organization for 
which they work? From my perspective, I believe that the organiza-
tion can foster such preferences. But my sense is that de gustibus, 
when incanted by an economist, means that the tastes of each indi-
vidual are innate and immutable; economics as a discipline takes 
them as a given. Do so many workers come with these innate prefer-
ences? And, if so, why do all those textbooks ignore what would be 
a powerful and common factor in workers’ utility functions? 
E: Well, remember that the population we’re speaking of consists of 
SEP participants and their direct reports. These are all people pretty 
high up on the organizational ladder. Maybe what is going on here is 
that organizations, when deciding whom to promote into high posi-
tions, screen in particular for workers who have a track record of 
doing the right thing for the organization, which would favor people 
who do have the welfare of the organization as a powerful factor in 
their preferences.25 
In this regard, I call your attention to the survey of Stanford MBA
students, referenced in Note 7. They gave better scores (on average) 
to tangible rewards. They are younger and less senior. If my hypoth-
esis is correct that the organization screens over time for people who 
value the welfare of the organization or interesting work, then as 
people are or are not put in positions of greater authority, you would 
expect that less screening has taken place for MBA students and 
their peers. Hence, on the margin, appealing to the universal desire 
for personal goodies becomes more effective.26 
P: How about this? If the problem in Type-K jobs is that we don’t know 
a priori what the employee should be doing—if we can’t devise a for-
mula a priori that will link outcomes to rewards—then surely, after 
the fact, the boss can ask “What did you do?,” judge whether this 
was what was desired, and provide a monetary reward if what the 





employee did was judged, ex post, to be “the right thing.” Doesn’t 
that sort of ex post evaluation coupled with tangible rewards get 
around the difficulties in designing ex ante incentive schemes for 
Type-K jobs? 
E: It would, if the boss can meet Conditions A, B, and C: A) discern 
what the employee did do ex post, B) know what the information 
state of the employee was when the employee made work choices, 
and C) credibly commit to rewarding “doing the right thing.” Each 
of those is somewhat problematic, but not entirely unreasonable. In 
a sense, what you are proposing is a scheme of subjective ex post 
evaluation, which has been studied in the economics literature; early 
papers include Prendergast and Topel (1993) and Baker, Gibbons, 
and Murphy (1994). But, as is very well known (and one of the main 
points in Prendergast and Topel), tangible reward schemes that are 
based on subjective ex post evaluation of performance invite what 
economists call infl uence activities and what you probably call argu-
ing or pleading one’s case, instead of getting on with productive 
work. The more a job is Type-K, I believe, the less likely it is that 
Conditions A through C will hold, and the greater will be the cost of 
infl uence activities. 27 
P: Let’s talk about Beth Israel Hospital, then. My explanation for the 
problems the hospital faces is that, through the practice of primary 
nursing, supervisors inculcated in their nurses a regard for the wel-
fare of the nurses’ patients as primary. I guess, to use your terminol-
ogy, I would say that Beth Israel increased the importance that that 
factor has in the utility functions of their nurses. Having done so, 
they have found it hard to “redirect” their nurses to balance what is 
ideal for the patient with what it costs the hospital. 
E: I’m not keen on this notion that the nurses’ preferences were some-
how changed, but I’d offer a closely related explanation. The hard 
work associated with primary nursing for a nurse is a very effective 
screen. Only RNs who have tremendous innate concern for the well-
being of their patients would put up with phone calls at 3:00 a.m. 
from a patient complaining about something or other. RNs without 
such a strong concern would look for work elsewhere. So, over the 
years, Beth Israel wound up with RNs with that sort of preference, 
and RNs with those sorts of preferences are not going to be very 
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good at the balancing act that is now required. Indeed, since I don’t 
think preferences of an individual are malleable, I think BIDMC 
is in worse shape than do you: They are stuck with a nursing staff 
whose preferences don’t fit the new economic realities. You, I gather, 
believe that, while it may take time and be painful, BIDMC may be 
able to “remake” its RNs’ preferences to fit better with what those 
new realities require. 
P: I certainly do believe that, although I’m not saying it will be easy. 
But let’s move on. I’m pretty sure I know what you will say, but 
what do you make of the correlations found in the survey answers, 
as reported in Table 5.5 and in the discussion following that table? 
Before you answer, let me tell you how I view them. While I’d be 
happier if some of the negative correlations in the bottom parts of 
the table were even more negative, they fit quite well with how I see 
things. Take the top part of the table first. I think what we are see-
ing here is a strong organizational fixed effect. Some organizations 
employ tangible rewards as a motivational device. Others employ 
“love of work.” And so forth. The SPEC data suggest as much, but I 
think that any level of casual empiricism would tell you that differ-
ent organizations in similar situations employ different motivational 
channels. Since each SEP participant and his or her direct reports 
work in the same organization, whatever is viewed as a strong, or 
most descriptive, motivator for the direct reports is more likely to be 
a strong or most descriptive motivator for the respondent. Hence, in 
the top half of the table, strong positive correlations are found down 
the diagonal, and not much correlation or even negative correlation 
is found on all off-diagonals. 
E: I agree with you that there is an organizational fixed effect here, and 
I think the ultimate explanation for it is equilibrium screening. If you 
are the sort of person who gets a lot of juice out of being a “member 
of the team,” you join an organization that rewards behavior that is 
directed at team success. If you love to work on challenging prob-
lems, you join an organization that rewards its employees with chal-
lenge. Of course, this is an equilibrium phenomenon: Organization 
A attracts people who want to be part of a team and work for the 
team’s success, so at Organization A, that becomes the most effec-
tive way to motivate the workforce it gets, which (to complete the 
loop) attracts the type of people who want to be part of a team. 
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P: Just what I expected you to say. I agree that what you call screening 
plays a role, but I’d go further: Once you join, say, your Organiza-
tion A, with everyone around you doing stuff so that the team will 
succeed, your desire to do what is best for the team is enhanced, as 
per the attribution-theory extension of self-perception. Indeed, if the 
company “rewards” your efforts by celebrating the team’s success, 
self-perception theory alone predicts that this motivating factor will 
be strengthened through time. 
E: Let me ask you: The most negative off-diagonal entry is motivation 
by social importance for the direct reports, and motivation by tangi-
ble rewards for the respondents. How do your theories explain that? 
P: To explain that, I want to look at Panels B and C of the table. Most 
of the correlations here are close to zero, with two exceptions: moti-
vation by tangible rewards has substantial negative correlation with 
socially important work, and motivation by success of the organi-
zation is substantially positively correlated with socially important 
work. I admit, I’d like to have seen the close-to-zero entries be more 
negative. In part, this should have been built in to the way the sur-
vey was worded. The highest category of answer is “Only this is 
effective” for eliciting best work, and we see percentages of around 
10 percent or more selecting this answer, at least for exciting work 
and success of the organization. The plain language of that answer 
should certainly imply that the respondent who picks this answer for 
one of the four motivational channels would give a very low score 
to the other three. But it turns out that this isn’t how the respondents 
responded. I looked at the detailed data and found that the average 
score given to the other three motivational channels by someone 
who gave one of the four an “only this” rating was 3.34, versus an 
average score in the entire sample of 3.50. There is even one respon-
dent who gave two of the four motivational channels an “only this” 
rating and the other two a “very effective.” 
But even without this—that is, even if the top category had been 
called “extremely effective,” so that it was phrased in a way that 
didn’t preclude high scores for the other motivational channels— 
I would have liked to see more negative correlations. My theories 
of motivation, and in particular self-perception, suggest that one 
motivational channel will be particularly effective if it is the sole 
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ex post rationalization available as to why individuals give consum-
mate effort, which would then go along with low scores for the other 
channels. So I can’t say that the data are what I’d want to see, ideally. 
That said, I think the correlations in Panels B and C between tan-
gible rewards and socially important work and between success of 
the organization and socially important work are, respectively, an 
extreme case of what I was hoping for and the results of an ambigu-
ously worded survey. To explain: If I had to guess which of the four 
motivational channels are “furthest apart” in terms of basic motiva-
tional forces, I’d guess tangible rewards—the “What’s in it for me?” 
motivation—and socially important work, or “What’s in it for soci-
ety?” So, being strongly motivated by one ought to go with being 
poorly motivated by the other. As for organizational success versus 
socially important work, I imagine that socially important work is a 
strong motivator in organizations whose mission is the accomplish-
ment of some socially important goal. Indeed, the notion that a sub-
set of organizations are “social purpose” organizations is quite con-
sistent with socially important work getting low average scores but 
being characterized as “most powerful” or “descriptive” in a fraction 
of the organizations. Now, if your organization is built to achieve 
some social purpose, achieving that purpose and having your organi-
zation succeed are naturally confounded. Put it this way: if “success 
of the organization” had instead been worded as “fi nancial viability” 
or “financial success” of the organization, the confounding would be 
less, and I’d expect those strong positive correlations to be smaller. 
And to get back to your question about the cross-correlations in Panel 
A, what we’re seeing here is a consequence of what I just described. 
So we agree that different organizations employ different motiva-
tional channels, and we agree that whichever channel is powerful 
for one employee in a given organization is relatively more likely 
to be more powerful for other employees in the same organization. 
You explain the last part by screening. I think it is something more— 
namely, the impact an organizational environment will have on the 
preferences of its employees. We also agree, I think, that different 
motivational channels are better or worse suited to specific jobs or, at 
the organizational level, to the constellation of tasks facing employ-
ees who are (and see themselves as) socially similar. 






E: Uh, that last bit is a bit mysterious to me. What’s this “constellation” 
stuff? 
P: I can explain with an analogy. Oliver Williamson’s Economizing 
Principle, in his theory of transaction-cost economics, says that a 
transaction will tend to be structured in whatever manner maxi-
mizes the benefits it creates, net of its transaction costs.28 William-
son’s focus is on different aspects of those transaction costs, which 
is fine. But his unit of analysis is the individual transaction. So if, 
say, Firm F is engaged in separate long-term transactions with Firms 
G1 and G2, we should (the principle says) look separately at the 
two transactions, trying to discern what structure is optimal for each 
one. But insofar as we think that G1 makes inferences about how F 
behaves and will behave in the future based on what G1 sees happen-
ing between F and G2 and vice versa, then that cognitive or infor-
mational link may mean that the structure of the F-G2 transaction 
should take into account the “externalities” it imposes on the costs 
and benefits of the F-G1 transaction. 
For the same basic reason, how Firm X motivates Employee A1— 
and, more generally, how X treats A1 in all aspects of their rela-
tionship—can have an impact on the perceptions, assessments, 
and behavior of Employee A2, the more so to the extent that A2 
is socially similar to A1. The attribution-theory extension of self-
perception mentioned in conjunction with the story about Company 
Z is one example of this at work, but this is part and parcel of the 
full theory of social comparisons. And, turning this a bit on its head, 
suppose Firm X has two categories of employees: A1, A2, and so on 
are all engineers, while B1, B2, and so forth are clerical assistants. 
This sort of consideration will (probably) lead X to rely on the same 
motivational channels for all the A’s. But X may be able to get away 
with a different sort of motivation altogether for the B’s. So, when 
asking “Which motivational channel or method is best for motivat-
ing Employee A1?,” you probably need to think at the level of the 
characteristics of the jobs of all the Type A employees. 
E: Hmmm. And since you posed the question, which motivational 
channel do you see as best for, say, engineers or other categories of 
employees in Type-K jobs? Incentive theory tells me when rewards-
for-performance will work well—see for instance Lazear (2000)— 
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and it also tells me that it will be problematic for more complex, 
Type-K jobs. But the survey introduces three alternatives, and I’m 
sure there are more. Why and when would an organization choose 
interesting work instead of organizational success or social mission? 
If you think that through self-perception processes employees can be 
molded into whatever preferences the organization wishes [P shakes 
her head]—okay, I see that you don’t believe that, quite—what 
makes one of those more or less fit? After all, that’s the question 
posed at the start of this chapter. 
P: I don’t have a complete answer to that question, and I don’t think 
you do, either. But SPEC gives us some alluring hypotheses. For 
one thing, the SPEC researchers looked at correlations between the 
firm’s strategic objectives and the founder’s HRM vision and, while 
the data set wasn’t large enough to draw robust conclusions, they 
found that firms whose strategic plan was to be the low-cost producer 
of a more or less established product were much more likely in the 
sample to choose Bureaucracy. Firms that aimed at wide-open tech-
nological innovation—creating a novel product that met a “need” 
as yet unrecognized by the intended clientele—were very much the 
most likely to be Star-model organizations. And their data on finan-
cial performance give some clues: All five models were basically fit 
(in the situations in which they were chosen) in terms of financial 
outcomes; none dominated any other. But the Commitment model 
had a slight edge, on average and overall, and the Star model was 
best if you looked only at the subsample of firms that made it to the 
IPO. Here’s a hypothesized explanation for this: Since, in these sorts 
of start-ups, key employees’ jobs are likely to have a lot of Type-K 
to them, the silver bullet of motivating by “love” of the organization 
might have a slight edge, if you can make it work. But in the culture 
of Silicon Valley, with its very high rate of labor mobility, this might 
be a hard sell. Being motivated by challenging and exciting work 
probably comes more naturally to more of the young engineers and 
technology types that make up a large part of the key workforce 
at high-tech start-ups. But we all know stories of engineers whose 
drive for technological perfection gets in the way of the financial 
success of the organization; remember Voltaire’s adage, “Better is 
the enemy of good.”29 Star-type firms, where attachment or motiva-
tion through work is allied to professional and not organizational 




norms, are at risk of having employees pursuing perfection when 
“good enough” is what they need for economic success. By look-
ing only at the Star-type firms that reach the stage of an IPO, you 
are probably censoring out a lot of technological wins but economic 
failures; you are looking at cases where technological wins meant 
at least a measure of economic success—hence this subsample does 
best of all. So: Commitment is best overall, if you can pull it off. But 
censor out the cases of motivation-through-work that go off the rails, 
and you have a conditional winner. 
E: Okay, I can see how to build an economic model of that sort. But let’s 
wrap up. What separates our views on the data? 
P: We agree on a lot, but we disagree on one potentially important 
point. I think an individual employee’s sources of motivation will 
be affected—I might even say manipulated to some perhaps limited 
extent—by the organizational environment in which she fi nds her-
self. You seem to resist this; instead, you invoke screening to explain 
the connection between what motivates an employee and the type of 
organization in which she is found. 
So I ask, how do you explain what happened at Firm Z? Employees 
previously motivated by the mission soured on this because of inter-
actions they had with the sales force. Have you got a story for that? 
E: I do indeed. I’ll explain their initial strong motivation by a desire to 
achieve the goal of changing Industry I and their belief that top man-
agement at Firm Z shared in that goal. When the salespersons were 
hired and compensated, the rest of the professional staff learned 
to their dismay that top management at Firm Z had been playing 
them—top management just wanted to make a lot of money. This 
did change their motivation, but through a shift in their beliefs, not a 
change in their tastes. 
You would no doubt attribute changes in behavior associated with 
what you call the undermining effect to changes in tastes caused by 
a change in self-perception. [P nods in agreement.] Let me tell you 
how an economist views this. The basic story is this: Person Y (he) 
has been doing a task, and doing it well, for little to no financial 
reward. His boss, X (she), offers him some financial compensation if 
he will continue. And this causes him to stop or, at least, to do a more 
slipshod job. 
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Two economists, Bénabou and Tirole, provide two explanations for 
such behavior. In the first of these (Bénabou and Tirole 2003), the 
story is that X knows how hard the job is, and Y infers from the offer 
of financial compensation that, at least this time, the job is going to 
be a lot harder. Not wanting to kill himself, especially if the financial 
compensation is small, he decides not to do it. And in the second 
story (Bénabou and Tirole 2006), Y has been doing the job to con-
vince X and others that he likes this sort of work for its own sake. 
When X offers him some financial compensation, doing the job is no 
longer a clear signal that Y is that sort of person—in the language of 
game theory, X’s offer has jammed the signal that Y was sending— 
so it is no longer worthwhile for Y to do the job. 
Now, these are simplified caricatures of the two papers—you’ll need 
to read them to see the details—but in each case, what you explain by 
changing tastes is easily explained by strategic behavior and rational 
inferences, with a completely stable set of preferences. 
P: Wow! Those are some pretty clever explanations. I might say to you 
that I find them a wee bit incredible, at least in the context in which 
the undermining effect was first discussed in the literature: the con-
text there was nursery school children drawing detailed pictures, 
seemingly for the fun of it, whose motivation was undermined with 
the offer of cookies.30 
But let me describe to you one other experiment that, it seems to me, 
can only be explained as a shift in tastes. This doesn’t concern moti-
vation in a work setting, but it does seem to me to pose a challenge 
to anyone who believes in utterly stable preferences, tastes, or utility. 
The experiment is described in Liu and Aaker (2008). Subjects were 
told about a particular charity, then asked how likely it was that they 
would donate some of their time to work for the charity and how 
likely it was that they would donate money. Finally, they were given 
the opportunity to make a financial donation. (I’m simplifying a bit; 
read the paper!) There were two treatments: In one treatment, they 
were asked “How likely is it that you’d donate time to the charity?” 
and then “How likely is it that you’d donate money?” In the second 
treatment, the money-ask came first, then the time-ask. The depen-
dent variable was the amount of money actually given, and Liu and 
Aaker find that in the time-ask-first treatment, subjects gave more on 











average than in the money-ask-first treatment—statistically signifi-
cantly more.31 They explain this by saying that the question asked 
first creates a state of mind in the subject—it primes or frames the 
behavior that is later observed—and they explain why a time-ask-
first primes the subjects to give more, when it comes time to give. 
And I would observe that this phenomenon is not only some mani-
festation of a psych lab experiment. University development (fund-
raising) departments are well aware that financial donations from 
alumni increase if and when the alums are first induced to give some 
of their time to their alma mater. For instance, the Stanford Gradu-
ate School of Business has alumni conduct interviews of prospec-
tive students. The information gathered in these interviews is not 
of zero value; only candidates with a high likelihood of admission 
are interviewed, and a really bad interview can turn acceptance into 
rejection. But for the most part, the admissions office does this as a 
favor to the development people. 
Getting back to Liu and Aaker, maybe you can tell a story about 
how the first question asked provides some sort of information to 
the subjects, and how that changes their beliefs in a way that, in the 
first treatment, makes them conclude the charity is more worthwhile. 
Or something. But it seems to me that if both questions are asked— 
and both are asked—telling an information-inference-based story is 
going to be diffi cult. Preferences change. They can be manipulated, 
to some extent. And, in terms of what motivates consummate effort, 
this is probably a signifi cant effect. 
BUT IS IT ECONOMICS? 
Since I gave her most of the good lines and allowed her the final 
word,32 I doubt that anyone will be surprised to learn that my sympa-
thies in this discussion are with my imaginary psychologist. This isn’t 
to say that the economist is incapable of explaining the data in the SEP
survey with orthodox economic models. At the least, orthodox econom-
ics can do a good job with those data, if one permits employees to value 
interesting problems, to internalize the welfare of the team or organiza-
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tion to which they belong, or to devote effort to improving the social 
weal. And while utility functions that have these sorts of things as argu-
ments with positive partial derivatives are not exactly rampant in the 
literature, there is nothing unorthodox about them. 
Indeed, I believe that a nice orthodox principal-agent model can be 
devised along these lines: Have a (possibly diverse) set of agents, all of 
whom are powerfully affected by their take-home pay, but all of whom 
also attach some weight to success of the organization. Give them Type-
K jobs, with (say) multiple tasks, some of which can be judged in terms 
of outcomes only after a lot of time has passed or with a lot of noise. In 
these circumstances, the principal may well opt to avoid pay for perfor-
mance, out of fear of getting it wrong, and let the agents’ (even slight) 
desire to see their organization succeed provide motivation, as long as 
that desire is sufficient to overcome any “disutility of effort” on the part 
of the employee.33 
But once we abandon the notion that each employee comes with 
time-consistent, present-at-birth preferences, we are (as far as I can 
judge) firmly doing unorthodox (heterodox?) economics. Mainstream 
economists have—for the most part—resisted enlisting models with 
changing tastes, preferring to explain phenomena while eschewing this 
modeling device. Witness, for instance, the characteristically ingenious 
pair of papers by Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006) that the fictitious 
economist cited. 
“For the most part” does not mean “entirely,” of course. Work of 
this general sort makes up a fair bit of so-called behavioral economics, 
dealing with time inconsistency that manifests itself as hyperbolic dis-
counting. And Akerlof and Kranton have published papers and even a 
book (Akerlof and Kranton 2010) on what they call identity economics, 
which breaks the taboo against models with changing tastes.34 But one 
might characterize such efforts as isolated brush fires in the vast for-
est of economic models, rather than as an increasingly encompassing 
conflagration. 
A classic paper by Stigler and Becker (1977) makes the argument 
for the orthodox position. As a matter of mathematical fact, one can 
pose dynamic choice behavior that cannot be accommodated with a 
model of unchanging individual preferences; this concerns behavior in 
which the decision maker chooses to put constraints on the choices he 
will have available later, with no compensating improvement (and even 






with a corresponding decrement) in what he consumes today.35 But, Sti-
gler and Becker argue, empirically important phenomena do not require 
this sort of modeling innovation. And, at least implicitly, they make the 
value judgment that this modeling innovation should be avoided if it 
can be. 
I think the last step in this argument—the value judgment—is defec-
tive. The standard argument for modeling agents as utility-maximizing 
is an “as-if” argument: if the choice behavior of an agent satisfies cer-
tain properties, her choices are as if she is maximizing some utility 
function that maps her options into real numbers. Most microeconomic 
textbooks, at least at the graduate level, start with this result; see, for 
instance, Kreps (2013, Chapter 1). The required properties, though, are 
posed in the context of choice from opportunity sets (drawn from some 
larger set of all possible choices that might be made) at a single point 
in time. Talk of “unchanging preferences” concerns dynamic choice 
behavior, and while additional properties can be found that knit together 
choices made at different points in time and that then guarantee that 
dynamic choices are as if the agent had unchanging preferences,36 those 
additional properties are even less reasonable empirically than the prop-
erties that give utility maximization as an as-if model for static choice. 
Even if economists can devise clever models with unchanging pref-
erences that account for some of the phenomena described in this chap-
ter,37 the models we employ to explore important empirical phenomena 
should be as simple and straightforward as we can make them, while 
being consistent with the phenomena. If the subject is motivating con-
summate effort in work settings, I believe the psychologist, backed up 
by her literature, makes a case for changing preferences that is very 
hard to dismiss. Economists should, instead, embrace these ideas. 
Notes 
I am very grateful to Jennifer Aaker, Jim Baron, Frank Flynn, Deb Gruenfeld, Wendy 
Liu, and Dale Miller for their assistance in helping me understand social psychologi-
cal approaches to motivation and related topics. Of course, any errors in translation 
or transcription that appear in this chapter are entirely my fault. This chapter has 
evolved from discussions I’ve had over the years with Bengt Holmstrom; additional 
valuable comments (from economist colleagues) have been made by Bob Gibbons, 
Jean Kimmel, and Paul Oyer. Versions of it were presented as the Karl Borch Lec-
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ture for 2013 and at a conference honoring Richard Cyert and James March’s classic 
book, A Behavioral Model of the Firm; comments from participants at both presenta-
tions, as well as the fi nancial support of the Stanford Graduate School of Business, 
are gratefully acknowledged. 
It will be obvious that this chapter does not stem from a research paper in the usual 
sense of the word, but instead from an essay intended to raise issues (and contro-
versy) among economists. Given its purpose, I am more than usually interested in 
hearing from readers; my e-mail address is kreps@stanford.edu. 
1. Some of these characteristics, such as ambiguity, preclude any modeling with 
mainstream techniques at all. 
2. And, for just the reason that it is hard to get pay-for-performance right in Type-
K jobs, it would take a lot of data, a lot of time, or both, to come to reliable 
conclusions. 
3. I lead sessions that begin with the economics of relationships (reciprocity, rep-
utation, and credibility; transaction costs; and vertical strategic partnerships) 
and then go on to motivation on the job. 
4. For the summer of 2014, the six-week program, including room, board, and 
instruction, cost $61,500 per participant. 
5. Using the five-point numerical scale, a paired-sample test of difference in 
means between “how effective is X in motivating my direct reports” and 
“ . . . in motivating me” gives a one-sided critical probability of 2 × 10−8 for X = 
“Success of organization” and 1.97 × 10−10 for X = “Work is socially important.” 
For “Exciting work,” the difference in means is still quite significant, with a one-
tailed critical probability of 0.0065. 
6. For a stark example of this phenomenon, see Heath (1999). In a different part 
of this survey, I replicate the Heath results with SEP participants and have done 
so every year for the past 12; along these lines, it is surely one of the easier-to-
replicate empirical results about motivation. 
7. The numbers of respondents in each category in these two tables differ, and they 
differ from the numbers in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. This happens because the tables 
were created at different points of time; tables created at a later time have more 
respondents. This, however, has no material impact on the qualitative results. 
Without claiming that any of the following are “established,” and recognizing 
the possibility of data mining in this sort of exercise, the data in Table A2 that are 
consistent with things I’ve seen in years past and that I would conjecture might be 
stable results are as follows: Europeans perceive themselves as less self-motivated 
by tangible rewards and more by organizational success than do U.S. citizens and 
Canadians, with East Asians in the middle. The U-shape seen in age versus tangi-
ble rewards has recurred; perhaps young participants feel they have time to make 
their fortunes, while older participants on average have made theirs. Or perhaps 
young participants selected to go to SEP feel so certain of their eventual (financial) 
success that they are unmotivated by the marginal bit of incentive pay. General 
managers certainly perceive themselves as more motivated by contributing to the 















success of their organization than do functional specialists, an effect that largely 
disappears when we look at their perceptions of their direct reports. (Presumably, 
chairs, CEOs, and chief operating officers [COOs] regard themselves as general 
managers, with direct reports who are more likely to be functional specialists, 
such as chief fi nancial officers [CFOs], chief information officers [CIOs], and so 
forth. Hence the observation that general managers see themselves as more moti-
vated by organizational success than do functional specialists is consistent with 
the observation that chairs, CEOs, and COOs see themselves as similarly moti-
vated but to a greater extent than is true for their direct reports.) 
Note that no participants in the financial services industry said that tangible 
rewards were the most descriptive of what motivates their own best work. Perhaps 
this is an example of folks reacting against stereotype: “I’m in fi nancial services, 
so everyone assumes all I want is to make money, so I’ll show them.” If you look 
instead at the respondents from financial services and what they said was most 
descriptive of how to motivate their direct reports, five said tangible rewards, five 
said interesting work, five said organizational success, and two said social impor-
tance. (Of course, these are all very small numbers.) 
Contrast these data with results I got a few years ago when I conducted a sim-
ilar survey of first-year MBA students. I won’t present the MBA data, but among 
the 140 respondents, tangible rewards were perceived by them in two ways: 1) as 
being significantly more powerful, on average, and 2) as being most descriptive 
of what motivated both their organizational peers (instead of direct reports) and 
themselves. The MBA students were asked to supply demographic details on age, 
sex, geography, industry (the one in which they were last employed), and under-
graduate major. And in the cross-tabs, the power of tangible rewards increased 
markedly for two types of students: 1) those from the financial services industry 
and 2) those who had majored as undergraduates in economics. Geography, sex, 
and age showed no marked pattern. 
8. I surveyed responses of a smaller and more homogenous group of upper-tier man-
agers from a different executive education program; these participants are all con-
nected to the financial services industry and all come from Australia. The group 
was relatively small, n = 38, so there are added reasons to distrust the results. But 
this group conformed to the pattern described in the text in nearly all important 
respects. 
9. It is probably obvious, but I’ll say anyway that these are not alternative theories in 
the sense that if one is true, the others must be false. Different motivational chan-
nels or pathways can happily coexist in specific circumstances. (Those circum-
stances may be a factor in determining how powerfully any one of these theories 
applies.) Indeed, from a normative perspective—the perspective of the practicing 
manager—enlisting several of these theories simultaneously to motivate desired 
behavior is good practice. Therefore, one is interested in knowing which of these 
can happily coexist and even reinforce the others, as well ask knowing which of 
these may weaken the impact of the others. See further on for the discussion on the 
undermining effect. 
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10. An economist colleague, reading this section, objected that this was “just econom-
ics.” The idea that employees take those actions that maximize the chance they 
will get a reward that they value (and even more, the “formal formulation” of an 
objective function that maximizes the probability of getting a reward times the 
“value” of the reward) is, to an economist, simple expected-utility maximization. 
I understand why an economist would observe these things; I’m unsure why an 
economist would object to a psychological theory that has a very close counterpart 
in the dominant economic theory of choice under uncertainty. 
11. I confess that I’m somewhat unclear on the demotivating impact of inequitable 
rewards on those at the top end of the distribution of ratios. That wasn’t my experi-
ence as associate dean at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. 
12. The theory of social comparisons is broader than its application to equity theory. It 
holds that, when person X tries to evaluate how well she is doing and how well she 
is being treated, she will look at her performance and treatment relative to others 
and, in particular, to others who are socially similar to herself. 
13. Recent work by Grant et al. (2007) adds a fourth item to this list: her perceived 
purpose, a sense that the task achieves something important and valued. 
14. I am told by colleagues who are psychologists that this paragraph doesn’t quite 
capture self-perception theory; it sounds more like dissonance theory. I gather 
that my use of the term justification is key; according to dissonance theory, when 
X works hard at some task, and when X is unable to perceive a clear purpose for 
doing so, X is affl icted with psychological disequilibrium. To resolve or mitigate 
this unhappy state, X looks for (and fi nds) justification for her actions: “I did it 
because . . . ,” and then whatever fills in the blank becomes part of X’s self-image. 
In self-perception theory, in contrast, X is simply and naturally curious about what 
motivated her actions. The young engineers at Data General look at their efforts 
and those of their peers, see that these cannot be due to the promise of tangible 
financial rewards if they succeed, nor to a desire to see Data General succeed, and 
so are left with, “We are doing this because it is fun.” And, then, they regard the 
activity as fun. The two theories give the same observed behavior (it seems to me); 
hence this is an excellent example of what Dale Miller (quoted at the top of p. 108) 
calls the psychologist’s effort to see two things that seem the same as different; in 
fact, I’m told that when Bem first advanced self-perception theory, something of 
an intellectual spitting contest with dissonance theorists was the immediate result. 
15. For details, see Friedman and Deinard (1991a,b), Koloroutis (2004), and Vitello 
(2011). The last is the New York Times obituary of Joyce Clifford, who was head 
nurse at Beth Israel when primary nursing was introduced. 
16. Well, it used to be, in the 1970s. Changes in how hospitals are compensated for 
patient care have pushed nursing somewhat in the direction of an assembly-line 
job. Keep reading. 
17. See Harvard Business Review’s case study Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Cen-
ter: Coordinating Patient Care (Gittell, Wimbush, and Shu 1999). 
18. Readers well versed in the literature may know of a work by Bénabou and Tirole 
that provides orthodox-economics explanations for this empirical phenomenon. I 
will discuss their work later in this chapter. 






















19. As long as X ≠ Y, an economist could regard attribution theory as a straightfor-
ward (Bayesian or otherwise) inference by X about Y’s preferences and desires. It 
is when X = Y, when X attributes her own motives ex post to why she took some 
action, and then is influenced in future behavior by the attribution on which she 
settles, that an orthodox economist becomes squeamish at least. 
20. Just more (Bayesian) inference—in this case about what motivates Y and people 
like him. 
21. This is a real-life story. I have tried to persuade the real-life company to let me 
write a case about it, but for reasons that will become apparent, they do not want 
this story told. So I must be careful not to identify the company and will resort to 
calling them Company Z in Industry I. 
22. Links to the output of SPEC can be found at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/ces/ 
research/specproject.html. 
23. Another 28 percent of the firms were what the researchers called a “hybrid engi-
neering” model, a model that varied from the engineering model in only one 
dimension. There are seven hybrid-engineering models, one of which is Bureau-
cracy. Of the 36 possible models, eight differ from each of the five pure types 
along two dimensions, and of the 154 firms in the sample, only two were one of 
these eight anomalous models. 
24. On multitasking, the classic reference is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). 
25. I’m not going to build formal models of any of this, but on this point I should note 
that if early-career employees understand that the organization screens for this 
characteristic in deciding whom to promote, the incentive to act early on “as if” 
the organization matters to the individual is increased. This will be good for the 
organization with respect to early-career employees, but it will make it more dif-
ficult to do the desired screening. Load on top of this a tournament model for who 
is promoted, and you have an interesting model to explore. 
26. And, to follow up on the previous note, as prospective MBA students, they pre-
sumably have less interest in taking actions that make it appear “as if” they have 
the organization’s best interests at heart, since they will probably leave the organi-
zation before such behavior would bear fruit. 
27. To add a technical point here: Credibility of the commitment—Condition C—is 
usually explained by economists as arising from the employer’s desire to maintain 
a reputation for behaving in a certain way. But the analysis of reputations—at 
least, the game-theoretic analysis of reputations—makes clear that the hinge on 
which a reputation hangs is whether interested third parties can tell when, in this 
context, the employer fails to live up to his reputation. For this to work, then, it 
isn’t enough that the employee and employer meet Conditions A and B; third par-
ties must meet these conditions as well, and have an understanding of what is “the 
right thing to have done.” 
28. See, for example, Williamson (1996). 
29. The English variant of Voltaire’s saying is “Perfect is the enemy of good.” 
30. Or consider the following completely hypothetical thought experiment. Suppose 
hospitals began to offer cash rewards for the donation from the dead of usable 
organs—so much for eyes, etc.—with the cash paid to the deceased’s estate. 
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Would this increase the number of people who indicate (say, on their driver’s 
licenses) that they are willing organ donors? Notwithstanding the bequest motive, 
which is well-established mainstream economics, I suspect not, at least among 
the relatively well-to-do. And it is hard to tell either Bénabou and Tirole story in 
this case, unless one supposes either that the living care to publicize that they are 
potential donors while alive, or that they care about their reputation when dead. 
31. The subjects could donate up to $10. In the time-ask-first treatment, the average 
donation was $5.85, versus $3.07 in the money-ask-first treatment. In a difference-
of-means test, the two-sided critical probability for the hypothesis of equal means 
was p < 0.001. Although not reported in the paper, Liu and Aaker (2008) also 
collected data on the answers to the (somewhat hypothetical) questions about the 
likelihood of donating time and/or money. Letting T1 be the average likelihood 
of volunteering time (on a scale of 1 to 7) in the time-ask-first treatment, letting 
M1 be the average likelihood of volunteering money, and letting T2 and M2 be the 
corresponding means for the money-ask-first treatment, they found T1 = 4.12 > T2 
= 2.94 and M1 = 4.34 > M2 = 3.72. To put this mathematical representation into 
words, in the time-ask-first treatment, the indicated likelihood of giving both time 
and money was higher than the likelihoods in the money-ask-fi rst treatment. The 
difference in means in T1 and T2 has a critical probability < 0.001, while for the 
difference in means between M1 and M2 the critical probability is p = 0.06. In both 
treatments, the indicated willingness to give was positively correlated: in the time-
ask-first treatment, corr(T1, M1) = 0.462; and in the money-ask-first treatment, 
corr(T2, M2) = 0.459 (Wendy Liu, associate professor of marketing, University of 
California San Diego, in discussion with the author, 2014). 
32. Since beauty is in the eye of the beholder, I add here that a psychologist colleague 
who read an early draft of this chapter was concerned that the representative of his 
tribe, P, comes off as “something of a twit.” I don’t see it, but, after all, de gustibus 
. . . . 
33. If papers along these lines have been written, I am unaware of them, and I would 
be grateful if readers would direct me to them. 
34. In fact, even Gary Becker sometimes built models in which preferences are 
manipulable, albeit the manipulable preferences are those of children (Becker, 
Murphy, and Spenkuch 2014). I say “even Gary Becker” here because of Stigler 
and Becker (1977), to be discussed momentarily. 
35. Stigler and Becker (1977, p. 76) seem to recognize this when they write, “[No 
need for models of changing tastes] is a thesis that does not permit of direct proof 
because it is an assertion about the world, not a proposition in logic.” 
36. See, for instance, Kreps (2013), Section 7.3 and, in particular, Proposition 7.1. 
37. And I’m hard-pressed to see how even a very clever economist could explain 
away Liu and Aaker (2008). 
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6 
Efficient and Effective Economic 
Regulation in a Confusing 
Technological Environment 
Michael J. Piore 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
This chapter focuses on the role of government in a market econ-
omy and the balance between government regulation and the “free” 
market. I examine this problem through the lens of several research 
projects in which I have recently been engaged, particularly a project on 
alternative approaches to the administration of labor standards, but also 
several studies in a very different domain—the organization of product 
design and product development. I hope, however, to make clear the 
relationship between these disparate activities. And, indeed, an impor-
tant part of my goal in this chapter is to widen the lens through which 
we think about economic activity. 
The debate about the market and the role of government in its regu-
lation is an old one, stretching back to the Industrial Revolution at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century (Polanyi 1944). But the contem-
porary variant is really rooted in the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The Great Depression was widely viewed as the product of an unregu-
lated market economy run amok, and most of the regulatory institu-
tions debated today are a product of the reaction to the unregulated 
market in that period. In the interim, between the origins of these insti-
tutions in the 1930s and the debate today, opinion on the need for them 
has oscillated back and forth in what Polanyi, writing at the beginning 
of the period but looking back at industrial history, calls the “double 
movement.” The prosperity of the immediate postwar period as medi-
ated by the institutions of the 1930s seemed to vindicate the regulatory 
movement. The stagnation of the 1970s produced a reaction, not simply 
against regulation but against government in general, and with the elec-
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tion of Ronald Reagan in 1980 a process of deregulation was initiated 
that continued through the next 30 years. One can in fact argue that the 
process of deregulation had begun even earlier in telecommunications 
and the airlines, but it was at first focused on those particular industries 
and not on economic regulation more broadly. Following the financial 
crisis of 2008, the pendulum started to swing back in the other direction. 
There was a widely shared perception that deregulation had gone too 
far, a renewed appreciation that the market operates within an institu-
tional framework created by government and managed by government 
agencies, and a recognition that the failure to maintain this framework 
makes the society vulnerable to a variety of excesses and abuses. In this 
sense, there is agreement about the need for some regulation. But there 
is nothing like a consensus about what that framework of regulation 
should look like. 
REGULATION IN THE LABOR MARKET
But while the emphasis in the debate has oscillated widely with 
changes in the economic environment over the course of the postwar 
period, the underlying arguments for and against regulation have not 
varied. The case in favor of the unregulated market is that it leaves 
prices free to reflect relative scarcity, and it places businesses under 
competitive pressure to pick the most efficient way to use limited 
resources. Regulation introduces rigidities, which interfere with these 
adjustment mechanisms (Hayek 1948). In so doing, it limits the ability 
of the economy to respond to variations in supply and demand, varia-
tions that occur for numerous reasons that cannot be anticipated. These 
variations are occasioned in the short run by accidents of weather, sud-
den changes in tastes, or the misfortunes of particular businesses or sec-
tors; in the intermediate run they are produced by the ebb and flow of 
economic activity over the business cycle; and in the long run by tech-
nological changes that render older approaches obsolete and require 
the constant accommodation and adjustment of business practices and 
institutional structures. 
In the case of work regulation, the argument is that it leads to rigidi-
ties in wages and in employment obligations in general, and that these 
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rigidities in turn lead to the inefficient deployment of labor and spe-
cifically to unemployment. These effects are especially strong at the 
bottom of the labor market, where the regulations are binding; hence, 
regulation will distort the income distribution. These basic concerns 
have been compounded in recent years by the belief that new technolo-
gies and expanding global competition have so changed the economic 
environment that the particular regulations that were developed in the 
1930s are outdated and, in some versions, irrelevant (Weil 2014). 
Forms of Work Regulation 
The image of work regulation that underlies this argument is, how-
ever, derived from the administrative system that is characteristic of 
the United States, and that system is far from universal. An alternative 
administrative approach (and one that is a good deal more fl exible) is 
found in France, most of southern Europe, and Latin America—what 
I will call in this chapter the Franco-Latin system. The contrast offers 
a very different perspective on regulation, one in which regulations 
can work along with market forces and not necessarily against them. 
The contrast here is between a specialized sanctioning system (as it is 
termed in the shorthand vocabulary used by the International Labour 
Organization) and a general compliance one (von Richthofen 2002). 
The U.S. system is specialized and sanctioning. Work regulations 
are spread out over almost a dozen different federal agencies: the Wages 
and Hours Division of the Department of Labor, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), several agencies that deal with 
immigration, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Federal 
Mediation Service, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), and so on. Many of these federal agencies have analogues at 
the state level which share the same territory. Each agency thus has a 
narrow jurisdiction and a limited mandate. It specializes in and focuses 
upon that dimension of work with which it is directly concerned. The 
underlying model of enforcement and compliance is one of deterrence 
through sanctions. Violations of regulations are penalized—usually 
through a fine, much more rarely through a prison sentence. The penalty 
basically discharges the obligation of the enterprise, and the penalty also 
serves in theory as a deterrent to violation. The size of the penalty and 






the probability of discovering a violation through complaints or inspec-
tions determine the incentive to comply with the law. When compliance 
is inadequate, these can be adjusted accordingly, either by raising the 
fine (also by possibly increasing the prison sentence) or by increasing 
the chances of getting caught—by, for example, increasing the number 
of inspectors. The level of fines and the number of inspectors are the 
basic parameters which control the effectiveness of the system. 
The Franco-Latin system of work regulation is by contrast built on a 
general conciliation/remediation model (Piore and Schrank 2006, 2008; 
Schrank and Piore 2007). The model is general in the sense that the 
whole of the labor code is administered by a single organization. The 
line agents of that organization (the labor inspectors), when they enter 
a given enterprise, can cite the organization for violations of any part of 
the code. But more basically, the employer cannot discharge his or her 
obligations by payment of a penalty alone. Employers are supposed to 
come into compliance with the law. The role of the inspector is to help 
them do so. Toward that end, the inspector is empowered to develop a 
plan that corrects violations of the law—if necessary, through reforms 
in technology and managerial practice. He or she also has the power 
to grant the enterprise the space to implement these reforms gradually 
over time. 
The system gives the inspectors wide discretion in how the regula-
tions are actually administered. The discretion derives from the very 
wide variety of provisions of the law over which the inspector has juris-
diction. He or she could not possibly inspect for every one of these pro-
visions and hence must pick and choose those provisions upon which 
to focus. The ability of the inspector to institute a plan that brings about 
compliance gradually over time further expands that inspector’s effec-
tive powers and discretion. In sum, the capacity for the inspector to 
adapt the rules and regulations in this way gives the system a potential 
flexibility to adjust to the peculiarities of particular enterprises and to 
the economic and social environment in which they operate—a poten-
tial that the U.S. system completely lacks. The inspector can, in effect, 
focus on health and safety violations when unemployment is low and 
alternative jobs are readily available if the enterprise has trouble bear-
ing the cost of correcting these, but he or she can look the other way 
when unemployment is high and the competitive environment in which 
the firm is operating is tight. Similarly, the inspector can enforce wage 




Economic Regulation in a Confusing Technological Environment  149 
laws less stringently when unemployment is high and the market pres-
sures would normally lead to lower wages. 
But additionally, and significantly, the emphasis on compliance 
should lead the inspector to look for the underlying causes of the viola-
tions and seek remedies in managerial practice or technology that actu-
ally address the problem at its root. In this way, the system encourages 
inspectors to look for support from other government programs that 
address these problems, such as manufacturing extension programs 
or employment and training. The U.S. system, by contrast, leads the 
inspectors to focus narrowly on what are, in effect, symptoms of the 
way the company does business. It is like the difference between a doc-
tor focusing on the symptoms and one focusing on the disease. 
Whether or not the labor inspection system actually exhibits this 
kind of flexibility depends on how the inspectors make their deci-
sions and how the system is managed. Interviews with inspectors in 
France, Spain, and Latin America suggest that they are best understood 
as “street-level” bureaucrats. They belong to a class of public servants 
who work in organizations where substantial discretion is lodged in 
the agents at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy (Lipsky 1980). 
Organizations of this kind that have been studied in the academic lit-
erature include social workers, classroom teachers, and forest rangers. 
But they also include civil servants whose power and discretion is not 
generally recognized, such as immigration agents or program auditors 
(Piore 2011). 
The canonical street-level bureaucrat is the police patrolman on the 
beat (Wilson 1968). In principle, the police are charged with enforcing 
the law. But in fact much of police work is really about maintaining 
social order. The law becomes an instrument in the pursuit of order 
and is evoked situationally. Social order, moreover, is an ambiguous 
concept that is dependent on context and varies with the moral code of 
the community. Thus, technically, prostitution is illegal at all times and 
in all places, and prostitutes in middle-class, suburban neighborhoods 
will be arrested on sight, but de facto prostitution is generally tolerated 
in the downtown entertainment districts of most large cities. 
How do street-level bureaucrats make these decisions? In some 
part, these decisions are idiosyncratic; each agent has his or her own 
moral code. But in most such organizations, when the agents work with 
each other for a prolonged period, they develop a common code of 
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behavior. The agents come to judge each other by the degree to which 
their actions conform to that code, and agents themselves seek to act in 
conformity with the code because they value the opinions of their col-
leagues; their own sense of self-worth is bound up with the judgment of 
the group. The code of behavior that governs their decisions is some-
thing like a language—a simile to which we will return below—and, 
like a language, it evolves through use. But the code also reflects a set of 
values that new recruits bring with them to the job, as these values are 
refracted through the process of training and socialization to which the 
recruits are subject once they are selected to join the organization. And 
the code then evolves over time through continual interaction among 
members of the organization as they discuss cases, particularly new and 
unusual cases. Those discussions proceed continually and informally 
through employees’ interacting on the job or relating “war stories” as 
they socialize with each other on breaks in the work routine or while 
relaxing together after work. In some organizations, these discussions 
are formalized in group meetings with higher levels of management, 
where the priorities of the organizations are presented and conflicts 
among organizational goals are debated and resolved. 
The behavior of street-level bureaucrats can be contrasted to two 
other models that dominate discussions of organizational behavior. One 
is the economist’s model of self-interested rational choice—ideally, in 
a market economy, constrained by the “prices” generated by the inter-
action of the actors in competition with each other. The agents in a 
street-level bureaucracy are not less self-interested than in the econo-
mist’s formulation, but their interest is centered on the judgment of their 
colleagues. Their prestige in their own mind is dependent on how their 
fellow workers perceive their work. The new public management is an 
attempt to simulate the market by identifying quantitative measures of 
organizational goals and rewarding the agents in accordance with their 
achievements. One can think of this approach as trying to substitute 
monetary rewards for the judgment of peers. It fails in part because col-
legial approval is not fungible and cannot be reduced to monetary com-
pensation. The model also fails in street-level bureaucracies because 
the objectives that measure what the organization is trying to achieve 
are too numerous and complex to be reduced to quantitative measures, 
and the weights attached to the different goals vary too widely with the 
economic and social environment. How do you measure the effective-
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ness of the police? Is it by the amount of crime? And if so what kinds 
of crime? Or is it by the sense of an orderly community? Or a feeling 
of safety they engender in the citizenry? And if the last, how do you 
weigh the concerns of the different citizens? How do you compare the 
white woman’s fear of the black teenager in the ghetto to the sense of 
insecurity and the humiliation felt by those teenagers when subjected to 
continual police “stop and frisk” encounters? 
The alternative to the market in the conventional formulation is a 
classic Weberian bureaucracy, where the agents are instructed in how 
to behave by directives from above and are punished when they fail to 
comply. Such bureaucratic regulations produce precisely the rigidities 
that are the subject of the conventional critique of regulation (Crozier 
1964). The higher-level directives do not adjust—or do not adjust fast 
enough—to the flux and uncertainties of a market economy or to the 
peculiarities of particular enterprises and the socioeconomic environ-
ments in which they are operating. They end up, for example, treating 
an enterprise in temporary distress because of accidents of nature or of 
the market in the same way as a firm that seeks a competitive advantage 
by exploiting its workforce and violating the protective rules and regu-
lations. They apply the same regulations in regions with high unem-
ployment and in regions with very tight labor markets that can afford to 
lose the jobs that a strict enforcement of health and safety regulations or 
of wages and hours laws might imply would be lost. 
But while street-level bureaucracies do not lend themselves to 
either hierarchical control or to management through simulated mar-
ket incentives, the social environment that governs the decisions the 
agents make can be “managed” (Piore 2011). The organization actually 
possesses a number of instruments for doing so. For convenience, we 
would group these instruments under four headings. First, management 
controls the processes of recruitment and selection of new candidates, 
and hence the values that new agents bring with them when they enter 
the service. In the case of labor inspectors, the social codes seem espe-
cially susceptible to the mix of candidates from working-class families 
relative to those from middle-class backgrounds more sympathetic to 
business; other dimensions stressed in our field interviews with labor 
inspectors include the mix between lawyers, engineers, medical doc-
tors, union officials, ex-military, and women versus men. 




Second, management controls the processes of socialization and 
training once the new recruits enter the service. The mix between for-
mal training on the one hand and apprenticeship on the other is espe-
cially important. In the latter, new recruits are sent out into the fi eld with 
experienced inspectors, and in this way values and behavioral patterns 
are passed on directly from one generation to another. Apprenticeship 
also emphasizes tacit knowledge. Formal training, on the other hand, 
can stress or counteract the biases introduced in the recruiting process 
by emphasizing explicit, formal criteria of evaluation. 
A third range of variables that management controls is that of how 
self-contained the organization is, how open it is to outside influences 
and values, and how dependent upon the judgment of their colleagues 
the agents actually are relative to other groups in society with whom 
they interact. At one extreme in this regard is the military, whose mem-
bers typically live and work in closed environments, with their own 
recreational facilities, medical care facilities, schools for their children, 
etc. This environment insulates military personnel from outside contacts 
that might compete with military values in judging their self-worth. In 
addition, members of military organizations become dependent on their 
colleagues not only for social validation but for physical protection in 
hostile environments, thus reinforcing their concern with the approval 
and support of their colleagues. This is true of police work as well. 
The balance between the support that line officers receive from their 
colleagues versus that offered by their supervisors in dangerous situa-
tions is also an important variable in determining how much influence 
the latter can exert over the decisions of their subordinates. Actually, in 
some environments, it is also true of labor inspectors. In France several 
years ago, two labor inspectors were shot dead by an irate farmer whose 
premises they were inspecting, and the failure of the government to 
speak out forcefully condemning the killings has colored the relation-
ship between the line inspectors and their supervisors ever since. 
The fourth way—and in many regards the most interesting way— 
in which management can exert influence over the decisions of street-
level bureaucrats is through the ongoing conversation surrounding the 
regulation process. My own sense of the importance of this conversa-
tion and what it means to “manage” it actually comes from a series of 
studies on product design and development, studies of what might be 
termed, in a very loose sense, “innovation.” Conventional economics 
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does not yield a clear theory of “innovation.” It deals primarily with 
how choices are made among a known set of alternative technologies. 
The properties of such technologies may not be known with certainty, 
but they are assumed to be sufficiently well identified that one can 
assign probabilities or expectations to key characteristics and then work 
to develop the characteristics of the alternatives so as to minimize their 
costs or maximize their contribution to a specified set of goals. But new 
product development often involves radical uncertainty (Knightian 
uncertainty) of choices in a situation where one does not even know 
what the alternatives really are. 
Among the products that emerged in our own studies, the canoni-
cal case is the cellular telephone (Lester and Piore 2004). The cellular 
phone is a combination of radio and telephone technologies, inspired by 
the two-way radios used by police and by taxis. The first such devices 
were bulky car-mounted instruments. People had only the vaguest idea 
of why one might want one or how they might be used. The device had 
to be developed to be commercially viable, but none of the developers 
knew exactly what he or she was developing. In addition, the radio and 
telephone companies that had to cooperate to work out the mechanics 
of the device were from completely different engineering and business 
cultures. Telephony had a tradition of quality engineering, of making 
almost perfect products, sold to expert customers. Emblematic of the 
ethos of the industry was the fact that the dial tone was always there 
when you picked up the phone, and calls were virtually never lost. Radio 
engineers were by comparison cowboys; they understood the technol-
ogy empirically; they accepted a reality in which the signal faded in and 
out and failure was corrected on an ad hoc basis. Radios were produced 
by large, expert companies, but they were sold to consumers for whom 
the product was ancillary to their main concerns. 
How did these two antagonistic business and engineering cultures 
learn to work together? How did the product they produced evolve 
from a clunky car radio to a perfectly portable instrument that people 
carried around in their pockets and to which were attached a range of 
functions that included not only two-way vocal communication but an 
ever-expanding list of other capabilities, from video games and written 
messages to still and video photography? 
The cellular phone as it exists today emerged out of what I term in 
my organizational research an ongoing conversation—a conversation 
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not only among the disparate engineers and managers who ultimately 
had to collaborate to produce the new product, but also between the 
producers and the consumers who would ultimately purchase and use 
it. The conversation proceeded in two phases. In the first phase, the par-
ticipants were basically developing a common language in which they 
could understand each other and could tolerate and ultimately appreci-
ate their differences. In the second phase, they used the new language 
to discuss various ideas as to how the product they were developing 
might be used. We called this process interpretative; it was open-ended 
and did not involve commitment to any particular model or design. Out 
of this ongoing interpretative conversation, at various points in time, 
particular product ideas were selected. These were then developed in 
a totally different process, an analytical process in which the engineers 
sought the optimal design. But it was the interpretative process through 
which they handled the radical uncertainty involved in the creation of a 
totally new product. 
We came to think of that interpretative process as being like a cock-
tail party. Like guests at a party, the engineers and managers engaged 
in seemingly idle conversation, moving back and forth from what we 
would classify in a rational choice framework as ends (what is the “thing” 
good for? how will it be used?) and means (how could it be powered if 
we move it out of the car? what kinds of material would make it light 
enough to be carried but durable enough to withstand being banged 
around in a pocket or purse?). The role of the manager in this process 
then becomes like that of a host at a party: invite the guests, introduce 
them to each other, stimulate conversation among them, break up con-
versations that become too antagonistic, and introduce new guests to 
conversations that seem to be becoming stale and repetitive—making 
sure at all times that the discussions are moving forward, that the guests 
are engaged, that new perspectives are emerging. 
A parallel set of conclusions are emerging in a series of studies of 
federal agencies that fund research and development with which I am 
currently involved. The agency that is closest to the innovative fron-
tier, generating new products continuously, is DARPA (the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency). Since its creation in 1958 in 
response to the surprise launching of the Soviet space satellite Sputnik, 
DARPA has been key in the creation of a wide array of revolution-
ary technologies, from the World Wide Web, the cellular phone, and a 







Economic Regulation in a Confusing Technological Environment  155 
host of new materials, to more narrowly military technologies such as 
the stealth bomber. Other major federal agencies funding research—the 
National Science Foundation, for example, or the National Institutes 
of Health—select projects and allocate funds through a peer review 
process. DARPA projects, by contrast, are created and managed by a 
project manager. The project manager has wide discretion to pick the 
particular area and type of technology that he or she is going to develop 
and the process through which that development is going to take place. 
The process that the DARPA program manager uses to do this paral-
lels the process that emerged in our case studies in design and product 
development (Fuchs 2010). 
The process begins with an often vague idea of a new technology— 
usually with some potential military application—but often an applica-
tion that is so ill-defined that one might think of it as an excuse rather 
than a target. The project manager then seeks to identify industries and 
areas of science and technology that might contribute in one way or 
another to the development of the idea, very often finding people who 
are strangers to one another and who in the normal course of events 
might never communicate—not unlike the radio and the telephone 
engineers who were brought together to create the cellular phone. These 
potential collaborators, once identified, are brought together in informal 
meetings, seminars, and conferences to discuss the project and their 
potential contribution to it. Only after this discussion has proceeded 
to the point where these people have, first, developed a common lan-
guage and, second, worked together to identify specific technological 
issues that must be addressed does the project manager formulate a set 
of research tasks and issue requests for proposals (RFPs). Most nota-
bly, at DARPA the discussions surrounding the project continue even as 
specific research is taking place. The agency as a whole, and the project 
managers individually, are forever convening seminars and colloquia 
in which the contractors are required to present their results to each 
other and review and comment on the work of their colleagues. In this 
way, an open-ended interpretative conversation is always ongoing in 
the background, however specific, narrowly focused, and goal-oriented 
the research itself becomes. 
How does this understanding of innovation map onto the Franco-
Latin work inspectors or to street-level bureaucrats more broadly? The 
street-level bureaucrats have been variously described as “the reflective 
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practitioner” (Schön 1983) or “the sociological citizens” (Silbey 2011). 
At its best, their task is to craft solutions to the particulars of each case. 
The DARPA project manager is in this sense a street-level bureaucrat. 
Or, the other way around, each work inspector becomes an innovator, 
and each case that he or she handles becomes like an innovation. The 
material out of which that innovation is constructed—the substance but 
also the practice—is drawn out of the ongoing conversation occurring 
in the background of the work process. And one can imagine manage-
ment in a street-level bureaucracy managing the conversation in much 
the same way as product-development managers in private industry or 
the project manager at DARPA: like a host at a cocktail party. The sin-
gular exception is that, in most cases, when the manager arrives on 
the scene, the cocktail party is already in process—a conversation is 
already ongoing among the agents; the work group has already devel-
oped a language and vocabulary in which they are accustomed to talk 
to each other. 
Finally, the analogue to innovation is not limited to day-to-day 
operations; there are often cases that are quite literally innovative 
situations, where the problem is fundamentally different from those 
that have arisen before, and where even experienced inspectors lack 
a vocabulary for defining what the underlying problem is and how to 
address it. Where this is the case, the analogy to the DARPA project 
manager is even stronger. This is especially true at the current moment, 
in which the advent of information technology, new forms of commu-
nication and transport, and new global trading regimes make existing 
work regulations appear anachronistic. 
The interpretive conversation among street-level bureaucrats—and 
in our case labor inspectors in the Franco-Latin model—goes on spon-
taneously, often informally, in the background of day-to-day life in the 
organization as the agents go about their work. And one can say that 
the solutions they fashion to the problems they encounter are drawn 
out of this ongoing conversation in the same way that the succession 
of cellular telephone models are drawn out of the interpretive conver-
sation among managers and engineers. But that conversation can also 
become a tool that management can organize and direct by playing the 
host at the cocktail party—convening formal meetings, inviting outside 
experts to participate and interact with the front-line agents, introduc-
ing particular topics that would not otherwise be discussed or, at least, 
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made the explicit focus of the conversation, even supporting academic 
research on different forms of work organization, technical processes, 
and business strategies that could inform the discussion.
 It is admittedly hard to imagine the United States adopting the 
Franco-Latin model of work regulation. The current state of labor mar-
ket regulation favors the power of business, and the alignment of politi-
cal forces favors the status quo. One could imagine a greater coordina-
tion among the various agencies but not a wholesale reform that would 
create a unified system. But in other regulatory arenas, the U.S. system 
is more unified, and the agents of the regulatory agencies operate with 
considerable discretion, much like a street-level bureaucracy. Examples 
include public prosecutors’ offices at both the state and the national lev-
els (Chattin 1996; Misner 1996), the Forest Service (USDA 2002), drug 
and medical device regulation (Carpenter 2010), and energy. 
Paradoxically, the regulatory domain that in the United States is 
closest to work regulation is finance. Here too, regulatory authority is 
dispersed among numerous federal organizations and in many areas 
is shared with the states as well. Here too, as well, there has been an 
intense debate about the relevance of the regulations initially conceived 
in the 1930s for the contemporary economy. But a major difference 
between finance and work regulation is that, despite the dispersion in 
finance, there is a single agency that oversees the sector as a whole: 
the Federal Reserve. The Fed may not have the power to coordinate 
the regulatory structure through administrative directives outside its 
own jurisdiction, but it does animate a debate, an interpretative con-
versation, that resonates throughout the sector and the many agencies 
that impinge upon it. This conversation concerns the goals of financial 
regulation, the “means” or instruments available to achieve those goals, 
and the relative weights to be assigned to alternative, possibly compet-
ing goals, explicitly weighing full employment, price stability, and risk 
management against each other and adjusting the balance among them 
over the business cycle. 
The financial service sector and the Fed’s role in managing the ongo-
ing conversation within it in recent years is, however, a cautionary tale 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). As chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan 
argued that new technologies had rendered obsolete the regulatory 
structures of the past, and the discussion under his leadership and direc-
tion completely failed to anticipate the financial crisis of 2008. It failed 





to do so, I believe, because the people invited to the “cocktail party” 
came from too narrow a segment of society. But the point here is less 
the particular failings of the past than the recognition of the importance 
of the ongoing conversation and the way it is organized as a critical 
instrument of public policy in a dynamic but also uncertain economy 
(Bernanke 2015). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter’s discussion of regulation has extended well beyond 
typical economics discussions of this topic. Why is this the case? Eco-
nomics is virtually alone among the social sciences in taking as its mis-
sion not only to develop a better understanding of the world but, through 
that understanding, to better human welfare within it. In that mission 
we have in recent years failed—and by some measures failed miserably, 
at enormous cost to human life and welfare, both individual and social.
In work regulation, the most conspicuous failure is represented by the 
factory building collapse in Bangladesh in 2013, the worst industrial 
accident in history. Over 1,000 workers died in a factory producing 
goods for the U.S. market, commissioned by and later sold under U.S. 
brand-name firms competing in market conditions created by the abrupt 
end of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, which regulated worldwide trade 
in textiles and clothing from 1974 to 2004. The United States promoted 
the end of this agreement as part of a policy of globalization, designed 
and supported by the backing of virtually the whole of the economics 
profession. The building collapse was preceded by a factory fire that 
was in many ways a replica of the New York City Triangle Shirtwaist 
fire 100 years earlier, which we in the economics profession believed 
had taught the lessons of the dangers of unregulated work in the garment 
industry and how to prevent such dangers (Bhasin 2014). In the United 
States itself, we have just lived through the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression and barely averted a comparable crisis in the real 
economy.  With very few exceptions, the profession failed to anticipate 
the crisis and, as just noted, promoted the elimination of regulations 
that might have moderated it or even prevented it. And we addressed 
the crisis by subsidizing a long list of major companies in finance and 
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manufacturing, while letting a host of rank-and-file workers go bank-
rupt, which meant they lost their housing and lifetime savings (Mian 
and Sufi 2014). We are now left with a legacy of unemployment and 
economic insecurity that is probably more acute than at any other time 
in the postwar period. All of this after four decades of slow economic 
growth in which average incomes have stagnated while earnings at the 
very top of the distribution have been allowed to rise progressively, so 
that the chief executives of major corporations (the kinds of major cor-
porations that were the beneficiaries of the financial bailout) have risen 
from 40 times the incomes of the average employee to 250–300 times 
(Mishel et al. 2012). 
Economics has created a framework that is designed to speak 
directly to public policy, but the analytical apparatus that we have 
brought to bear within that framework is inadequate to the problems 
we have set out to solve. We need a broader-based analysis, a broader 
understanding, first of human motivation and behavior and second of 
how knowledge develops and evolves in an uncertain world. I have 
tried here to point out instances of other social sciences from which 
those understandings might come, and how they might be applied to the 
formulation of public policy. I believe that that is the task economists 
face today. The basic lesson that emerges from the examination of the 
Franco-Latin model of work regulation, then, is that we need to turn 
much more deliberately and self-consciously to the question of how 
to manage that discretion, to understand the sociology of such regula-
tory systems, and to draw from sociology in a more self-conscious and 
deliberate way to develop and deploy the instruments’ potential in such 
systems for supplementing the market to overcome some of the limits 
of a market economy. 
Note 
The argument of this chapter was developed in collaboration with Andrew Schrank and 
is presented in detail in our forthcoming book Root Cause Regulation. 
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The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofi t research 
organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employment-
related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the 
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in 
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn 
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during 
economic downturns. 
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemploy-
ment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications. 
Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research pro-
gram conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 2) a com-
petitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal research 
program by providing financial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a 
publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the 
research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in the field; and 
4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the 
publicly funded employment and training programs in the local area. 
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions 
to employment and unemployment problems. 
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income 
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements; 
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic devel-
opment and local labor markets. 
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